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This dissertation seeks to explore the manner in which Irish education has 
responded to recent demographic and cultural change. This will be undertaken 
through a comprehensive intratheoretical analysis of political philosophy with a 
view to identifying the difficulties that are commensurate with maintaining social 
cohesion while recognising difference in a meaningful and constructive manner. 
This analysis will then be applied to Irish educational thinking in order to locate 
the philosophical basis of Irish education and to determine its relevance to the 
cultural difference that is now becoming a defining feature of Irish society.
This dissertation is undertaken against the backdrop of an Ireland which 
still lacks a comprehensive immigration and integration policy and which is 
increasingly susceptible to market forces and neo-liberal politics. The expected 
outcomes are that while Irish education aspires towards the achievement of an 
intercultural society, there are still significant barriers to be overcome, both in the 
educational and political arenas. The dissertation will conclude with a series of 
observations that may help to inform the process and outcomes of future 
educational policy development.
Introduction
Philosophy and Irish Education
According to Drudy and Lynch (1993, p; 28) education is a central social 
institution in Ireland and in other societies because of its crucial ideological role. 
In addition, they observe that we can learn a lot about the aims and aspirations of 
Irish society, and especially about those of its most powerful interest groups, by 
examining the formal curriculum of the school. Drudy and Lynch’s observations 
provide a succinct summary of what this dissertation is about. The task of the 
dissertation subdivides into two parts. The first part is concerned with the 
analysis of the writings of some major theorists with a view to determining how 
their deliberations may impact on Irish society in general, and on Irish 
educational policy in particular. The second part is concerned with using the 
ideas of these theorists to identify and discuss the underlying philosophy within 
Irish education through the analysis of a limited selection of curriculum 
documents. This analysis will be placed in the context of the rapidly changing 
demographic profile in Ireland today in order to determine whether the 
philosophical basis within Irish educational policy meets the needs of the many 
different cultures now represented in Irish schools.
Seery (2008, p. 133) observes that there is no single ‘grand narrative’ of 
education that secures its essence and guarantees permanence and shared 
understanding. On the other hand, he also observes that neither is any language 
of education neutral with respect to metaphysical and conceptual traditions, 
social and cultural influences or structures of power, surveillance and control. 
Seery’s comments are apposite to the concerns that will be expressed in this 
dissertation and serve to unsettle any complacency in relation to either ‘grand
narratives’ or perceived neutrality in terms of the provision of education. Our 
evolving identity in the context of a multicultural society unsettles the likelihood 
of a ‘grand narrative’; while the challenges posed by the pursuit of recognition 
serve to highlight the inadequacies of a neutral stance.
Irish Identity
Traditionally, Ireland was regarded as a homogenous, integrated and 
consensual society (O’Sullivan, 2005, p. 200) and the criteria applied to Irish 
identity tended to be quite exclusive. These criteria included being “Catholic and 
Gaelic” (Tovey and Share, 2000, p. 330) and having a “stubborn devotion to 
property” (Ardagh, 1994, p. 96). Haran and Tormey (2002, p. 14) observe that 
there are many who argue against this ethnocentric vision of Irish identity and 
who have sought to achieve a more inclusive vision of what it means to be Irish. 
MacLachlan and O’Connell (2000, p. 2) observe that the “historical hallmarks” 
of the Irish psyche are changing. These hallmarks include the experiences of 
colonialism, the civil war, the Catholic Church and Ireland being a small island 
on the fringes of Europe, yet achieving great literary and artistic fame. These 
hallmarks are gradually becoming less overtly significant to our identity, yet their 
influence should not be underestimated, even today. At the same time, despite 
these residual influences, Waldron’s (2004, p. 209) observation that Irish identity 
is a “work-in-progress” is very relevant to the context of this dissertation. While 
a challenge to the more exclusive aspects of Irish identity could be deemed a 
welcome development, the uncertainty wrought by the ongoing displacement of 
the meaning of identity poses a dilemma for Irish society and for Irish education. 
In addition, Ireland’s political status as a nation-state operating out of a liberal-
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democratic perspective could be deemed to be under increasing challenge by the 
advent of a multicultural society. Also, the republican ideal, with its emphasis on 
active citizenship, becomes difficult to sustain in a society where the ‘common 
good’ becomes increasingly elusive.
Rationale
Although the Primary School Curriculum (DES, 1999) is a relatively 
recent publication, societal change in the intervening decade has called its 
relevance to current society into question. The terms 4 multicultural ism’ and 
‘interculturalism’ were almost unknown and certainly unused in Ireland up to the 
new millennium. (These two terms are not without their own hermeneutical 
difficulties and I will endeavour to distinguish between them below). Lodge, 
Devine and Deegan (2004, p. 6) outline the need to bring to the fore the realities 
of living and learning in an increasingly diverse Ireland and the role of primary 
schooling in shaping and contributing to such change. O’Sullivan (2005, p. 104) 
observes, “the increasing uses of multiculturalism and interculturalism in 
education tend to be more by way of description, aspiration, advocacy and 
legitimation than as reflexive and analytical constructs”. These observations 
provide the rationale for this study.
O’Sullivan’s comments reflect an underlying difficulty in Irish 
educational policy and practice: namely that there is a lack of clarity in relation 
to its philosophical basis. The 1992 Green Paper became a focal point for this 
lacuna (Coolahan, 1994, p. 7). However, I believe that the difficulty is not unique 
to the Green Paper. Nor, despite a concerted effort by the 1995 White Paper to 
delineate a philosophical framework, has this difficulty been resolved. There are
3
significant philosophical tensions running through later educational documents 
and these will be explored in this dissertation. My analysis of some of the major 
theorists will be undertaken with a view to addressing the philosophical lacunae 
evident in Irish educational documents. It will also demonstrate that, despite the 
impression conveyed by benign and seemingly non-controversial language, these 
documents cannot be culturally neutral.
At this juncture, it becomes apposite to clarify my own interest in this 
area. My interest emerged from my reading of the Guidelines for Intercultural 
Education in Primary Schools (DES, 2005a). Here I noticed a disjunction 
between the political and educational context of Ireland and a lack of analysis in 
relation to the impact of many different cultural groupings on school organisation 
and ethos. On this basis, I decided to subject this document to critical debate.
In order to undertake this debate, I felt that I needed to engage in an 
analysis of one of the key philosophical tensions facing theorists today: that of 
maintaining social cohesion while recognising cultural difference. I consider that 
this problem is not adequately addressed in the Guidelines for Intercultural 
Education, or in other educational documents of the preceding decade. Along 
with the Guidelines, I have chosen to include the 1999 curriculum and, in 
particular, the Social, Personal and Health Education (SPHE) curriculum in this 
analysis. This is the curricular area with which I am engaged in my professional 
life. While I believe that it has many merits, and is indicative of significant 
progress in terms of curricular design, I contend that its perspective is heavily 
weighted in favour of the ‘Self. It could be argued that this is supportive of the 
recognition of difference. This may well be the case, but, nonetheless, the 
recognition of difference could be seen to outweigh concern for social cohesion
as the excessive focus on the ‘Self renders the curriculum susceptible to the 
charge of facilitating the culture of individualism which Taylor (1991/1994) 
views as being endemic to current society.
In his 1994 essay, The Politics o f Recognition, Taylor provides a clear 
and lucid formulation of the problems that emanate from the assertion of identity 
and the quest for recognition, the main one being their potentially conflicting 
relationship with social cohesion. In doing so, he problematises the concept of 
liberalism and a liberal society. He considers Dworkin’s (1978/1984) vision of 
‘procedural’ liberalism wherein society focuses on treating everyone with equal 
respect but eschews any views on the ends of life or the good life, as being 
inadequate to the needs of a multicultural society (Taylor, 1994, pp. 92-95). He 
puts forward alternative conceptions of liberalism, ones that may help to resolve 
the tensions between the quest for recognition and the maintenance of social 
cohesion and the common good. This will be addressed in more detail in Chapter 
One. Suffice to say at this juncture that Taylor helps to enunciate the 
philosophical tensions within Irish society and Irish education.
Philosophical Tensions
The inadequacies of procedural liberalism in a rapidly changing 
demographic can be seen as an illustration of the tensions between modernity and 
postmodemity. In a society that is increasingly confronted with the impact of 
globalisation, and the consequent effects of market forces, a modernist solution 
could be viewed as somewhat ineffective. As will be seen in Chapter One, the 
adoption of a neutral political stance, ostensibly in the interests of giving a voice 
to cultural difference, also deflects attention from the impact of globalisation.
O’Sullivan (2005, p. 222) reveals the susceptibility of modernity to the effects of 
what he terms the ‘mercantile paradigm’. He contends that these effects may 
include “a narrowing of the imperatives of equality, a fragmentation of the basis 
of civil society, behaviour bereft of a social morality, and a formalist 
understanding of citizenship and democracy.” He proposes that these effects 
emerge when a society, in endeavouring to detraditionalise, uses naïve or 
unreflexive modernist appeals without quite engaging with their implications or 
contradictions (ibid, p. 223). The modernist and mercantile paradigms thus 
become unequal partners.
Here O’Sullivan reveals to us the “contradictions/limitations of 
modernity’s enlightenment legacy” (ibid, p. 222). This does not mean that he is 
rejecting enlightenment theory or modernism out of hand. However, like Taylor, 
he is critiquing one particular aspect of it. The ineffectiveness of a modernist 
perspective when confronted with the mercantile paradigm can be attributed to 
the culture of individualism that can, in turn, be interpreted as the darker side of 
the Enlightenment. ‘Being true to oneself tends to overrule any commitments to 
the public sphere. This leads to the demise of political engagement and active 
citizenship. Such demise cultivates the rise of market forces. Yet, it would be 
wrong to dismiss the phenomenon of the Enlightenment on this basis. I view the 
reflexive or authentic modernist as a significant contributor to current society.
While the Enlightenment comes in for considerable scrutiny, many of its 
principles are still relevant today and thus merit inclusion in addressing the needs 
of a multicultural society and in helping the transition from being multicultural to 
intercultural. Kant (1991, p. 54) defines Enlightenment as “man’s emergence 
from his self-incurred immaturity”. Man thus becomes imbued with the ability to
act according to his own understanding, instead of being the subject of dogmas 
and formulas. Enlightenment theory requires man to “make public use” of reason 
in all matters, so that established doctrines and mores can be challenged. The 
evolution and progress of knowledge is achieved.
One age cannot enter into an alliance on oath to put the next age 
in a position where it would be impossible for it to extend and 
correct its knowledge, particularly on such important matters, or 
to make any progress whatsoever in enlightenment. This would be 
a crime against human nature, whose original destiny lies 
precisely in such progress (Kant, 1991, p. 57).
It is difficult to be definitive about enlightenment theory as it can be 
viewed from a number of perspectives, and indeed, the fact that it evades a single 
definition reflects Kant’s vision of the progression of knowledge. For example, 
Dreyfus and Rabinow, (1987, p. 109), observe that Habermas and Foucault had 
both shared and divergent conceptions of enlightenment theory and O’Sullivan 
(2005, p. 183, referencing Outram, 1995) observes that such theory is “in no 
sense unitary”. In the context of this dissertation, enlightenment theory will be 
analysed with a view to defining its role in the context of a multicultural society.
Critique of the Enlightenment is embodied in postmodernist theory. Here, 
again, there tend to be anomalies in terms of definition. Cahoone (2003, p. 1) 
cautions avoidance of the pursuit of “a single, essential meaning applicable to all 
the term’s instances”, but concedes that it acts as a critique of Western or 
Enlightenment culture (ibid, p. 2). Postmodernism “reveals a discontinuity with 
earlier phases of the modem period, hence with the socio-cultural forms, or ideas 
and methods characteristic of modem Western culture” (ibid). Cahoone
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expresses equivocation as to whether postmodernism signals the end of 
modernity or is, instead, a “phase within the modem” (ibid). This equivocation is 
endorsed by Bauman (2000) who prefers to use the term “late modernity” to 
describe the current era.
Postmodern writers are many and varied and represent, at times, many 
conflicting viewpoints. For example, McLaren, (1994, p. 193) distances himself 
from the “spectatorial detachment of postmodern free-floating intellectuals” who 
fail to transform intellectual discourse into action. McLaren places such writers 
in the category of Tudic’ postmodernism that he views as having little 
consequence due to its lack of transformative properties. ‘Ludic’ critique 
“involves the implosion of the real into representation, the social into the 
mediascape, and exchange value into sign value” (ibid, p. 199). He places 
Derrida in this category, and, although, he is not mentioned by name, one could 
speculate that Foucault is also a candidate for such a distinction. McLaren views 
such critique as “endorsing a form of epistemological relativism that calls for a 
tolerance of a range of meanings without advocating any one of them” (ibid). 
While acknowledging McLaren’s reservations, I still consider that it will be 
useful to include Foucault and Derrida, among others, in this dissertation as their 
writings will help to illustrate the multiplicity of meaning that can be found in 
policy discourse. Foucault and Derrida help us to realise that to homogenise the 
heterogeneous elements of a multicultural society is to undermine, and perhaps 
ignore, its complexity.
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I have already referred to what will emerge as the dominant theme of this 
dissertation, namely that of maintaining social cohesion while recognising 
difference in the context of a multicultural society. The challenge here is to move 
beyond the defensive stance of asserting difference just for difference’s sake, to a 
more proactive stance of working towards the preservation of the 'common 
good’. Thus, the recognition of difference is located within the public sphere. In 
defending the cause of the public sphere, one is very likely to be accused of 
maintaining a hegemonic perspective by one or other of the heterogeneous 
groups within this sphere. Hegemony will be explored as an instrument of social 
cohesion in this dissertation and I will question whether social cohesion may 
actually exist without hegemony. In doing so, I will also question the effect 
which repeated charges of hegemony exert upon the common good.
The tension between the maintenance of social cohesion and the 
recognition of difference is a recurring theme in the educational context. Such 
tension is reflected in the statement of aims of both the 1971 and the 1999 
curricula. Both curricula are concerned with enabling the child to live a full life 
as a child and to contribute to the good of society. The development of a moral 
and ethical outlook is seen to be an essential component of the individual’s 
ability to contribute to the common good. The 1971 curriculum (citing the 
National Industrial Economic Council Report No. 16) views “religion, morality 
and ethics” as determining “the essential quality of the society and of the people 
who constitute it” (Department of Education, 1971, p. 14) and the 1999 
curriculum, although eschewing an overt reference to religion, “seeks to develop 
children spiritually and morally and to foster in each child an ethical sense that
Defining Themes
will enable him or her to acquire values on which to base choices and form 
attitudes” (DES, 1999a, p. 7). Thus, it could be argued that the freedom of 
children is to some degree constrained by the values and beliefs of the society in 
which they find themselves. This may be a reasonably unproblematic issue when 
the culture of the child and his or her family is in harmony with the culture of 
their society. It becomes problematic when there is dissonance between the two 
cultures. This becomes an increasing likelihood with the advent of different 
groups to Ireland. The recognition of difference tends to be bound up with the 
discourse of freedom or emancipation. It quickly becomes evident that there are 
many interpretations of the concept of freedom. The concept of freedom is 
addressed in Chapter One and its relationship with social cohesion, particularly 
in the context of a multicultural society, is problematised.
A Theoretical Framework
The philosophical tensions of this dissertation will be explored through 
the theoretical lens of critical theory. The interpretation of critical theory, 
traditionally associated with the Frankfurt School and thus with a universal 
perspective, will expand beyond the views of these philosophers so that 
divergent, particularistic viewpoints may be included. Kincheloe and McLaren 
(1994, p. 139) caution against reducing critical theory to discrete formulaic 
pronouncements or strategies. They advocate a broad and heuristic interpretation 
of critical theory, thus affirming the inclusion of some dissenting voices.
Guba and Lincoln (1994, p. 113) define the aim of critical theory, as “the 
critique and transformation of the social, political, cultural, economic, ethnic and 
gender structures that constrain and exploit humankind, by engagement in
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confrontation, even conflict” (original emphasis). A neo-Marxist perspective 
emerges with more flexible models of revolution presented to the reader. This 
more flexible model reaches a broad and diverse audience. The writings of 
Gramsci, for example, have proven very attractive to both the New Left 
movement of the Anglo-American world and the national liberation struggles in 
the Third World (Kearney, 1986, p. 172). In the context of education, critical 
theory “problematised both the content of education and the processes of 
influence and control within it” (Lynch, 1999, p. 10).
The theme of emancipation, particularly emancipation from the spread of 
positivism, permeates the writings of the critical theorists (Kearney, 1986, p. 2). 
In its earlier phase, critical theory was concerned with liberating the individual 
from the shackles imposed upon him or her by what Bauman (2000, p. 24) terms 
“an order-obsessed modernity”, embodied in the public sphere. Bauman contends 
that today critical theory has to contend with a converse problem, namely the 
defence of the vanishing public realm from being deserted by its citizens (ibid, p. 
39). This problem has been generated by the pursuit of unconstrained 
emancipation. That such pursuit can cause problems for social cohesion seems to 
have been overlooked. Kearney (1986, p. 175) summarises this dilemma in his 
essay on Gramsci. He observes that Gramsci viewed the work of the critical 
theorist as being two-fold: it must serve as an iconoclastic demystification of the 
old system of values and it must propose a new set o f values (emphasis added). 
In the case of some of the writers presented in this dissertation, it could be argued 
that the first task overshadowed the second, thus rendering them open to the 
charge of Mudic3 critique. Yet, the void that is left when an existing set of values 
has been overturned, must be filled in order to avoid a state of anarchy. This
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consideration will be borne in mind in the application of critical theory to 
educational discourse.
Chapters One and Two of this dissertation will explore alternative 
philosophical viewpoints through the lens of critical theory in order to identify a 
potential philosophical basis for Irish education. The pursuit and maintenance of 
social cohesion will be the main focus of Chapter One, while the recognition of 
difference will occupy Chapter Two. The two chapters could thus be viewed as 
opposing forces. However, this is not the full scenario, as the inclusion of 
Derrida’s exploration of différance serves to mitigate the sense of binary 
opposition. Chapter Three will place the theoretical framework into an Irish 
context as I consider that there is a need to provide more detail of the political 
and educational context of Ireland, before undertaking a detailed analysis of the 
chosen documents. It will become evident that the work of Irish theorists such as 
Drudy and Lynch, along with O’Sullivan, has significant links with the work of 
the theorists outlined in Chapters One and Two. Chapter Four will feature a 
systematic description, interpretation and contextualisation of the Primary 
School Curriculum (1999), while Chapter Five will feature the Guidelines for  
Intercultural Education in the Primary School (2005). The concluding section of 
the dissertation will contain a reflection on the process and some observations in 
relation to rendering future Irish educational documents more transparent in 
terms of philosophical rationale.
This dissertation is not a definitive critique of Irish educational policy. It 
merely suggests one way of engaging in such critique and highlights the potential 
contribution of some leading philosophers in this regard. Because of the fact that 
this is a tentative endeavour, I am not proposing solutions to the limitations of
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the current education system in relation to cultural difference, although I am 
making some observations in relation to how the development of future policy 
may be addressed. Also, although I challenge some of the assumptions made 
about Irish teachers and endeavour to problematise their role in meeting the 
needs posed by cultural difference, this dissertation is not proposing to identify 
and present specific problems encountered as a result of cultural difference in the 
classroom. This may be material for future research. Neither am I endeavouring 
to determine why the curricular documents were presented as they were; I am 
merely critiquing their format and discourse. To uncover the ‘why5 of their 
presentation requires a different approach, that of direct engagement with the 
curriculum designers. Again, this is material for future research.
Clarification of Two Essential Terms
Before proceeding into the main body of this dissertation, I consider it 
incumbent upon me to clarify two sets of related, yet potentially problematic 
terms. These are ‘multicultural7‘intercultural’ and ‘multiculturalism’/ 
‘interculturalism’. Within each set, the terms are sometimes used 
interchangeably. For example, Parekh (2006) eschews the use of the terms 
‘intercultural’ and ‘interculturalism’. Yet, his interpretation o f ‘multicultural’ and 
‘multiculturalism’ is, at times, close to the terms ‘intercultural’ and 
‘interculturalism’ as presented in the Guidelines for Intercultural Education in 
Primary Schools (2005). Nevertheless I consider that there are differences 
between the terms that need to be acknowledged.
Parekh (2006, p. 4) equates a multicultural society with one that 
endeavours to accommodate rather than to assimilate cultural diversity. He views
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such a society as embracing the ideology of multiculturalism. Yet such ideology 
is subject to a number of different interpretations. Fanning (2007, p. 243) states, 
“multiculturalism is a term that is employed in a number of ways to refer to a 
range of ideas and practices that relate to acknowledgement of and responses to 
social diversity”. Parekh (2002, p. 146) observes that multiculturalism draws its 
inspiration from a number of different sources and
when a writer attacks multiculturalism, we need to be on our 
guard, for he is likely to impose a false unity on a disparate and 
loosely held body of ideas, equate multiculturalism with one 
particular strand of it and end up distorting those who do not quite 
fit into his simplistic version of it.
As will be seen, a number of writers express dissatisfaction with the term 
and present it as being inadequate to the challenge of cultural difference. Bauman 
(2001, in Chapter One) and Bhabha (1990, in Chapter Two) emerge as 
particularly trenchant critics of the term. While they may be guilty of imposing a 
“false unity” on the term, their arguments are worth consideration. Bhabha 
(1990, p. 208) presents multiculturalism as an outdated concept and views it as a 
means of containing difference. Bauman (2001, p. 124) contends that the term 
‘multiculturalism’ lacks definition and instead reflects the world’s uncertainty 
about the kinds of values that deserve to be cherished and cultivated and the 
directions that should be pursued. Parekh’s observation (above) endeavours to 
shield the multiculturalist agenda from such criticism. However, Phillips (2004, 
cited by Fanning, 2007, p. 243) suggests that the term should be abandoned as it 
“is not useful, it means the wrong things....Multiculturalism suggests 
separateness...”
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Even this truncated debate of these terms demonstrates the complexities 
inherent in the terms ‘multicultural5 and ‘multiculturalism5. To obviate 
confusion, I have chosen to use the term ‘multicultural5 to represent the current 
situation in Irish society, i.e. that we are now a society of many cultures but that 
these cultures are not necessarily in harmony with, or accommodating of, each 
other. The term ‘intercultural5 is interpreted as a society that has come to terms 
with difference and in which many cultures meet and work together with a 
shared aim, namely the good of that society. To me, this latter term is more 
reflexive and proactive than the term ‘multicultural5. This intercultural society is 
more likely to be an aspirational concept and its existence in any country, Ireland 
or otherwise, remains a subject for debate.
I accept Parekh5s representation of multiculturalism yet I am also mindful 
of Bauman's and Bhabha’s interpretation of the term. Again, in order to obviate 
confusion, I will use the term ‘multiculturalism5 to represent an inadequate and 
limited response to cultural difference, and the term ‘interculturalism5 to 
represent a more concerted and deterministic response which Irwin (2009, p. 1) 
defines as seeking “to encourage.. .different perspectives to enter into 
communication and to work towards a common framework55. Irwin 
acknowledges the respective merits of both approaches but argues that one of the 
limitations of the ‘multiculturalist5 approach is that “it fosters a certain 
isolationism by allowing specific cultures to remain detached from their wider 
social and political milieu55. The Irish Times (MacCormaic, 2008, p. W2) defines 
the ideology of interculturalism as “a two way process of mutual 
accommodation, albeit starting from certain core values55. This approach to the 
dilemmas brought about by a heterogeneous society incorporates the notion of
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critical dialogue and posits the challenge of the establishment of core values from 
whence the development of a socially coherent and diverse society may develop. 
The public sphere is reinstated here. The establishment of core values will 
involve a critical reappraisal of existing cultural mores on the part of all cultures.
Conclusion
In this Introduction, I have endeavoured to provide an overview of this 
dissertation and have outlined its main tasks: namely to identify and discuss the 
philosophical tensions within current Irish educational policy through the 
application of the deliberations of a number of theorists to selected documents.
The rationale for this study emerged from a concern about the need to 
problematise the role of Irish educational policy in the context of a multicultural 
society and, more broadly, in the context of a lack of a defined philosophical 
basis in Irish educational policy. The exploration of meaning becomes the focal 
point of my deliberations. O’Sullivan (2005, pp. x-xi) observes that many 
analyses of policy issues tend to focus on their history or methodology and tend 
to be descriptive rather than analytical. He contends that while these disciplines 
have a significant contribution to make, it is not in their nature to place meaning 
at the centre of their enquiries. I aspire to fill this lacuna, albeit in a modest and 
limited way.
The underlying theme of this dissertation is the dilemma of maintaining 
social cohesion while recognising difference in the context of a multicultural 
society. Perspectives on emancipation will form a significant part of the 
argument. The associated theme of hegemony as an instrument of, or adjunct to, 
social cohesion will also be addressed, as it is a likely charge to emanate from
16
one or other grouping in a heterogeneous society. The tensions between these 
related themes will be placed in the context of Irish educational policy. The 
problems relating to the identification of a core value system to which all 
members of this society can subscribe will be addressed.
Critical theory has been identified as the theoretical lens through which 
the philosophical tensions in this dissertation will be viewed. The use of critical 
theory, particularly in the expanded sense outlined above, will serve to unsettle 
the benign and consensual tone of Irish educational policy documents and will 
endeavour to identify and confront potential areas of conflict in order to generate 
the critical dialogue required to meet the needs of a multicultural society.
I view this undertaking as a forum in which to make the case for a more 
reflexive approach to the development of educational policy documents. This 
will be undertaken so that lacunae in terms of philosophical basis can be 
challenged and anomalies between the discourse of the documents and the 
realities of a multicultural society can be seen.
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Chapter One: A Universal Approach to Social Cohesion
1.1 Introduction
McLaughlin (2003, p. 121) comments on the dilemmas faced by schools 
of “every kind, place and time” in relation to the contrasting and competing 
demands with which they are confronted in reconciling the needs of the 
individual with the overall aims and ethos of the classroom and school. He 
acknowledges that schools in plural, multicultural, liberal democratic societies 
face very specific dilemmas and concludes that these dilemmas are derived from 
the complex principles, values and practices that articulate and underpin societies 
of this kind. I believe that such dilemmas are accelerating in the Irish educational 
context. Due to our changing demographic, teachers are confronted with the 
tensions between meeting the needs of many different cultural groupings while 
endeavouring to prepare them to become active citizens. Thus helping the child 
“to live a full life as a child and to realise his or her potential as a unique 
individual” is juxtaposed with preparing him or her “to contribute to the good of 
society” (DES, 1999a, p. 7). The pursuit of these aims leads to a debate on what 
constitutes personal freedom, with a number of writers viewing adherence to 
societal norms and values to be an impediment to its realisation. The tensions 
between the maintenance of social cohesion and the recognition of difference 
thus become manifest.
The discourse of Irish educational policy tends to place more emphasis on 
the recognition of the child as an individual than on the realisation of his or her 
potential as a citizen. This can be seen in the manner in which the aims of 
education are catalogued and, in particular, in the emphasis, accorded to the 
6Self in the Social, Personal and Health Education (SPHE) curriculum. Seery
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(2008, p. 134) attributes this focus on the individual to the discourse of 
developmental psychology that has become the dominant informing discipline in 
education of the twentieth century. Within this perspective, the aims of education 
are self-realisation, the realisation of potentialities and the moral and social 
development of the individual. I view this extensive focus on the self as 
compromising the notion of harmonious co-habitation within a community. Such 
a notion is, potentially, further compromised with the advent of many different 
cultural groupings. In this chapter and the next, I wish to explore the concept of 
social cohesion with a view to determining how it can be reconciled with the 
meaningful recognition of difference. In doing so, I will also address the 
associated (or dialectical) theme of emancipation and explore its various 
interpretations. The theme (or charge) of hegemony tends to emerge as a subtext 
in the pursuit of social cohesion, and so, this consideration will be taken into 
account throughout the discussion. Essentially, I am endeavouring to highlight 
the tension between the ‘good’ and the ‘right’, a tension that, I believe, has not 
been sufficiently exposed in the discourse of Irish educational policy.
This tension is manifested in Isaiah Berlin’s (1984) exploration of the 
concept of liberty. He presents two different interpretations of the concept: 
‘Negative’ freedom is the freedom to do as one wishes without obstruction, thus 
pursuing one’s rights (Berlin, 1984, p. 16). ‘Positive’ freedom is the freedom to 
live one prescribed way of life, that of the ‘common good’ (Berlin, 1984, p. 24). 
Berlin presents the latter as a more limited concept and contends that ‘negative’ 
freedom embodied in pluralism seems to be a truer and more human ideal than 
the authoritarian structures of ‘positive’ self-mastery by classes, or peoples or the 
whole of mankind (Berlin, 1984, p. 33). Yet, it could be argued that this view of
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freedom is a catalyst for social implosion as its inherent laissez-faire approach is 
the breeding ground for inertia and disengagement from societal concerns.
This chapter presents an argument for the retention of a universal 
approach to the working of society, an approach that, while acknowledging the 
rights of individuals, retains the perspective of the common good as a foil to the 
pursuit of unconstrained emancipation. While Berlin’s ‘negative’ freedom may 
seem to be more sympathetic to the needs of a diverse society, the writers who 
feature in this chapter, with the exception of Hegel, also endeavour to address 
such needs, while still retaining a vision of social cohesion. They can thus be 
seen to be closer to the more deterministic concept of interculturalism rather than 
the more isolationist concept of multiculturalism as defined in the Introduction to 
this dissertation.
1.2 From Socrates to Sittlichkeit
Hegel is a necessary starting point for this analysis of social cohesion as 
many of the writers who are subsequently featured in this chapter derive their 
inspiration from him. In his writings, Hegel grappled with the tensions between 
the self (as embodied in Socrates) and society (as embodied in the Greek polis) 
(Singer, 2001, p. 20). While Hegel had significant reservations in relation to the 
workings of the original polis, due to the lack of critical reflection demonstrated 
by its inhabitants, he still emerges as its champion. Although he admired 
Socrates for engaging in the critical reflection that was absent from the polis, he 
ultimately endorsed his execution as he viewed Socrates as a threat to the 
cohesion of the polis. Taylor (1984, p. 179) informs us that despite Hegel’s
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admiration of Socrates, he believed that man’s true realisation of himself cannot 
occur independently of his society.
This does not mean that Hegel rejected the value of reason. On the 
contrary, as Taylor (1984, p. 179) observes, he relinquished the original concept 
of Sittlichkeit (one’s moral obligations to one’s community) as embodied by the 
Greek polls but aspired to see it reborn in a new way which would incorporate 
the role of reason (ibid). Habermas (1987a, p. 27) observes that Hegel viewed 
reason as “a force that not only differentiates and breaks apart the system of life 
conditions, but also reunites them again.” This is where Hegel successfully 
intertwines the principles of the Enlightenment with the older moral order, the 
‘great chain of Being’ that “gave meaning to the world and to the activities of 
social life” (Taylor, 1991, p. 3). For Hegel, the ‘good’ took precedence over the 
‘right’. For him, full realisation of freedom required society for the Aristotelian 
reason that a society is the minimum self-sufficient human reality (Taylor, 1984, 
p. 179). This notion of freedom contrasts with Berlin’s concept of ‘negative’ 
freedom.
The advent of critical reflection, as 'a product of enlightenment thought, 
served to accord greater recognition to the role of the individual and, 
consequently, to the ascent of individualism. Taylor (1991, p. 2) observes that the 
emergence of individualism is viewed by many as the finest achievement of 
modem civilisation. People were liberated from “a role and a station that was 
properly theirs and from which it was almost unthinkable to deviate” (ibid, p. 3). 
On the other hand, individualism has generated a break with the activities of 
social life. Here, individualism could be viewed as a threat to social cohesion.
21
The synthesis between individual and community is no longer a given. Hegel, 
however, negotiates an integration of individual and community:
In civil society each member is his own end, everything else is 
nothing to him. But except in contact with others he cannot attain 
the whole compass of his own ends, and therefore these others are 
the means to the end of the particular member
(Hegel, 1956, cited by Habermas, 1987a, p. 38).
The dialogical notion of identity becomes apparent here: “objective and 
subjective will are then reconciled and form one and the same untroubled whole” 
(Hegel, 1955, cited by Taylor, 1984, p. 186).
In serving the community, “the individual is not serving an end separate 
from him, rather he is serving a large goal which is the ground of his identity, for 
he only is the individual he is in this larger life” (Taylor, 1984, p. 182). This is all 
very well when the individual and the community are able to reach a level of 
harmony with each other. However, the converse is also possible; “this 
inescapable relation to the culture of my society does not rule out the most 
extreme alienation. This comes about when the public experience of my society 
ceases to have any meaning for me” (ibid, p. 183). In a multicultural society, 
where the likelihood of alienation looms ever larger, it is to be pondered as to 
whether the Hegelian notion of the individual in harmony with his community 
can be retained. If not, Hegel’s vision of freedom is lost and while other concepts 
of freedom may emerge, they, paradoxically, bring with them new forms of 
bondage. According to Habermas (1987a, p. 33), Hegel viewed such concepts as 
‘unfreedom’ because the unshackling power of reflection has become 
autonomous and now achieved unification only through the violence of a
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subjugating subjectivity. This ‘unfreedom’ (which equates with Berlin’s negative 
freedom) is epitomised in the dark side of individualism. This is a constant 
concern of Taylor and will be addressed in more detail below.
1.3 Universal Participation and the Recognition of Difference
Hegel’s vision of freedom is founded upon the premise of universal 
participation. But as Taylor (1984, pp. 194-195) observes, “the very size, 
complexity and inter-dependence of modem society makes this increasingly 
difficult on technical grounds alone.” In addition, “the increasing alienation in a 
society which has eroded its traditional foci of allegiance makes it harder and 
harder to achieve the basic consensus, to bring everyone to the ‘general will’ 
which is essential for radical democracy.” Short of imposing a totalitarian 
approach, mass participation is subjected to increasing challenge by the 
complexity and fragmentation of a large-scale contemporary society. This 
fragmentation leads to “the disruption of the conditions of symmetry and of the 
reciprocal dependencies of an intersubjectively constituted life-context, where 
one part isolates itself and hence also alienates all other parts from itself and their 
common life” (Habermas, 1987a, p. 29). This is the negative impact of a subject- 
centred reason. According to Habermas, this is combated by Hegel through the 
unifying power of an intersubjectivity in which the living spirit is the medium 
that founds a communality of the sort that one subject can know itself to be one 
with another subject while still remaining itself. Isolation of subjects leads to a 
disruption of communication (Habermas, 1987a, p. 30). This solution is seen by 
Taylor (1984, p. 197) as unworkable due to the fact that it is based upon 
homogenisation and thus suppresses differentiation. Taylor contends:
23
one of the great needs of the modem democratic polity is to 
recover a sense of significant differentiation so that its partial 
communities,..can become again important centres of concern 
and activity for their members in a way that connects them to the 
whole.
This is one of the challenges which interculturalism endeavours to address.
What renders Hegel’s work particularly problematic for his critics is that 
he leaves no room for alternative constructions of society. The community to 
which one has an ethical obligation is already in existence. The ‘common good’ 
has already been defined and transmitted. Habermas observes that he is operating 
out of the perspective of a presupposed ethical totality (Habermas, 1987a, p. 29, 
original emphasis). Hence, as Taylor (1984, p. 178) concludes, in Sittlichkeit 
there is no gap between what ought to be and what is, between So lien and Sein. 
This makes Hegel a target for censure by adversaries of the Enlightenment, such 
as, for example, Horkheimer and Adomo (2003, p. 160) who contend that 
enlightenment is as totalitarian as any system. Its untruth does not 
consist in what its romantic enemies have always reproached it 
for...but instead in the fact that for enlightenment the process is 
always decided from the start.
Both Habermas and Taylor recognise the potential for such critique of Hegel’s 
work. However, they avoid rejecting it on this basis and instead retain many of 
his ideas and many of the principles of the Enlightenment, albeit reshaping them 
to align more comfortably with the exigencies of difference.
In Hegel’s work, we observe that the impact of subjective reason and the 
rational world contribute to the evolution and, paradoxically, to the demise, of
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the polis. This is the conundrum with which Hegel grappled in his writings. The 
singular notion of community has become fragmented by the recognition of 
different communities within it. This poses a threat to social cohesion as these 
communities are likely to work to achieve emancipation, in the sense of Berlin’s 
negative freedom, but may ignore the interests or even the existence of a unified 
whole. On the other hand, the imposition of a universal perspective based on the 
common good may lead to a charge of hegemony.
In the remainder of this chapter, I will endeavour to build upon the 
framework provided by Hegel. I will undertake this task through the lens of 
critical theory provided by the works of Gramsci, Habermas, Taylor and 
Bauman. The discussion will focus upon both the positive and negative 
influences of enlightenment principles upon society. The works of the above- 
named authors will be employed to illustrate how enlightenment principles can 
be reformulated to meet the needs of a complex and diverse society while still 
retaining social cohesion.
1*4 On Hegemony
As observed in 1.1 above, the theme of social cohesion tends to be 
accompanied by the theme (or charge) of hegemony. This theme is explored in 
considerable detail by Gramsci who lauds the benefits of “intelligent reflection” 
as a catalyst for “social reconstruction” (Gramsci, 1988, p. 58). Gramsci supports 
his contention through the example of the influence of enlightenment thought on 
the French Revolution. The identification and the challenging of hegemony could 
be viewed as a defining moment in the process of social reconstruction. Gramsci 
describes hegemony as:
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the ‘spontaneous5 consent given by the great masses of the 
population to the general direction imposed on social life by the 
dominant fundamental group; this consent is ‘historically5 caused 
by the prestige (and consequent confidence) which the dominant 
group enjoys because of its position and function in the world of 
production (Gramsci, 1971, p. 12).
While Gramsci was significantly influenced by Marx, he did not believe that 
hegemony was defined by solely economic considerations (or by the base). In his 
view, hegemony is also defined by a ‘superstructure5 (or ethico-political history) 
embodied by apparatuses such as education, the media, law and mass culture 
(Boggs, 1976, p. 17). Gramsci views the base and superstructure operating on the 
basis of “necessary reciprocity55. This reciprocity is “nothing other than the real 
dialectical process55 (Gramsci, 1971, p. 366).
Gramsci does not dismiss the notion of hegemony out of hand. What he 
wishes to highlight is the hegemony of the dominant or governing classes who 
“constitute a willed and knowing deception55 and the suppression of the voice of 
subordinate groups who are the subjects of the deception (Gramsci, 1988, p. 
196). He views the destruction of one hegemony and the creation of another as “a 
necessary moment in the revolutionising of praxis55. He notes that, at certain 
points in history, there occurs an inevitable backlash against the ideological 
hegemony of the ruling classes as either the ruling class has failed in some major 
political undertaking or because huge masses have moved from a stage of 
political passivity to political activity and have put forward demands which, 
taken together, constitute a revolution. Thus, a ‘crisis of authority5 or a crisis of 
hegemony occurs (Gramsci, 1971, p. 210). Gramsci cautions that the conquering
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of the old system is not enough, the proletariat must also assume the power that it 
has conquered:
This revolution also presupposes the formation of a new set of 
standards, a new psychology, new ways of feeling, thinking and 
living that must be specific to the working class, that must be 
created by it, that will become ‘dominant’ when the working class 
becomes the dominant class (Gramsci, 1988, p. 70).
However, while the proletariat indeed attempted to challenge the old system of 
values, it would seem, according to Gramsci’s evaluation, that they fell short in 
terms of replacing such values. This is illustrative of a significant shortcoming in 
the writings of those who dissent from the universal perspective: namely that, in 
challenging one set of values, an alternative is not proposed. In the context of this 
dissertation, it could be argued that this is one of the limitations of the 
multiculturalist struggle. In addition, Gramsci’s writings serve to emphasise that, 
if social cohesion is to be maintained, it will be accompanied by some form of 
hegemony. What I believe Gramsci to be proposing here is that hegemony does 
not always have to be interpreted in the pejorative sense that the ‘dissenters’ tend 
to attribute to it.
1.4.1 Instruments of Hegemony
Let us look in more detail at the influences which give sustenance to 
ideological hegemony and which may subvert the achievement of meaningful 
revolution. From Gramsci’s point of view, religion emerges as a frontrunner 
here. He problematises the notion of religion and, in particular, that of the 
Catholic Church, “in the secular sense of unity of faith between a conception of 
the world and a corresponding norm of conduct” (Gramsci, 1988, pp. 327-328).
Boggs (1976, p. 43) observes that, in Italy, religious ideology performed a 
concrete political function in containing and distorting popular rebellion, for 
example, by stressing the ‘natural’ (God-given) character of existing structures 
such as private property and the family; the importance of transcendental 
commitment over everyday (‘earthly’) collective action to save the world; the 
supposed moral virtues of poverty and weakness; and the sacrosanct nature of all 
forms of established authority. Indeed, in Gramsci’s view, the words ‘ideology’ 
or ‘politics’ were acceptable substitutions for ‘religion’ (Gramsci, 1988, p. 328). 
He contends that the strength of religions, and of the Catholic Church in 
particular, lies in the fact that they feel very strongly the need for the doctrinal 
unity of the whole mass of the faithful and strive to ensure that the higher 
intellectual stratum does not get separated from the lower (ibid, p. 330). Gramsci 
concludes that religion has the upper hand over philosophy here as the current or 
‘immanentist’ philosophies, as he sees it, have not even attempted to construct a 
conception which could take the place of religion in the education of children. 
This situation still prevails today, particularly in the Irish context, and may 
explain the lacuna in terms of philosophical framework in Irish educational 
policy. The ‘ethos’ of the school may have, hitherto, been seen as an alternative 
to a formal philosophy. The issue of ethos will be addressed in more detail later 
in this dissertation.
Gramsci demonstrates conflicting and almost contradictory attitudes in 
his observations on education. It is difficult to determine whether he endorses 
education as a transmitter of the ‘grand narrative’, or the transformative potential 
of education. It could be that he is doing both. If this is the case, Gramsci could 
be seen to be both perpetuating and subverting hegemony. He endorses the
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fundamental elements in the ‘old’ primary school. These consisted of teaching 
children the rudiments of natural science and the idea of civic rights and duties 
(Gramsci, 1971, p. 33). In this school, the children were taught about the 
existence of “objective, intractable natural laws to which man must adapt himself 
if he is to master them in his turn” and also about the existence of social and 
State laws which “create that human order which historically best enables men to 
dominate the laws of nature, that is to say which most facilitates their work” 
(ibid, p. 34). It may seem here that Gramsci is endorsing the Marxist view of 
labour as an unreflective activity. He is without doubt endorsing social cohesion. 
However, endorsement of work and of social cohesion does not imply a passive 
acceptance of hegemony. On the contrary, Gramsci sees work as “the specific 
mode by which man actively participates in natural life in order to transform and 
socialise it more deeply and extensively” (ibid). Education is thus acknowledged 
as the means to liberation and transformation.
However, in his endorsement of the content and methodology of a 
traditional, classical education, Gramsci would seem to favour education as a 
transmitter of the ‘grand narrative’. His perspective on the Greek and Roman 
civilisations is a tacit acknowledgement of the Hegelian vision of society. 
Knowledge of the civilisations of the past is seen as a necessary precondition to 
knowledge of modem civilisations and, consequently, to self-knowledge 
(Gramsci, 1971, p. 37). His support of more formal methodologies would 
certainly be challenged by the more ‘progressive’ educationalists. His focus is on 
the object of education rather than the process:
In education one is dealing with children in whom one has to 
inculcate certain habits of diligence, precision, poise (even
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physical poise), ability to concentrate on specific subjects, which 
cannot be acquired without the mechanical repetition of 
disciplined and methodical acts (ibid).
According to Gramsci, these are requirements for the production of great 
scholars who are necessary to every civilisation. Gramsci deflects the charge of 
hegemony by emphasising that the creation of scholars or intellectuals is not 
confined to one social group (Gramsci, 1988, p. 301). Forgacs observes that 
much of Gramsci’s early educational thinking revolved around the problem of 
rendering working class people intellectually autonomous in the interest of 
revolution. They would no longer have to concede decision-making to the ‘career 
intellectuals’ (Forgacs, 1988, p. 53). Kearney (1986, p. 171) observes that 
Gramsci’s ‘new organic intellectual’ is neither elitist and authoritarian, nor 
servile and passive. This brings up an interesting proposition: namely that 
acknowledging the strengths of education as a transmitter of the ‘grand narrative’ 
does not necessarily imply that one has adopted a hegemonic stance.
Gramsci is concerned about the (then) emerging dominance of vocational 
schools, schools which are advocated as being democratic, but which instead 
perpetuate social difference (Gramsci, 1971, p. 40). Gramsci posits that instead 
of tailoring schooling to suit different social groups, a single type of formative 
school (primary-secondary) should be created in order to form each child as a 
person capable of “thinking, studying and ruling -  or controlling those who rule” 
(ibid). This observation has important implications for the debate on intercultural 
education. Gramsci presents a universalist rather than a particularist perspective 
here. It could be argued that the recognition of difference through modified 
programmes and expectations could lead to a new intellectual elite with the
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consequent ghettoisation of certain groups of children. Thus, the proponents of 
difference could, inadvertently, be contributing to the perpetuation of hegemony.
One can conclude in reading Gramsci’s writings that, while championing 
the cause of the marginalised, Gramsci retains a unified view of society and 
recognises the intrinsic value of the Enlightenment as the catalyst of “intelligent 
reflection” and its powerful contribution to revolution. He defends the 
Enlightenment against the “facile critics of theoretical reason” (Gramsci, 1988, p. 
58) and contends that it provided Europe with a unified consciousness sensitive 
to all the woes and misfortunes of the common people (ibid, referencing De 
Sanctis, 1868). It could be argued that this unified consciousness is still relevant 
to today’s society and to the agenda of interculturalism. In order to bring the 
universal perspective closer to the current context, I will now turn to the works of 
Habermas. I view Habermas as an essential contributor to this dissertation as he 
locates the project of critical theory within current technological society.
1.5 Reason Revisited: The Habermasian Perspective on 
Critical Theory
Habermas, while distancing himself from the more metaphysical aspects 
of Hegel’s writings, endorses his universalist stance, albeit from a more nuanced 
perspective. Habermas advocates the acceptance of society as it is and the 
seeking of change within this framework. He acknowledges the indisputable 
contribution of the Enlightenment to philosophy and, while conceding that its 
focus on reason contained many negative and repressive characteristics, he 
ultimately endeavours to defend it against its detractors. In Technology and 
Science as ‘Ideology \ he views “the secularisation and ‘disenchantment’ of
action-orienting worldviews, of cultural tradition as a whole” to be “the obverse 
of the growing 'rationality5 of social action55 (Habermas, 1971, p. 81). Yet, 
instead of renouncing current society, he advocates its retention, seeing 
technological development as corresponding to the structure of work (original 
emphasis) and
realising this, it is impossible to envisage how, as long as the 
organization of human nature does not change and as long 
therefore as we have to achieve self-preservation through social 
labour and with the aid of means that substitute for work, we 
could renounce technology, more particularly our technology, in 
favour of a qualitatively different one (ibid, p. 87).
Habermas's defence of the Enlightenment is undertaken through the 
differentiation between purposive-rational (instrumental) reason, which can be 
aligned with utilitarianism, and substantive reason embodied in the rational life- 
world (cf. 1.5.2 below). In doing so, he emerges as a formidable challenger to the 
adversaries of the Enlightenment (Horkheimer and Adorno being two significant 
examples) and presents their writing as being counterproductive to the task of 
critical theory. Habermas responds to the radical critique of the Enlightenment by 
endeavouring to replace it with a philosophy of intersubjectivity which he views 
as the facilitator of communicative action (Habermas, 1987b, p. 11). This 
philosophy encompasses “a paradigm of mutual understanding, that is, of the 
intersubjective relationship between individuals who are socialised through 
communication and reciprocally recognise one another” (Habermas, 1987a, p. 
310). This vision will be realised through a communication community “existing
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under constraints towards co-operation”, wherein consensus is pursued but not 
coerced (ibid, p. 40).
1,5.1 Challenging the Adversaries
Habermas (1987a, p. 107) presents enlightenment thought as “an 
opposition and counterforce to myth”. For him
Mythical worldviews are far from making possible rational 
orientations of action in our sense. With respect to the conditions 
for a rational conduct of life in this sense, they present an 
antithesis to the modem understanding of the world (Habermas,
1984, p. 44).
Habermas (1987a, p. I l l )  challenges the “totalised reproach” of Horkheimer and 
Adomo in relation to the Enlightenment (cf. Section 1.3 above). He contends that 
this has ensued from their presentation of validity claims as being assimilated by 
sheer power (ibid, p. 112). To Habermas, this is an incomplete and one-sided 
interpretation of the Enlightenment that overlooks the essential characteristics of 
cultural modernity (ibid, p. 114). This interpretation reduces enlightenment 
thought to the “limited horizon of purposive rationality proper to subjects 
interested in self-preservation and to self-maintaining systems” (ibid, p. 113). 
This is to acquiesce to the Marxist perspective of unreflective labour as 
sustaining social cohesion. In short, the purposive-rational viewpoint excludes 
the superstructure. In contrast, Habermas admits the superstructure as a means of 
resisting “this inclination towards a social regression of reason” (ibid). The 
superstructure is embodied in “the formation of expert cultures, within which 
carefully articulated spheres of validity help the claims to propositional truth, 
normative rightness and authenticity, attain their own logic” (ibid, original
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emphasis). Habermas contends that, if thinking is undertaken independent of 
validity claims, contradiction and criticism lose their meaning. “To contradict, to 
negate, now has only the sense of “wanting to be different” (ibid, p. 124, original 
emphasis). This is insufficient rationale for critique as there needs to be a 
demonstration of “why it is false or incorrect or bad to recognise the sovereignty 
of the ideals of science and universalistic morality, which are inimical to life” 
(ibid, p. 125). Here, I believe that Habermas is endorsing Gramsci’s perspective 
and is levelling an implicit criticism at those writers who endeavour to challenge 
social cohesion through the process of deconstruction, but who equally fail to 
provide alternative solutions.
Habermas effectively demonstrates that Horkheimer and Adorno’s 
critique of the Enlightenment has its roots in a one-sided interpretation of the 
latter, namely that the sciences themselves have been absorbed by instrumental 
reason and
that reason has been driven out of morality and law because, with 
the collapse of religious-metaphysical world views, all normative 
standards have lost their credit before the single remaining 
authority -  science (ibid, p. 111).
As observed above, Habermas does not endeavour to refute the claims of 
Horkheimer and Adorno by negating the significance of science and technology. 
Instead he problematises the relationship between what he terms ‘purposive 
rationality’ or the world of science and technology and what he terms the ‘life- 
world’ or the world of communicative action.
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1,5,2 Purposive rationality and the life-world
According to Habermas (1971, p. 90), the difficulty which accompanies 
the advent of science and technology lies in determining in “a categorically 
precise manner the meaning of the expansion of the rational form of science and 
technology, i.e. the rationality embodied in systems of purposive-rational action, 
to the proportions of a life-form, of the ‘historical totality’ of a life-world.” 
Instead of rejecting the instrumentalism of purposive rationality out of hand, 
Habermas instead endeavours to present the purposive-rational world and the 
life-world as (potentially) complementary rather than opposing concepts. While 
purposive-rational action provides us with skills, the communicative action of the 
life-world us with the “binding consensual norms which define reciprocal 
expectations about behaviour and which must be understood and recognized by 
at least two acting subjects” (Habermas, 1971, p. 92). He contends that for 
society to operate successfully, both of these processes (the systemic and the 
social), need to be interwoven but yet differentiated. Failure to differentiate co­
ordination of action by systemic means, from co-ordination in terms of social 
integration, results in the ‘hermeneutic paradox’ (Habermas, 1987b, p. 164).
Habermas emphasises that for the merger between systemic and social 
processes in society to work, purposive-rational action must remain subordinate 
to the institutional framework or the superstructure of society (Habermas, 1971, 
p. 95). However, politics is now aimed almost exclusively at the elimination of 
technical problems (ibid, p. 103). This has contributed to the demise of 
interaction, as the normative order (a function of communicative action oriented 
to shared cultural meaning and presupposing the internalisation of values), is 
supplanted by conditioned behaviour (ibid, p. 107). One form of hegemony
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replaces another. The latter form of hegemony is evident particularly “in the 
areas of putative subjective freedom (such as electoral, consumer and leisure 
behaviour)” (ibid, p. 107, original parenthesis). The maintenance of the status 
quo has been achieved by securing the loyalty of the masses through reward 
rather than through repression. This lessens the likelihood of revolt. Gleeson 
(2004, p. 109) places the domination of the technical paradigm within the domain 
of Irish education and reiterates Habermas’s observation on the elimination of 
problems.
1.5.3 Class and Cultural Tensions
Habermas then extends his argument to include a specific focus on 
difference. While he looks at class difference, his comments are relevant to the 
context of cultural difference also. He observes that reducing the likelihood of 
revolt does not mean that class conflict has been eliminated; instead it has 
become latent. “Class distinctions persist in the form of subcultural traditions and 
corresponding differences not only in the standard of living and life style but also 
in political attitude” (Habermas, 1971, p. 109). He provides a concrete example 
of class tension by referring to racial conflict in the United States. Tensions can 
become so acute that in certain areas “explosions resembling civil war can 
occur”. Habermas contends that these revolts, despite their sometimes tragic 
consequences, have little long term impact unless they are connected with protest 
potential from other sectors of society, namely privileged groups (ibid). Here he 
is implicitly referring to the isolationist problematic of a solely multiculturalist 
agenda. The role of critical pedagogy with its potential for political action 
becomes apparent.
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In some ways, the subtleties of “soft despotism” (Taylor, 1991, p. 10, cf.
1.7.1 below) render life even more difficult for the marginalised. There is no 
longer an overt coercive force that must be combated. The depoliticisation of the 
masses through the media of reward and excess render them immune and even 
oblivious to the plight of the marginalised. Habermas contends that 
underprivileged groups do not of themselves constitute a social class nor do they 
even potentially represent the mass of the population (Habermas, 1971, p. 110). 
Therefore, class struggle as embodied by the proletariat will not occur, as there is 
no common unifying force. The case for a universal approach to social cohesion 
comes into sharp relief here. Habermas observes that underprivileged groups are 
in themselves quite diverse and thus do not unite in the interest of combating 
their situations. In many cases, they are competing against each other and in the 
words of Bauman (1997, p. 29) “the weak meet and confront the weak”. Bauman 
concludes that such confrontations, when occurring between indigenous and non- 
indigenous groups, can provide the basis for racism. Both Habermas and Bauman 
are signalling the problems inherent in the pursuit of recognition. This is given 
considerable attention by Taylor.
1.6 Recognising Difference, Maintaining Social Cohesion
Taylor (1994, p. 75) observes that the demand for recognition is a 
significant feature “in what is today called the politics of ‘multiculturalism’”. His 
placement of the term ‘multiculturalism’ within quotation marks serves to 
demonstrate the potential for confusion in the term. Taylor is concerned about 
the impact of differentiation on social cohesion. His concerns with the 
fragmentation in society are a recurrent theme throughout his work and, although
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ultimately, he does not agree with Hegel, his writings certainly re-echo many of 
Hegel’s propositions. While implicitly acknowledging the negative impact of 
hegemony, he retains a unified worldview, although Bauman (2001, p. 77) 
disputes this espousal of universality and presents Taylor as prioritising the 
concept of self-realisation. I contest Bauman’s contention and view Taylor as 
being ultimately concerned with the maintenance of social cohesion. The need to 
maintain an underpinning moral order in society, despite the flaws associated 
with such order, is vigorously defended in his work.
Taylor is constantly endeavouring to reconcile the tension between the 
individual and the polity. While acknowledging the “undoubted primacy of the 
individual in modem Western culture” (Taylor, 2004, p. 64), he also expresses a 
type of nostalgia for “older moral horizons” (Taylor, 1991, p. 3). References to a 
cosmic order in which humans were accorded a specific place, while ultimately, 
and perhaps reluctantly, dismissed, emerge often enough to convince the reader 
that such a concept is significant to Taylor. He constantly reminds us of the 
‘bigger picture’ that is society. Following de Tocqueville (and Hegel), Taylor 
expresses concern in relation to the demise of a heroic dimension in life due to 
the loss of the cosmic perspective. “People no longer have a sense of a higher 
purpose, of something worth dying for” (ibid, p. 4). This higher purpose was an 
intrinsic feature of the Greek polis. In it, the ends of the individual are overruled 
by those of the State. However, as observed in section 1.2 above, a commitment 
to society can be undermined by a sense of alienation.
When alienation from the community occurs, “men have to turn 
elsewhere to define what is centrally important to them” (Taylor, 1984, p. 186). 
Sometimes they turn to another society or a religious community. However,
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increasingly “they strike out on their own and define their identity as 
individuals”. This is the product of Enlightenment thinking but it becomes 
problematic when community commitments are sidelined or even ignored. This 
is an increasing likelihood in a multicultural society. Taylor observes that 
language, and the related set of distinctions underlying our experience and 
interpretation, is something that can only grow in and be sustained by a 
community. He contends that an immigrant population cannot fully live their 
culture and are always forced to take on something of the ways of the new 
society they have entered. The life of a language and culture is larger than that of 
the individual (ibid, p. 182). The challenge is to include immigrant populations 
within the existing culture so that the sense of alienation is at least reduced if not 
eliminated. The interpretation of language is, according to Taylor, a significant 
element in shaping our experience and this has a lot to do with the terms that are 
available to us (ibid, p. 183). The issue of language will be addressed in more 
detail in the analysis of educational documents, in Chapters Four and Five. The 
deconstruction of the language therein will help to determine the extent to which 
Irish educational policy includes, or excludes, immigrant populations.
L 6.1 Taylor’s Liberalism
From a political perspective, Taylor retains many of the principles of 
liberalism in that he endorses freedom of choice and the pursuit of self-fulfilment 
(Taylor, 1994, p. 77). This is consistent with the achievement of authenticity. For 
Taylor the pursuit of self-fulfilment occurs within the backdrop of the polis and 
citizenship. Ultimately, one is expected to act for the common good. What is 
problematic for Taylor is that the pursuit of self-fulfilment is now being 
undertaken independently of the common good and discussions about what
39
constitutes the good life (or the common good) are “banished to the margins of 
political debate” (Taylor, 1991, p. 18). Referencing Dworkin, he differentiates 
between ‘substantive’ liberalism, which incorporates a vision of the good life 
towards which people should strive, and ‘procedural’ liberalism, which has no 
particular substantive view about the ends of life and instead focuses upon 
treating people with equal respect (Taylor, 1994, p. 92). Taylor aligns himself 
with the former view.
The substantive view of liberalism, with its focus on the common good, 
operates on the basis of equality of rights for all citizens. Yet, for the proponents 
of cultural difference this is insufficient to their needs as it does not take account 
of cultural distinctness (ibid, p. 89) and is, in fact, the reflection of one 
hegemonic culture (ibid, p. 85). This form of liberalism is seen to accord 
only a very restricted acknowledgement of distinct cultural 
identities. The notion that any of the standard schedules of rights 
might apply differently in one cultural context than they do in 
another, that their application might have to take account of 
different collective goals, is considered quite unacceptable 
(ibid, p. 89).
Procedural liberalism would seem to be more accommodating of difference as 
there are no particular ends in this view of liberalism; instead, it “understands 
human dignity to consist largely in autonomy, that is, in the ability of each 
person to determine for himself or herself a view of the good life” (ibid, p. 92). 
Consequently, this view of liberalism cannot accommodate publicly espoused 
notions of the good (ibid, p. 93). Taylor disagrees with this view of liberalism 
and contends that collective goals can, in fact, be aligned with liberalism:
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A society with strong collective goals can be liberal, in this view, 
provided that it also is capable of respecting diversity, especially 
when dealing with those who do not share its common goals; and 
provided it can offer adequate safeguards for fundamental rights 
(ibid, p. 94).
In this way, liberalism can be cleared of the charge of hegemony as the 
recognition of difference is an inherent element of the concept. While Taylor is 
supportive of this “hospitable variant” of liberalism, he is not without 
reservations and emphasises that liberalism cannot and should not claim 
complete cultural neutrality (ibid, p. 95). The “liberalism of neutrality” views the 
good life as “what each individual seeks in his or her own way, and governments 
would be lacking in impartiality and thus in equal respect for all citizens, if it 
took sides in this question” (Taylor, 1991, p. 18).
I am proposing here that Taylor’s appellation of the “liberalism of 
neutrality” could be replaced by the appellation of neo-liberalism as the 
characteristics of the latter are represented in the ‘hands-off, non-interventionist 
depiction of the State. Taylor concludes that just as more rigid forms of 
liberalism merit challenge, so too does this ‘hospitable variant’ (Taylor, 1994, p. 
95). He acknowledges the challenges posed by multicultural societies and the 
sense of awkwardness generated by those who may call into question our 
philosophical boundaries. The challenge, as he sees it, is to deal with their sense 
of marginalisation without compromising our basic philosophical principles 
(ibid, p. 96). Taylor refutes the implied premise of the multicultural agenda that 
we owe equal respect to all cultures and states that while openness to the 
potential value of different cultures is a valid demand, the acknowledgement of
41
this value cannot be taken as a foregone conclusion (ibid, pp. 97-99). Taylor 
concludes that difference alone cannot be the ground for the according of equal 
value (Taylor, 1991, p. 51) and “ a favourable judgement on demand is 
nonsense” (Taylor, 1994, p. 100). He attributes such sentiments mainly to 
Foucault and Derrida and observes that they amount not to respect, but rather to 
condescension (ibid). I contend that this type of recognition is an impediment to 
interculturalism. Taylor proposes that, instead of granting recognition on 
demand, we should base this recognition on “some standards of value on which 
the identities concerned check out as equal” (Taylor, 1991, p. 52).
1.6.2 ‘Toleration’ and ‘Celebration’
I wish to extend Taylor’s notion of condescension here. Bauman (1997, p. 
28) adds a significant observation to this perspective. He contends that attitudes 
to strangers are manifested according to the stratum of society to which one 
belongs. To those who are secure in terms of personal safety, financial 
circumstances and occupation, the stranger is somewhat of a novelty, offering 
new experiences and perhaps more significantly, undertaking tasks and services 
which are avoided by the indigenous population. Also, the groups who emit this 
attitude are the dominant groups in society; the groups who have imposed their 
own form of hegemony and who, in bestowing this level of ‘acceptance’ to 
strangers, remain secure that their hegemony will not be threatened. This is the 
group who ‘tolerates’ and even ‘celebrates’ diversity, as long as it is something 
that is experienced on their terms. Such ‘toleration’ and ‘celebration’ are, in my 
view, acts of condescension. In addition, Bauman observes that
toleration of difference may well be wedded to the flat refusal of 
solidarity, monologic discourse, rather than giving way to a
dialogic one, will be split into a series of soliloquies, with the 
speakers no more insisting on being heard, but refusing to listen 
into the bargain (Bauman, 1997, p. 81).
This re-echoes Habermas’s contentions (see 1.5.3 above) in relation to the 
limited impact or even likelihood of revolt unless various sectors of society unite.
Habermas (2006, p. 197) states that for ‘tolerance’ to refute the above 
charges, it must be based on the principle of reciprocity, with a universal 
determination of what can and cannot be tolerated. “Everyone who could be 
affected by the future practice must first voluntarily agree on those conditions 
under which they wish to exercise mutual toleration”. Habermas thus 
demonstrates that the enjoyment of cultural rights does not come “free of 
charge”. Members of discriminated groups cannot benefit from a morality of 
equal inclusion without themselves making this morality their own (ibid, p. 205). 
If minority groups view tolerance as a gift of which they are only the recipients 
and not the benefactors, the paternalistic characteristics of the concept of 
tolerance will be perpetuated. If this is the case, tolerance will remain the 
prerogative of the privileged sectors of the indigenous population as not all strata 
of the indigenous population can afford to bestow such ‘blessings’ on strangers.
Bauman (1997, p. 29) identifies two very different and unsatisfactory 
reactions to the advent of different cultures. The first “rejoice in the variety of 
guests and pride themselves on their open minds and open doors, the second 
gnash their teeth at the thought of lost purity.” To present the indigenous 
population as a united front working together in the interest of ‘celebrating’ 
cultural difference is to present a one-sided hegemonic viewpoint, a viewpoint 
which obscures reality. I think that this is a very important point and one to
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which I will return in my analysis of educational documents, as the viewpoints of 
those most likely to be threatened by the advent of a multicultural society do not 
really feature in the optimistic aspirations of the documents.
I wish to acknowledge at this juncture that the ‘celebration’ of difference 
is viewed as a progression from the concept of tolerance by critics of the liberal 
tradition, for whom liberalism is an insufficient modus vivendi for contemporary 
society. I refer, in particular, to the works of Haran and Tormey (2002) and 
Baker, Lynch, Cantillon and Walsh (2004). While Baker et al. align themselves 
with the concept of celebration, they also acknowledge the need for such 
celebration to be accompanied by critical assessment (Baker, et al., 2004, p. 35). 
Without this understanding of celebration, it becomes a tokenistic gesture, 
manifested by those least likely to be affected by the advent of different cultural 
groups. As will be seen in the analysis undertaken in this dissertation, the word 
‘celebration’ is used in the documents under scrutiny. However, it is not 
accompanied by the caveat of critical dialogue or analysis.
1.7 Preserving the Whole
For Taylor, the working of society is based on a unified perspective 
encompassing the moral ideal and, in consequence, he contends,
it is reasonable to suppose that cultures that have provided the 
horizon of meaning for large numbers of human beings of diverse 
characters and temperaments, over a long period of time -  that 
have, in other words, articulated their sense of the good, the holy, 
the admirable -  are almost certain to have something that deserves
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our admiration and respect, even if it is accompanied by much that 
we have to abhor and reject (Taylor, 1994, p. 101).
This is the modem order as we know it. Yet, Taylor contends that the modem 
order, although entrenched, or because entrenched, still awakens much resistance 
(Taylor, 2004, p. 82). Once again, Foucault and Derrida, along with Nietzsche, 
are identified as key protagonists in such resistance (Taylor, 1994, p. 100). 
Taylor contends that the process of deconstruction of values is a key factor in the 
rise of anthropocentrism as “it leaves the agent...with a sense of untrammelled 
power and freedom before a world that imposes no standards, ready to enjoy 
‘free play’, or to indulge in an aesthetics of the self’ (Taylor, 1991, p. 61). 
Nevertheless, despite Taylor’s antipathy towards the proponents of 
deconstruction, I consider that their inclusion in this dissertation will serve to 
mobilise our thinking in relation to the issue of social cohesion and possibly 
unseat any complacencies we have in this regard.
Taylor outlines how the rise of anthropocentrism has generated a new 
dilemma in society, namely the disappearance of the public sphere. This dilemma 
has been referred to in the Introduction to this dissertation. In some ways the 
disappearance of the public sphere may be viewed by some as welcome, as its 
demise could be viewed to lead to the demise of hegemony. Yet, as previously 
noted, hegemony can appear in many guises and its ultimate demise may not be 
achievable or even desirable. Taylor (2004, pp. 83-99) provides an outline of the 
public sphere that can be effectively linked with Gramsci’s outline of civil 
society (the ethico-political sphere). Taylor consigns what he terms an 
‘extrapoliticaT status to the public sphere. It is defined as “a locus in which 
rational views are elaborated that should guide government” (ibid, p. 89).
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Although it differs in significant ways from the Greek polis, it still mirrors the 
notion of community involvement and citizenship. Yet there are many new 
considerations to be taken into account when analysing what constitutes the 
public sphere. Citing Warner (1990), Taylor observes that the rise of the [new] 
public sphere “involves a breach in the old idea of a social order undivided by 
conflict and difference”. Instead it acts as a catalyst for debate, “involving in 
principle everybody” (Taylor, 2004, p. 90). The old unity of the social order 
disintegrates in its wake; however, this is replaced by a new unity (ibid, pp. 90- 
91). Implicit in Taylor’s remarks here, is the admission of, at the very least, the 
possibility of hegemony. In his observation that the debate involves everyone in 
principle, he appears to be conceding that this does not necessarily occur in 
reality. Also, his comments on ‘soft despotism’ (cf. 1.7.1 below) signal a belief 
that hegemony may be construed as a still dominant force in society. However, 
this does not necessarily align him with the Gramscian notion of hegemony.
L  7.1 Hegemony by imposition, Hegemony by choice
Where Taylor and Gramsci diverge, is in their explanations for the 
perpetuation of hegemony in society. Gramsci is concerned with the false 
consciousness of the masses, which led them to mobilisation against oppression 
but which ultimately resulted in them being manipulated by the new system. 
They were aware of hegemonic forces and sufficiently concerned to revolt 
against them, but did not succeed in liberating themselves from the shackles of a 
dominant force, possibly due to a lack of an alternative worldview. However, the 
public sphere was a definitive influence at this juncture. Taylor, on the other 
hand, presents a scenario where the individual reigns supreme and where 
hegemony should, by consequence, recede. However, it exists almost as a
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conscious choice of the masses. Following de Tocqueville, he delineates the 
phenomenon of ‘soft despotism’, which he views as a fundamentally modem 
problem. Here, control is still in the hands of an oligarchy, not as a result of 
tyranny or oppression, but as a result of the self-absorption of the individual 
(Taylor, 1991, p. 9). Participation in the public sphere is minimal and the 
individual “is left alone in the face of the vast bureaucratic state and feels, 
correctly, powerless” (ibid, p. 10). In this scenario, hegemony could be seen to 
occur as a consequence of unconstrained emancipation as opposed to a quest for 
social cohesion.
Powerlessness as a result of diminished participation in the public sphere 
has contributed to what Gramsci (1988, p. 201) terms ‘conjunctural’ movements. 
These movements give rise to political criticism of a minor, day-to-day character 
but which has little far-reaching historical significance. Taylor develops this 
perspective. He contends that the anthropocentrism of modem society has had 
the inevitable result of rendering its people increasingly less capable of forming a 
common purpose and of carrying it out (Taylor, 1991, p. 112). They may well be 
capable of engaging in small-scale political activities (conjunctural), but they 
tend to have a local rather than a global impact. Small scale participation (or non­
participation) in political activity, leads to a sense of being incapable of 
participation, which leads to further non-participation and so a vicious circle is 
created (ibid, p. 113). This accords greater power to the global elites whose 
freedom to move depends to a very great extent on the locals’ inability or 
unwillingness to get their act together (Bauman, 2001, p. 105). Here again, the 
spectre of neo-liberalism looms large. It would seem that the more 
disengagement that occurs in society, the more the global elites will benefit. In
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the context of educational policy, two considerations emerge from these 
deliberations. The first is the extent to which the child is prepared for political 
awareness and activism so that he or she can pursue the common good. The 
second is the effect of differentiation on the formation of a common purpose. As 
I observed above, the domination of the discourse of developmental psychology 
does not necessarily synthesise with the formation of a common purpose or 
pursuit of the common good.
Taylor advocates the formation of a common democratic purpose in order 
to counteract the fragmentation that results from the pursuit of one’s rights at any 
cost and without taking cognisance of the effects of such action on the whole 
(Taylor, 1991, p. 117). Taylor contends that the only way to address the cultural 
struggle of current society is, rather than according indiscriminate recognition 
based on an ideology of relativism, to promote the politics of democratic 
empowerment (ibid, p. 118). Such politics are based upon effective community 
action that can be achieved through devolved power to communities that are 
already acknowledged as such by their members (ibid, p. 119). I acknowledge 
later in this dissertation that what O’Sullivan (2005, p. 113) terms “the 
majoritarian tendencies of democracy” are not without their problems, 
particularly in a society where citizenship, and thus the right to vote, is denied to 
many of its population. Notwithstanding this consideration, Taylor’s 
deliberations merit attention. Taylor concludes by cautioning us that the many- 
faceted and complex debates which are required for democratic empowerment 
must take account of what is great in modernity as well as what is shallow or 
dangerous (Taylor, 1991, p. 120). This dual focus on modernity is one that many
of the postmodernist writers choose to ignore. Their concerns lie with pursuing 
the rights of the individual and with challenging the modem order.
The works of Bauman can be seen to endorse those that have been 
analysed throughout this chapter, as they engage in a trenchant defence of the 
modem order. I acknowledge that he takes a limited view of multiculturalism, in 
that he sees it as an indeterminate concept with no clear direction in relation to 
values or social cohesion (Bauman, 2001, p. 124). Parekh, in particular, would 
take issue with his view and counsels against imposing a false unity on a 
disparate set of ideas (Parekh, 2002, p. 140). As will be seen in the Conclusion of 
this dissertation, Parekh himself successfully aligns multiculturalism with a 
substantive view of liberalism. Despite this caveat to Bauman’s theses, I believe 
that his observations on current society resonate effectively with the argument 
presented hitherto.
1.8 On Bauman: The Separation of Human Rights from Social 
Cohesion
The pursuit of one’s rights at any cost unsettles the notion of community 
and undermines the concept of social justice based upon the principles of 
equality. Bauman (2001, p. 74) contends that, in the new postmodern version of 
community, social justice has been replaced by human rights as the yardstick by 
which to establish acceptable forms of cohabitation. Here, the ‘right’ has taken 
precedence over the ‘good’. The concept of human rights is open-ended and 
constantly subject to redefinition and the setting of ever new battleffonts and 
dividing lines, as more and more claims to recognition occur (ibid, p. 75). The 
concept aligns with postmodern uncertainty. Friedman (cited by Bauman, 2001,
49
p. 75) observes that with the decline of modernism, all we are left with is simply 
difference and its accumulation. This echoes Habermas’s comments on the 
limitations of contradiction and criticism independent of validity claims. Bauman 
suggests locating the issue of recognition within the framework of social justice 
rather than self-realisation. In this framework demands for recognition in the 
name of equality become a fertile ground for mutual engagement and meaningful 
dialogue. This may lead eventually to a new unity, indeed a widening rather than 
a cutting down, of the scope of ‘ethical community’ (ibid, p. 78). He thus aligns 
himself with Taylor’s substantive liberalism. However, as observed above, he 
seems to misread Taylor in that he places him in the camp of self-realisation 
(ibid, p. 77), whereas Taylor’s concerns about individualism would seem to 
distance him from this perspective.
The task of critical theory has thus become redefined. A new form of 
emancipation is being sought. Here, instead of denouncing the public sphere, it 
seeks instead to relocate the individual within it, thus reconnecting him/her to the 
public policy agenda. This task is open to criticism by those advocating above all 
the recognition of difference, as they would see it as being dismissive of the 
human rights agenda due to public policy being defined by the dominant group in 
society. Yet, to focus on human rights independently of society is to render the 
latter susceptible to a form of anarchy, which, in its own way, poses more threat 
to it than the shackles imposed by the forces of production and enlightenment 
principles. Bauman contends that the “yawning gap between the rights of self- 
assertion and the capacity to control the social settings which render such self- 
assertion feasible or unrealistic seems to be the main contradiction of fluid 
modernity” (Bauman, 2000, p. 38). This contradiction tends to feature in some
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multicultural discourse and will become evident in the analysis of Irish 
educational documents.
h 8.1 Communitarianism and Multicommunitarianism
The concept of community may well serve to bridge the gap between 
rampant individualism and the exigencies of the public sphere as embodied in the 
Greek polis, Rorty (1991, p. 13) urges,
whatever good the ideas of “objectivity” and “transcendence” 
have done for our culture can be attained equally well by the idea 
of a community which strives after both intersubjective agreement 
and novelty -  a democratic, progressive pluralist community....
Rorty considers questions relating to community to be political rather than 
metaphysical or epistemological. Yet the achievement of intersubjectivity or 
solidarity is a difficult challenge, as there tends to be little common ground 
between groups. What exists instead is a series of individual, separated 
communities without a common allegiance. This is likely to lead to, at best, 
‘conjuncturaT movements. Bauman (2001, p. 128) likens these communities to 
‘swarms’ who act in a co-ordinated, but not an integrated manner. In such a 
scenario, communal cultures may live alongside one another but they seldom talk 
to each other. To subscribe to this is to deny all participants the benefits of a 
shared life (ibid, p. 135). Multiculturalism (as Bauman interprets it) is 
transformed into multicommunitarianism (ibid, p. 141). Such an outcome falls 
short of the critical dialogue and shared values implicit in the intercultural 
agenda. The issues of dialogue and shared values will be explored in more detail 
in subsequent chapters.
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1.9 The Habermasian Solution
Bauman (2001, p. 139) contends that recognition of difference should 
occur within the Habermasian framework of the democratic constitutional state. 
The constitutional state or autonomous society does not necessarily resolve the 
issue of conflicting community and individual rights “but it does make evident 
that without democratic practice by free-to-self-assert individuals”, the issue 
cannot be addressed. This requires a universal perspective in which “discussion 
about a shared conception of the good and a desired form of life that is 
acknowledged to be authentic” (Habermas, 1994, cited by Bauman, 2001, p. 140) 
is situated. Universality of humanity does not stand in opposition to pluralism, 
“but the test of truly universal humanity is its ability to accommodate pluralism 
and make pluralism serve the cause of humanity” (Bauman, 2001, p. 140). Only 
in this scenario, can Habermas’s discussion of the good be facilitated.
Such debate, as that envisaged by Habermas, is hampered by the current 
preoccupation with ‘political correctness’. While its intentions are laudable, it is 
also an effective means of eliminating all constructive debate in relation to 
difference. Bauman observes that, if attention is focused on civility and political 
correctness in encounters with difference, it will absolutise the difference and bar 
all debate about the relative virtues and demerits of coexisting forms of life. 
(Bauman, 2001, p. 106). Bauman contends that the implicit message is that we 
will acknowledge difference just for its own sake, but that all debate is to be put 
out of bounds in case it is aimed at reconciling extant differences, so that the 
overall standards binding human life can be raised.
Bauman attributes a subversive element to this elimination of debate, 
namely that debate does not really serve current global economic interests (ibid,
p. 105). Thus, the assertion of difference for its own sake is detrimental to the 
interests of those asserting the difference. This is an issue overlooked by many of 
those promoting the cause of multiculturalism. Bauman observes that the liberal 
face of multiculturalism hides an essentially conservative force, as its effect is 
the recasting of inequalities, which are unlikely to command public approval, as 
‘‘cultural differences’ - something to cherish and obey. “The moral ugliness of 
deprivation is miraculously reincarnated as the aesthetic beauty of cultural 
variety” (ibid, p. 107). This is to succumb to a neo-liberal agenda as this 
metamorphosis obviates the need for public expenditure to address social 
inequalities. Thus, the multicultural agenda achieves virtually nothing for its 
proponents unless it is discussed within the framework of social justice wherein 
redistribution of goods serves to support and render meaningful the quest for 
recognition. Again I acknowledge that not all proponents of the multiculturalist 
agenda eschew the social justice agenda and, again, Parekh is notable here.
However, if the assertion of difference remains just that, it is doomed to 
failure by what Bauman (2001, p. 81) terms the “callous indifference of 
disengagement”. In modem society, the notion of engagement is becoming 
anachronistic. Instead people are left to their own devices, being managed at a 
distance and seduced by economic rewards that will contribute to their individual 
happiness (ibid, p. 129). Bauman views the ideology of multiculturalism as a 
way of adjusting the role of the learning classes to these new realities (ibid, p. 
133). More alarmingly, it grants the right to be indifferent along with the right to 
be different (ibid, p. 135). In such a scenario, different communities may coexist 
but their indifference to each other obviates any opportunity for shared dialogue.
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In this chapter, it has been observed that the universal perspective on 
social cohesion, while acknowledging and welcoming the advent of a 
multicultural society, does not demonstrate boundless or gratuitous acceptance of 
the concept of difference. While the metaphysical nature of Hegel’s writings is, 
to a greater or lesser degree, circumvented by the more recent theorists, many of 
his ideas re-emerge in their writings. A universal set of values is acknowledged 
by all to be the rubric of social cohesion. The almost inevitable charge of 
hegemony can be levelled at the defence of universalism; a charge that the 
theorists referred to in this chapter may well find difficult to refute. In fact, 
Gramsci makes overt acknowledgement of the unavoidable existence of some 
form of hegemony in society.
Hegel could be viewed as championing the transmission of long-standing 
values, the maintenance of social order and, by default, hegemony, and the 
prioritisation of the state over the individual. The recognition of different cultures 
or social groupings did not feature in his vision of society. In this chapter, the 
‘‘presupposed ethical totality” of his worldview has been subjected to scrutiny, 
evaluation and modification.
Gramsci explores the impact of the base and the superstructure on society 
and sees the potential for hegemony in both. However, perhaps controversially, 
he concedes that one form of hegemony will inevitably be replaced by another. 
He acknowledges the need for subordinate classes to revolt against oppression, 
but that in revolting against one set of values, they must have formulated another 
set to replace them. This contention is implicit in the theses of the other writers in 
this chapter also. In other words, there is not much point in revolution if one
1.10 Conclusion
54
cannot address the aftermath. Gramsci’s views on education could be viewed as 
anachronistic and hegemonic. However, careful reading demonstrates that one 
does not have to break with traditional forms of content and methodology in 
order to highlight and address the causes of the marginalised. In fact, although 
his ideas may be disputed by the ‘progressive’ educationalists, he imbues his 
view of education with transformative potential. An intellectual elite is created in 
every stratum of society through the dissemination of a single programme of 
education in which each child is challenged and accorded the possibility of 
becoming part of the governing class. Differentiation is discouraged as it is seen 
as restrictive and divisive. Thus, Gramsci, like the other writers featured in this 
chapter, eschews the claim to recognition of difference just for its own sake.
Habermas expands on Gramsci’s account of the impact of the base and 
the superstructure on society and places them in a more contemporary context. 
The benefits of market forces, embodied in ‘purposive rationality’, are 
acknowledged. However, Habermas recognises the need to ensure that the base 
remains subordinate to the superstructure or the life-world, something that is 
becoming less evident in contemporary society. If this trend is to continue, 
Horkheimer and Adorno’s version of the Enlightenment will come to fruition 
with the resultant implosion of society. Habermas views the superstructure as the 
means of engaging in a meaningful quest for truth. For him, criticism of society 
must extend beyond simply fulfilling the wish to be different. Asserting 
difference in a directionless manner does little for the cause of interculturalism. 
This assertion is developed by Taylor and Bauman.
Taylor is constantly struggling with the need to recognise difference and 
the need to maintain social cohesion. While sympathetic to the causes of
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minority groups and aware of the negative impact of nonrecognition or 
misrecognition, Taylor refuses to concede to the potential fragmentation of 
society that may result from a gratuitous acknowledgement and acceptance of 
difference. His writings help us to reflect on the meanings and implications of 
liberalism, particularly in relation to the common good. While espousing a 
‘hospitable variant’ of liberalism, he distances himself from adopting a neutral or 
laissez-faire stance. He laments the disappearance of the public sphere in society 
and trenchantly defends the need for a moral order, reluctantly stopping short of 
imbuing this with metaphysical characteristics. While Bauman may see him as 
veering more towards self-realisation, I contend that Taylor ultimately retains a 
universalistic viewpoint and cautions us that the adoption of a liberal perspective 
may not always defend the cause of social cohesion.
Bauman expands on Taylor’s view and engages in a trenchant defence of 
the common good. He adopts a sceptical if not cynical view of the concept of 
multiculturalism, seeing it as simply a moniker for non-intervention and for the 
abandonment of social order. This may be overly derisory, yet his concerns are 
worthy of consideration. Like Gramsci, Habermas and Taylor, Bauman decries 
the gratuitous assertion of difference and contends that it is actually 
counterproductive to the cause of those who are marginalised in society. He 
contends that the social inequalities that accompany assertions of difference need 
to be addressed in order for the assertion to have any meaning or effect. 
However, he takes the argument a step further by observing that the 
acknowledgement of difference as something to be celebrated in society, 
removes the onus from those in power to address its problems. This perpetuates 
indifference and removes the possibility of shared dialogue among communities.
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The writers in this chapter demonstrate awareness of the threat to the 
public sphere from the assertion of difference without consideration of social 
cohesion. They consequently maintain a universal focus in the interest of 
maintaining cohesion. The universal focus has been subjected to significant 
challenge by other theorists as they deem it an instrument in the marginalisation 
and exclusion of some groups in society. In order to maintain a balanced 
perspective in this dissertation, I am now about to include some dissenters from 
universalism into this theoretical framework.
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Chapter Two: Deconstructing the Universal Perspective: 
Dissenting Voices
2.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, I endeavoured to address the complexities of 
maintaining social cohesion in an increasingly diverse society. This was 
undertaken through the use of the theoretical lens of critical theory, which in its 
purest form, takes its inspiration from Hegel. The writings of some of the 
protagonists of the Frankfurt School were employed to facilitate this task. The 
Frankfurt School distanced itself from traditional metaphysics while, in some 
instances, retaining a nostalgia for some of its precepts. Yet, even within the 
Frankfurt School, opposing or dissonant voices were heard. The voice of 
dissonance becomes more acute if we expand the definition of critical theory to 
include other writers who extended the concept and the pursuit of emancipation 
and who engaged in a more trenchant rejection of, and detachment from, 
traditional Western metaphysics. This extended version of critical theory is 
needed in order to undertake a rigorous and balanced interrogation of educational 
policy and to obviate a charge of ideological bias.
Adherence to a Hegelian or neo-Hegelian, and thus universalist, 
perspective brings with it the risk of being charged with an ideological bias and, 
in doing so, of excluding the voices of the marginalised. McLaren (1994, p. 205) 
provides a detailed account of what he terms “the politics of signification” and, 
drawing upon the writings of Teresa Ebert, outlines how “our current ways of 
seeing and acting are being disciplined for us through forms of signification, that 
is, through modes of intelligibility and ideological frames of sense making”. The
adoption of an intercultural perspective does not necessarily shield us from the 
charge of ideological bias. Irwin (2009, p. 2) while adopting the term 
‘intercultural ism’ in favour of that of ‘multiculturalism’, cautions us that “there is 
a real possibility that an emphasis on dialogue and communication between 
cultures can all too easily become distorted into a majority demand that minority 
cultures conform to the overarching ‘essential’ identity”. Thus, a need to present 
an alternative argument to the universalist perspective becomes evident. Kearney 
observes, “it is the critical duty of philosophy to explore and interrogate other, 
and perhaps hitherto, undisclosed, dimensions of existence and truth” (Kearney, 
1984, p. 9, following Marcuse, original emphasis). Therefore I am turning to two 
notable critics of universalism, namely Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida. 
Both writers are concerned with what is singular and contingent in life and call 
attention to those who do not conform to one ‘essential’ identity. In addition, I 
am including the voice of Homi Bhabha, as I consider that his comments on 
cultural difference complement the theses of Foucault and Derrida and lend 
themselves in a more specific manner to the tensions within this dissertation.
In exploring the works of these writers, I will expand upon the notion of 
critical theory as presented in Chapter One to include a postmodernist, or more 
specifically, a poststructuralist, perspective. Postmoderist social theory dismisses 
the conviction that knowledge is knowledge only if it reflects the world as it 
“really” exists in favour of a view in which reality is socially constructed or 
semiotically posited (Kincheloe and McLaren, 1994, p. 143). Poststructuralist 
theory focuses more specifically on power, not simply as one aspect of a society 
but as the basis of society (ibid, p. 145). This theory “offers very different ways 
of looking at and beyond the obvious and puts different sorts of questions on the
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agenda for change” (Ball, 1994, p. 2). Since educational policy is shaped by 
political power relations (Sugrue, 2004, p. 168), the need to include a 
poststructuralist focus in this dissertation becomes apparent. The inclusion of 
Foucault, Derrida and Bhabha will serve to obviate the reductionism and the 
pursuit of certainties inherent in Western metaphysics. In this chapter, I will 
endeavour to demonstrate how the emancipatory motives of the poststructuralists 
impact upon the pursuit of social cohesion and upon the ideology of 
interculturalism.
2*2 Foucault’s Genealogy
The diversity of Foucault’s writings provides fertile ground from which a 
multiplicity of themes can be developed. His dissociation from metaphysics is 
well documented in his writings not only by virtue of their content but also of the 
design and method employed in his critique. For him, “criticism is not 
transcendental, and its goal is not that of making a metaphysics possible: it is 
genealogical in its design and archaeological in its method” (Foucault, 1991a, p. 
46). He views history not as a metaphysical concept, imposing its own 
4 Egyptian ism’, but as a privileged instrument of genealogy on condition that it 
refuses the “certainty of absolutes” (Foucault, 2003, p. 246). Foucault outlines 
the fallibility of the concept of social order as a political undertaking and 
identifies the real political task in society as that of criticising “the working of 
institutions which appear to be both neutral and independent; to criticise them in 
such a manner that the political violence which has always exercised itself 
obscurely through them will be unmasked, so that one can fight them” (Foucault,
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1974, cited by Rabinow, 1991, p. 6). For Foucault, order is not something that 
can be imposed externally, but is
at one and the same time that which is given in things as their 
inner law, the hidden network that determines the way they 
confront one another, and also, that which has no existence except 
in the grid created by a glance, an examination, a language; and it 
is only in the blank spaces of this grid that order manifests itself in 
depth as though already there, waiting in silence for the moment 
of its expression (Foucault, 1989a, p. xxi).
Like the critical theorists discussed in Chapter One, Foucault does not 
limit his critique of society to formal institutions like the Law or the State. He 
also targets the more subtle methods of power which are embodied in ‘The 
Norm’ or ‘Normalisation’. For Foucault, normalisation acts as a mechanism for 
differentiation, hierarchization, homogenisation and exclusion and is “irreducible 
in its principles and functioning to the traditional penalty of the law” (Foucault, 
1991b, p. 183), which, in turn, “permits the perpetual instigation of new 
dominations and the staging of meticulously repeated scenes of violence” 
(Foucault, 2003, p. 246). The law, an instrument of social cohesion, has been 
redefined as a violent means of social control, the latter term tending to invade 
the meaning of the former.
Foucault rejects an ontological interpretation of the development of 
humanity and instead views it as resulting from “substitutions, displacements, 
disguised conquests and systematic reversals” (Foucault, 2003, p. 246). Here, I 
view Foucault’s genealogical approach as being close to Derrida’s assemblage 
which suggests a bringing-together which “has the structure of an interlacing, a
weaving, or a web, which would allow the different threads and different lines of 
sense or force to separate again, as well as being ready to bind others together” 
(Derrida, 2003, p. 226).
Foucault’s genealogy questions the realm of the universal in terms of its 
accommodation of “what is singular, contingent and the product of arbitrary 
constraints” (Foucault, 1991a, p. 45). While he agrees that government is 
primarily concerned with men (sic), he presents these concerns as a bringing 
together or assemblage of other significant factors and their consequent impact 
on men:
the things which the government is to be concerned about are 
men, but men in their relations, their links, their imbrication with 
those other things which are wealth, resources, means of 
subsistence, the territory with its specific qualities, climate, 
irrigation, fertility, etc.; men in their relation to that other kind of 
things which are customs, habits, ways of doing and thinking, etc.; 
lastly, men in their relation to that other kind of things again 
which are accidents and misfortunes such as famine, epidemics, 
death, etc. (Foucault, 1979, p. 11).
Here, Foucault is also encapsulating Lefebvre’s (1947) concept of 
‘everyday life’ (Irwin, 2009, pp. 8-12) and just as Irwin argues that Lefebvre’s 
preoccupation with the everyday accords him significance in the interculturalism 
debate, so too, could this argument be extended to Foucault. (Indeed, I 
acknowledge that the term 6assemblage’ is more usually associated with 
Lefebvre and Gilles Deleuze).
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Foucault may be aligned with Gramsci as he emerges as a significant 
challenger of hegemony. However, as observed by Rabinow (1991, p. 13), 
Foucault is resolutely and consistently anti-Hegelian and anti-Marxist, a 
categorisation that cannot be applied to Gramsci. Smart (1986, pp. 158-159) 
contends that Foucault’s work “may be read as providing a radically different 
approach and a new set of concepts through which to develop analysis and 
understanding of the exercise of power and the associated effects of hegemony in 
modem societies”. For Foucault,
criticism is no longer going to be practiced in the search for 
formal structures with universal value, but rather as a historical 
investigation into the events that have led us to constitute 
ourselves and to recognise ourselves as subjects of what we are 
doing, thinking, saying (Foucault, 1991a, p. 46).
While Foucault can be linked to Gramsci in relation to the challenge of 
hegemony, it can be seen that he takes a more radical stance than the latter in 
relation to the forces of social cohesion. Gramsci and the other writers in the 
previous chapter have all indicated that there are boundaries beyond which they 
will not go. Foucault on the other hand seeks “to give a new impetus...to the 
undefined work of freedom” (ibid). He envisages “a philosophical life in which 
the critique of what we are is at one and the same time the historical analysis of 
the limits that are imposed on us and an experiment with the possibilities of 
going beyond them” (ibid, p. 50).
2,2.1 Challenging Hegemony
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I view Foucault’s main preoccupation as that of giving a voice to those 
who have been marginalised. His extensive corpus illustrates that 
marginalisation, in various guises, has been a consistent feature of society. It also 
illustrates that marginalisation is an instrument of hegemony. In Madness and 
Civilisation, Foucault demonstrates how communication between the madman 
and the man of reason is silenced. Dialogue with the madman is broken off and 
“all those stammered, imperfect words without fixed syntax”, in which the 
exchange between madness and reason occurs are thrust into oblivion (Foucault, 
1989b, p. xii). Oppression thus becomes manifest through its silence. Only the 
language of the dominant group, in this instance, the psychiatrists, is heard. The 
madman becomes marginalised and confinement within the Hôpital Général is 
the embodiment of his marginalisation. Foucault observes that in a relatively 
short period of time, “confinement had become the abusive amalgam of 
heterogeneous elements” (ibid, p. 41). He questions why this is so and concludes 
that a social sensibility must have taken root across Europe that “suddenly 
isolated the category destined to populate the places of confinement” (ibid, p.
42). He acknowledges that, to our eyes, this group is strangely mixed and 
confused, comprising an undifferentiated mass of beggars, disbanded soldiers or 
deserters, unemployed workers, impoverished students and the sick (ibid, pp. 42-
43). Foucault contends, “what is for us merely an undifferentiated sensibility, 
must have been, for those living in the classical age, a clearly articulated 
perception” (ibid, p. 42). Foucault extends this theme in Discipline and Punish, 
wherein the high wall of the prison becomes “the monotonous figure, at once 
material and symbolic, of the power to punish” (Foucault, 1991b, p. 116). Again,
2.2.2 On Marginalisation
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difference (of crime and of criminal in this instance) is reduced to the “grey, 
uniform penalty” of imprisonment (ibid, p. 117).
The ‘undifferentiated sensibility’ referred to above can be linked 
specifically to cultural difference. In today’s society, there is a tendency to refer 
to 4 multicultural ism’ as if one were referring to one homogenous group, when in 
fact there are many different layers and groups in a multicultural society. As 
demonstrated in Chapter One, Bauman (2001) outlines the inadequacies of the 
term and contends that it is indicative of a limited response to cultural difference. 
Bhabha (1990, p. 208) observes that while multiculturalism can be viewed as 
entertaining and encouraging cultural diversity, it also seeks to contain it. Thus, 
the charge of amalgamating heterogeneous elements, as levelled by Foucault, 
may still be applicable today and it is a consideration of which we should be 
aware when engaging in discussions on multiculturalism and interculturalism. 
That is why I have chosen to differentiate between the two terms.
2.2.3 On Education
In Discipline and Punish, using the Lancaster method as a model, 
Foucault demonstrates how education is a continued, repeated process wherein 
“the school became a machine for learning, in which each pupil, each level and 
each moment, if  correctly combined, were permanently utilised in the general 
process of teaching” (Foucault, 1991b, p. 165). Education was based on the 
process of Stimulus/Response: “the order does not need to be explained or 
formulated; it must trigger off the required behaviour and that is enough” (ibid, 
p. 166). Education forms part of a complex and chronological machine that 
maintains control over a nation. This machine could be embodied in the forces of 
the military or the forces of labour (ibid, p. 165). Whatever machine it
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contributes to, it is evident from Foucault’s outline that critical reflection or 
dialogue does not form part of this education. Education is transmitted to the 
children who provide the appropriate response to a series of codified signals. 
This scenario corresponds with Freire’s ‘banking’ concept of education, “in 
which the scope of action allowed to the students extends only as far as 
receiving, filing and storing the deposits” and in as meek a manner as possible 
(Freire, 1972, pp. 45-46).
Gramsci’s outline of the vocational school mirrors Foucault’s depiction 
of the Lancaster method. The vocational school allows the labourer to become a 
skilled worker or the peasant a surveyor or petty agronomist. However, it tends 
“to restrict recruitment to the technically qualified governing stratum, in a social 
and political context which makes it increasingly difficult for ‘personal initiative’ 
to acquire such skills and technical-political preparation” (Gramsci, 1971, pp. 40- 
41). A hierarchical system of social control is thus maintained. Yet Gramsci also 
acknowledges the less attractive aspects of the educational process as intrinsic 
parts of the formation of the child:
Many people have to be persuaded that studying too is a job, and a 
very tiring one with its own particular apprenticeship -  involving 
muscles and nerves as well as intellect. It is a process of 
adaptation, a habit acquired with effort, tedium and even suffering 
(ibid, p. 42).
It can be concluded here that Foucault and Gramsci diverge significantly on the 
actual process of education. Gramsci can be viewed as presenting a more 
conciliatory attitude to the process, whereas Foucault seeks to reveal what he 
views as its intrinsic power imbalance.
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Foucault’s observations on transformation, although not written in the 
context of education, merit consideration here. In Discipline and Punish, 
Foucault outlines the developments of the penal system and its reformative as 
well as punitive aspects. The reformative aspect of the penal system was 
designed to bring about the transformation of the individual. Many 
characteristics of this aspect of punishment mirror Foucault’s observations on 
education: time-tables, compulsory movements, regular activities, solitary 
meditation, work in common, silence, application, respect, good habits (Foucault, 
1991b, p. 128). This is undertaken with a view to shaping the obedient, ‘docile’ 
subject who is less likely to threaten the cohesion of the society in which he is 
located. All of this serves the interests of those in power who focus on “changing 
the consciousness of the oppressed, not the situation which oppresses them” 
(Simone de Beauvoir 1963, cited by Freire, 1972, p. 47). Freire observes that the 
oppressed are regarded as the pathology of the healthy society, who must 
therefore be ‘integrated’, ‘incorporated’ into the healthy society that they have 
‘forsaken’ (Freire, 1972, p. 48). Thus, both Foucault and Freire identify that the 
process of transformation needs to be relocated from the individual to society; a 
society that, in their view, manifests many characteristics of ill-health; 
characteristics which they see as being perpetuated by the existing social order.
2.2,4 The Location and the Unearthing of Knowledge and Meaning
Foucault’s genealogy acts as a foil to the universalist perspective and to 
the notion that meaning and understanding have remained steadfast throughout 
the centuries. He views meaning as constantly reinventing itself and as being the 
product of many and diverse sources. Meaning is obtained through the process of 
genealogy which “rejects the metahistorical deployment of ideal significations
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and indefinite teleologies” and “opposes itself to the search for ‘origin’” 
(Foucault, 2003 p. 242). Instead, it must seek the singularity of events in “the 
most unpromising of places... in sentiments, love, conscience, instincts” (ibid, p. 
241). Genealogy finds at the historical beginning of things not the inviolable 
identity of their origin but the dissention of other things and thus disparity (ibid, 
p. 243). Thus, according to Foucault:
The purpose of history, guided by genealogy, is not to discover 
the roots of our identity, but to commit itself to its dissipation. It 
does not seek to define our unique threshold of emergence, the 
homeland to which metaphysicians promise a return, it seeks to 
make visible all of those discontinuities that cross us (ibid, p.250).
In short, as observed by Ball, (1994, p. 4), “genealogy identifies and 
counterpoints antagonistic discourses -  the dominant and the silenced, the 
‘truthful5 and the illegitimate”.
Having thus identified where meaning can be found, it is important to 
know how to unearth it. Foucault responds to this dilemma by providing us with 
the archaeological method. For “the problem is no longer one of tradition, of 
tracing a line, but one of division, of limits; it is no longer one of lasting 
foundations, but one of transformations that serve as new foundations, the 
rebuilding of foundations” (Foucault, 1989c, p. 6).
The focal point of this problem is the document. Foucault acknowledges 
that the document was also the focal point of linear and continuous analysis. 
However, now the approach to the document has changed: “history now 
organises the document, divides it up, distributes it, orders it, arranges it in 
levels, establishes series, distinguishes between what is relevant and what is not,
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discovers elements, defines unities, describes relations” (ibid, p. 7). Documents 
are no longer inert materials, instead they are evolving, organic structures with 
the potential for transformation into monuments by means of an archaeological 
approach (ibid, p. 8). Foucault transposes the incongruities, uncertainties and 
fallibilities of this approach into his own writing. “Hence the cautious, stumbling 
manner of this text: at every turn, it stands back, measures up what is before it, 
gropes towards its limits, stumbles against what it does not mean and digs pits to 
mark out its own path” (ibid, p. 18). The vagaries of this method will become 
more apparent both to the reader and myself as I attempt to analyse the discourse 
of Irish educational policy later in this dissertation.
2.2 .5  Limitations of Foucault
Rabinow (1991, p. 22) observes that while Foucault exhorts us to 
challenge the power of the state and thus to reform society, the general practical 
implications of this challenge have not been explored by him to any great extent 
in his writings. This is a limitation of Foucault, one to which many of his critics 
return from time to time (Rorty, 1986, 1991; Couzens-Hoy, 1986; Taylor, 1991; 
et al.). Ashenden (1999, p. 159) defends Foucault from his detractors by 
observing that rather than searching for universally valid criteria of justice, 
Foucault suggests the more modest approach of giving an account of what we 
are, of the relationships that constitute and circumscribe us. Ashenden contends, 
this is not to dismiss normative questions but to suggest that in so 
far as genealogies bring our modes of acting upon ourselves and 
others into relief, this is already to question what we are and to 
open space in which to reflect critically on what we might become 
(ibid).
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Ashenden’s defence strengthens the rationale for the inclusion of Foucault in this 
dissertation as it endorses the reflexivity that his approach brings to analysis.
2 3  The Derridean Challenge to ‘Logocentrism’.
Foucault, following Baudelaire, criticises modernity for Zeroizing’ the 
present (Foucault, 1991a, p. 40). This critique is taken up and expanded upon by 
Derrida. He undertakes this task in his undermining of the ‘logocentrism’ of 
Western metaphysics. Kearney (1986, p. 114) observes that one of the motivating 
impulses of his work has been to disrupt all univocal classifications and fixed 
identities which he sees as symptomatic of the logocentric bias of Western 
thinking -  the compulsion to have a central place for everything and to reduce 
everything to this central place. The logic of the argument leads the way, while 
everything else is consigned to the periphery as mere rhetoric or ornamentation 
(Caputo, 1997, p. 83). According to Caputo, Derrida viewed logocentrism as 
privileging the philosophy of Plato. As the focal point of this dissertation is the 
document, Derrida’s rejection of logocentrism, in the specific context of the 
elevation of speech over writing, is relevant to the analysis. Derrida believed that 
the traditional supplementary role occupied by writing in relation to speech 
resulted in writing carrying out the task of veiling or hiding or encrypting itself 
throughout history. Its role was servile, becoming “the instrument of an abusive 
power, of a caste of ‘intellectuals’ that is thus ensuring hegemony, whether its 
own or that of special interests...” (Derrida, 1998, p. 55). Derrida endeavoured to 
challenge this servile role in many of his texts, one of the most influential being 
his essay ‘Differance ’ (Derrida, 1968/2003).
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Here, the metaphysical prestige of the logos is subverted by the operation 
of différance (Kearney, 1986, p. 119) as, in changing the spelling to 
accommodate duality of meaning (to differ; to delay), Derrida is according 
priority to writing over speech as the change can only be seen in writing (the ‘a’ 
being silent in speech). Derrida informs us that writing is considered subversive 
in that it creates a spatial and temporal distance between the author and the 
reader; it presupposes the absence of the author and so we can never be sure 
exactly what is meant by a written text; it can have a multiplicity of meanings as 
opposed to a single unifying one (Derrida, 1984, p. 116). Thus, writing can no 
longer be seen as an auxiliary or an ancillary to speech (Derrida, 1998, p. 51) and 
the relationship between writing and power is thrown into relief.
Différance assumes a liberating quality; the bringing together of an 
assemblage of uses for the word or concept (although Derrida contends that it is 
neither) of différance in its new spelling (Derrida, 2003, p. 226). Writing is no 
longer. confined to the transmission of a set of ideas. It is no longer the 
prerogative of those who hold power. Instead, the multiplicity of meaning that 
can be drawn from a document bears witness to the transformative powers within 
writing itself. “The a of différance, therefore, is not heard; it remains silent, 
secret and discrete, like a tomb. It is a tomb that (provided one knows how to 
decipher its legend) is not far from signalling the death of the king” (ibid). Here I 
view Derrida as signalling a challenge to the reign of universality, of 
metaphysics, and the emergence of singularity and contingency. This occurs 
through the process of deconstruction. In a later commentary, Derrida observes, 
the very meaning and mission of deconstruction is to show that 
things -  texts, institutions, traditions, societies, beliefs and
71
practices of whatever size and sort you need -  do not have 
definable meanings and determinable missions, that they are 
always more than any mission would impose, that they exceed the 
boundaries they currently occupy (Derrida, 1994, cited by Caputo,
1997, p. 31).
Thus, deconstruction is, for Derrida, “an affirmation of the other, a precursorial 
way to make way for the invention of the other” (Caputo, 1997, p. 103).
Derrida demonstrates that differance does not lend itself to binary 
oppositions. It does not require us to choose a sensible or intelligible 
interpretation. In fact, we must resist this opposition as differance refers neither 
to the voice nor to writing. Differance undermines modernity’s ‘heroizing’ of the 
present as it cannot be exposed and thus does not become present (Derrida, 2003, 
p. 227). Derrida contends instead that differance encompasses and inevitably 
surpasses onto-theology or philosophy (ibid, p. 228). “We thus interrogate the 
limit that has always constrained us...to form the sense of being in general as 
presence or absence, in the categories of being or beingness” (ibid, p. 230). 
Derrida later expands upon the difficulties in translating the term as “it is neither 
this nor that; but rather this and that (e.g. the act of differing and deferring) 
without being reducible to a dialectical logic either, [and thus] cannot be 
defined... within the logocentric system of philosophy” (Derrida, 1984, pp. 110- 
111).
Differance is distinguishable by its disorder and thus challenges the 
linearity that tends to be associated with the rational order. Derrida informs us 
that his thesis “will not be developed simply as a philosophical discourse that 
operates on the basis of a principle, of postulates, axioms and definitions and that
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moves according to the discursive line of a rational order”(Derrida, 2003, p. 
228). He is thus imploding the notion of cohesion and the certainties proposed by 
metaphysics. Derrida does not, however, advocate an absolute rupture with 
metaphysics. Indeed, he observes that differance has profound affinities with 
Hegelian speech, but that despite these affinities, “it can, at a certain point, not 
exactly break with it, but rather work a sort of displacement with regard to it” 
(ibid, p. 232).
2.3.1 Challenging Metaphysics
Drawing upon Nietzsche, Derrida enunciates one of the key criticisms of 
[Western metaphysical] philosophy, namely that it comprises active indifference 
to difference (Derrida, 2003, p. 234). This is one of the charges that may be 
levelled at a universal perspective, although I have endeavoured in Chapter One 
to counter this charge. Derrida is not unaware of the inherent difficulties of his 
challenge to metaphysics. The existence of Being “has always made ‘sense’, has 
always been conceived or spoken of as such”, however “differance [is] ‘older’ 
than the ontological difference or the truth of Being” (ibid, p. 237). It thus 
predates the arche and thus Derrida is “reinscribing our truths and principles 
within the an-arche of differance, attaching to them a co-efficient of 
‘contingency(Caputo, 1997, p. 102). Differance is not contained within 
boundaries and thus “there is no support to be found and no depth to be had for 
this bottomless chessboard where being is set in play” (Derrida, 2003, p. 237). 
Here, I view Derrida as removing the ‘bottom line’ implicit or explicit in the 
writings of the theorists in Chapter One. We thus have to cope with an 
irrepressible iterability that can never be contained or decisively regulated 
(Caputo, 1997, p. 102). We must venture beyond our own logos, that is, we must
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confront “a différance so violent that it refuses to be stopped and examined as the 
epochality of Being and ontological difference” (Derrida, 2003, p. 237). This is 
neither to give up this passage through the truth of Being, nor is it 
in any way to “criticize”, “contest” or fail to recognize the 
incessant necessity for it. On the contrary, we must stay within the 
difficulty of this passage; we must repeat this passage in a 
rigorous reading of metaphysics, wherever metaphysics serves as 
the norm of Western speech, and not only in the texts of “the 
history of philosophy” (ibid).
Here, Derrida is acknowledging the magnitude of the metaphysical 
influence and the difficulties inherent in confronting it. While problematising 
metaphysics, he does not provide a conception of “what stands opposed to the 
text of Western metaphysics” and concedes, “différance remains a metaphysical 
name; and all the names that it receives from our language are still, so far as they 
are names, metaphysical” (ibid, p. 239). Thus “we are still in metaphysics in the 
special sense that we are in a determinate language” (Derrida, 1984, p. I l l ,  
original emphasis). Yet, we are exhorted to move on from the nostalgia (original 
emphasis) of metaphysics as we must accept that there is no unique or finite 
name, not even the name of Being. Instead the name “must be conceived outside 
the myth of the purely maternal or paternal language belonging to the lost 
fatherland of thought” (Derrida, 2003, p. 240). This is the task of deconstruction, 
a task that does not necessarily lead to resolution but instead reveals the aporias 
(or irresolvable contradictions) of texts (Thomassen, 2006, p. 5).
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23.2 The Community as a means of Social Cohesion
In the previous chapter, I outlined how the concept of community remains 
quite tenuous and how it may, perhaps mistakenly, be viewed as the panacea for 
the demise of citizenship. Through exploring the treatises of Taylor and Bauman, 
it became evident that such a solution is not without its problems. Derrida also 
demonstrates the potential tensions within the concept and cautions us to avoid 
viewing ‘community’ as being synonymous with ‘harmony’:
If by community one implies as is often the case, a harmonious 
group, consensus and fundamental agreement beneath the 
phenomena of discord or war, then I don’t believe in it very much 
and I sense in it as much threat as promise (Derrida, 1995, cited 
byCaputo, 1997, p. 107).
Caputo, in his analysis of Derrida, allies the word community with the 
word ‘communio’ in the sense of military formation whose purpose was to 
defend a city against the stranger or foreigner (Caputo, 1997, p. 108). There are 
visible parallels with Foucault here, although whereas here the majority or 
dominant group remain within the walls of the city and those marginalised 
remain without, for Foucault it was those marginalised who were confined within 
the walls of the Hôpital Général or the prison. Bhabha’s views on confinement 
of difference (cf. 2.4.3 below) are also relevant here. Caputo makes the very 
obvious but perhaps overlooked point in relation to communities: they always 
have an inside and an outside (ibid). This is something that we need to bear in 
mind when advocating the establishment or re-establishment of communities as a 
means to active citizenship and thus to social cohesion.
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Caputo observes that “what alerts and alarms Derrida about the form of 
association described by the word “community” is that, while the word sounds 
like something warm and comforting, the very notion is built around a defence 
that a “we” throws up against the “other” (ibid, p. 113). This is to mask the 
potentially conservative force of community under the guise of liberalism. I have 
already outlined a similar reservation of Bauman (2001, in Chapter One) in 
relation to the liberal face of multiculturalism. Caputo contends that 
deconstruction is the opposite of community “since deconstruction is the 
preparation for the incoming of the other, 6open5 and 'porous5 to the other55 (ibid, 
p. 108). However, community finds itself in an almost impossible conundrum: if 
it is too welcoming, it loses its identity; if it keeps its identity, it becomes 
unwelcoming (ibid, p. 113). Thus, deconstruction may help us to acknowledge 
difference but we may get no further as it may also reveal the impossibility of 
resolving the difficulty of accommodating difference within unity, a 
contradiction that Foucault also failed to resolve. Such is an example of aporia.
2.3.3 Derrida’s Response to the Concept o f Tolerance
In Chapter One, I outlined what I believe to be significant limitations in 
relation to the concept of tolerance. Here, I drew upon the work of Habermas and 
Bauman. Derrida also expresses reservations and mistrust of the concept and 
views it as a manifestation of power. His deliberations on tolerance are 
epitomised in his representation of hospitality. Derrida challenges the positivity 
that tends to be attached to both of these concepts and reveals them to be more 
complex constructs, with less positive undercurrents. His essay 6Hostipitality’ 
reveals many facets and contradictions of the concept of hospitality. Like the 
concept of 4 differance \ it eschews the assertion of an alternative worldview and
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instead provides us with a similar middle voice of undecidability as that provided 
by 6 differance
In linking the word ‘hospitality’ with its German equivalent, Wirtbarkeit, 
Derrida reveals to us the assertion of power that accompanies the exercise of 
hospitality. The patron of a house (Der Wirt) is the master “who defines the 
conditions of hospitality or welcome; where consequently there can be no 
unconditional welcome, no unconditional passage through the door” (Derrida, 
2006, p. 210). Derrida views the formalisation of a law of hospitality as violently 
imposing a contradiction on the very concept of hospitality, in that there are 
conditions imposed on the guest before he can accept the hospitality of the patron 
(ibid, p. 211). The threshold of the host is symbolic of the contract that is implicit 
between the host and the guest. Here, I view Derrida as using the concept of 
hospitality to symbolise the ‘bottom line’ that was erased by différance. Yet in 
delineating this ‘bottom line’, Derrida quickly erases it again by contending that 
hospitality is “not a present being” (ibid, p. 216). He concludes that hospitality 
has to extend beyond hospitality in order to reveal its essential meaning. It needs 
to extend beyond the ‘bottom line’ of the threshold in order to avoid being 
confused with hostility (ibid, pp. 226-227). Derrida’s deconstruction of 
hospitality serves to illustrate the tensions within the concept of tolerance. The 
latter concept also contains the conditionality inherent in hospitality. The image 
of the benevolent but yet exacting patron is common to both concepts. While 
‘tolerance’ and ‘hospitality’ seem to endorse the principles of interculturalism, 
Derrida has effectively unearthed the potential for hegemony within these 
concepts and, like both Habermas and Bauman in Chapter One, cautions us 
against complacency in using these terms. Yet, I feel compelled to add here, as a
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rejoinder to Derrida, that I am unsure about the survival of society without the 
imposition of some conditions.
2,3.4 Deferring Interpretation
It is evident from this brief and limited outline of Derrida’s work, that to 
view him as rejecting the universal out of hand, would be to misinterpret him. 
Ultimately, I see him as endeavouring to unsettle the universal perspective out of 
a certain complacency that it has amassed throughout the centuries. Derrida 
views “the privilege granted to unity, to totality, to organic ensembles, to 
community as a homogenised whole” as “a danger for responsibility, for 
decision, for ethics, for politics” (Derrida, 1997, p. 13). However this does not 
imply that we have to choose between unity and multiplicity. Indeed pure unity 
or pure multiplicity “is a synonym of death” (ibid). Thus we need to defer our 
interpretations and instead be mindful of their plurality, occupying a middle 
voice between unity and multiplicity. Derrida contends that a plurality of 
perspectives and of interpretations is essential to the workings of a state. This 
plurality is unearthed by the process of deconstruction (ibid, p. 15). A state where 
unity reigns supreme would be a catastrophe:
A state without plurality and a respect for plurality, would be first, 
a totalitarian state, and not only is this a terrible thing, but it does 
not work...thus a state as such must be attentive as much as 
possible to plurality, to the plurality of peoples, of languages, 
cultures, ethnic groups, persons, and so on. This is the condition 
for a state (ibid).
It is interesting to note how Derrida subscribes to the notion of 
conditionality here, whereas it is rejected in his later essay. I consider that this
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particular statement demonstrates the relevance of the process of deconstruction 
to the context of this dissertation. It illustrates how universality must be 
challenged in order to encompass the concept of difference. It outlines the 
transformative nature of hermeneutics and challenges us to counteract 
Nietzsche’s criticism of philosophy as active indifference to difference. This 
gauntlet is taken up by Homi Bhabha who presents his own perspective on the 
middle voice presented by both 'Differance ' and ‘ Hostipitality \ Bhabha also 
places the concept specifically within the context of cultural difference.
2.4 Homi Bhabha and the ‘Third Space9
While Derrida was somewhat equivocal about his political role, finding it 
difficult to align political action with his intellectual project of deconstruction 
(Derrida, 1984, p. 120), Bhabha adopts a more overt stance in relation to political 
activism. He reiterates Derrida’s endorsement of the role of writing in the 
process of social transformation and observes that “the attention to rhetoric and 
writing reveals the discursive ambivalence that makes ‘the political’ possible” 
(Bhabha, 1994, p. 24). Bhabha contends that the language of critique is effective 
not for delineating opposition but in overcoming it and opening up a space of 
translation, a place of hybridity. In such a space, negotiation rather than negation 
takes place (original emphasis) and the possibilities of differance are exposed 
(ibid, p. 25). Bhabha makes a critical point at this juncture, one that tends to be 
overlooked by the more extreme defenders of both the right and the left. He 
draws our attention to the fact that “there is no given community or body o f the 
people whose inherent, radical historicity emits the right signs ” (ibid, p. 27, 
original emphasis). This caution serves as an endorsement of differance.
Bhabha acknowledges the presence of hegemony in society, and, like 
Gramsci, acknowledges its role in revolution (ibid, p. 28). Instead of 
endeavouring to eliminate it in order to serve the cause of the recognition of 
difference, he calls for a counter-hegemonic power to be established and, 
echoing Stuart Hall (1987), contends that the Labour Party of 1980s Great 
Britain was not hegemonic enough. Thus, transformation of society cannot occur 
without hegemony. This poses a challenge to those who champion the cause of 
transformation and who may spend fruitless time and energy in seeking the 
elimination of hegemony in order to bring transformation about.
What Bhabha does is to endeavour to use the impact of hegemony to 
achieve his own ends as he views its work as “the process of iteration and 
differentiation” (ibid, p. 29). Bhabha consistently endorses an antagonistic 
approach to political change and views hegemony as giving meaning to the 
politics of struggle and the war of positions (ibid). He recognises the difficulties 
inherent in endorsing hegemony and similarly seeking a collective political will. 
He views both as being necessary in society but insists that one is not the product 
of the other. Yet, he acknowledges the conundrum posed by the endeavour to 
represent differentiated social movements in a collective will and the potential 
lack of synchronicity in such representation (ibid, p. 30). The role of theory as a 
metanarrative is thus portrayed as an anachronism. Bhabha emphasises that, from 
the perspective of negotiation and translation, there is no final act or closure of 
theory. Neither is there any first or final act of revolutionary social 
transformation. Here, I view Bhabha as reiterating Gramsci’s (or Marx’s) call to
2,4.1 A ccepting Hegem ony
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permanent revolution (Gramsci, 1971, p. 210) although he distances himself 
from the universal perspective.
2.4.2 ‘Diversity9 and ‘Difference’
Bhabha (1994, p. 31) engages in a substantial exploration of the 
complexities and tensions within critical theory and outlines the limitations of 
Western logocentrism. He endorses what he terms a 6 revisionary ’ approach to 
critical theory and lauds Foucault’s archaeology for enabling “the linear, 
progressivist claims of the social sciences...to be confronted by their own 
historical limitations” (ibid, p. 32). Bhabha concretises these tensions through his 
separation of the concepts of cultural diversity and cultural difference, identifying 
the latter term as being representative of the discourse of deconstruction and, 
potentially, of transformation. This separation of concepts can be linked with the 
tensions between multiculturalism (as an undifferentiated term) and 
interculturalism. For Bhabha, “cultural diversity is an epistemological object -  
culture as an object of empirical knowledge -  whereas cultural difference is the 
process of the enunciation of culture as knowledgea6/e, authoritative, adequate 
to the construction of systems of cultural identification” (ibid, p. 34, original 
emphasis). Bhabha then goes on to make a very significant point in relation to 
the enunciation of cultural difference, namely that this enunciation in itself needs 
to be problematised. What happens in reality is that
the reality of the limit or limit-text of culture is rarely theorised 
outside of well-intentioned moralist polemics against prejudice 
and stereotype, or the blanket assertion of individual or 
institutional racism -  that describe the effect rather than the 
structure of the problem (ibid).
81
These observations are particularly relevant to the Guidelines for Intercultural 
Education. As will be seen, polemic, well-intentioned or otherwise, does not 
serve the cause of interculturalism.
2.4,3 Locating Meaning
Drawing on Fanon (1986), Bhabha contends that the enunciation of 
cultural difference demands that we rethink our perspective on the identity of 
culture and engage in a critique of the positive aesthetic and political values we 
ascribe to the unity or totality of cultures, especially those that have known long 
and tyrannical histories of domination and misrecognition (ibid, p. 35). This is 
not to endorse dualism or binary opposition; it is not simply to replace the 
perspective of the ‘Self with that of the ‘Other’. It is instead to locate meaning 
within the middle voice of differance or what Bhabha terms the ‘third space’. 
This space “displaces the histories that constitute it, and sets up new structures of 
authority, new political initiatives, which are inadequately understood through 
received wisdom” (Bhabha, 1990, p. 211). In the context of linguistics, this space 
“represents both the general conditions of language and the specific implications 
of the utterance in a performative and institutional strategy of which it cannot ‘in 
itself be conscious” (Bhabha, 1994, p. 36, original punctuation). This 
unconscious relation introduces an ambivalence in the act of interpretation (ibid). 
Bhabha sees the intervention of the third space (and by association that of 
differance) as challenging “our sense of the historical identity of culture as a 
homogenising, unifying force, authenticated by the originary Past kept alive in 
the tradition of the People” (ibid, p. 37). A willingness to engage with the third 
space helps to avoid the polarisation of the ‘Self and the ‘Other’ and to speak 
about and problematise cultural difference. It helps to avoid what Bhabha terms
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“the exoticism of multiculturalism” and to engage with “culture’s hybridity” 
(ibid, p. 38, original emphasis).
To retain a perspective of cultural diversity instead of cultural difference 
is to eschew entry into the third space. Bhabha observes, “it is a commonplace of 
plural, democratic societies to say that they can encourage and accommodate 
cultural diversity”. However, he contends that the term ‘diversity’ represents a 
limited and conditional indulgence on the part of the host or dominant culture 
which tends to place other cultures “in a kind of musée imaginaire; as though one 
should be able to collect and appreciate them.” (Bhabha, 1990, p. 208). Bhabha 
concludes that while there is an entertainment and encouragement of cultural 
diversity, there is always a corresponding containment of difference. He equates 
the term ‘diversity’ with the liberal relativist perspective. The similarities 
between Bhabha and Foucault are easily identified here as the notion of 
containment is a recurring theme with Foucault. Also, Bhabha observes that 
focusing on difference allows him to engage with alterity, thus avoiding a 
logocentric bias. Bhabha calls for a notion of politics that is based upon 
potentially antagonistic political identities (original emphasis). He observes:
What is at issue is a historical moment in which these multiple 
identities do actually articulate in challenging ways, either 
positively or negatively, either in progressive or regressive ways, 
often conflictually, sometimes even incommensurably -  not some 
flowering of individual talents and capacities (ibid, original 
emphasis).
2.4.4 The Limitations of ‘Multiculturalism9
Bhabha observes that the endorsement of cultural diversity became the 
bedrock of multicultural education policy in England (Bhabha, 1990, p. 208). He 
identifies two specific problems in relation to multiculturalism and multicultural 
education: one is the containment of difference outlined above and the second is 
the fact that he sees racism as still being rampant in societies where 
multiculturalism is encouraged. “This is because the universalism that 
paradoxically permits diversity masks ethnocentric norms, values and interests” 
(ibid). As is seen in the previous chapter, those that champion the universal 
perspective would not agree with Bhabha here and they would not be content to 
be placed within this limited sphere of ‘multiculturalism’. We have observed that 
much of their deliberations serve the cause of interculturalism, namely the 
coming together of many cultures to act in the interest of the common good. 
Nevertheless, while Bhabha’s observations on universalism may be open to 
debate, his comments on multiculturalism merit consideration. He observes that 
in the English context “multiculturalism represented an attempt both to respond 
to and to control the dynamic process of the articulation of cultural difference, 
administering a consensus, based on a norm that propagates cultural diversity” 
(ibid, pp. 208-209, original emphasis). His use of the past tense is noteworthy 
here. I view it as implying that ‘multiculturalism’ has become somewhat of an 
archaic term and one that, in the British context, has been replaced with an 
alternative ideology. I am not sure that this is the case in reality.
Bhabha distances himself from the liberal relativism of cultural diversity, 
and thus of ‘multiculturalism’, as he views this as inadequate and limited. Here, I 
view him as throwing down a significant gauntlet to liberalism, namely
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challenging whether it is adequate to the vagaries and complexities of a 
multicultural society. This dilemma has already been addressed in the previous 
chapter, notably in the works of Taylor, who while operating out of a somewhat 
different perspective to that of Bhabha, and who ultimately retains the liberal 
view, nevertheless expresses very similar concerns.
Bhabha’s work, in itself, could be viewed as a conduit to the 
understanding of the more esoteric style of Foucault and, in particular, Derrida, 
His delineation of the Third space5 renders differance more accessible. The 
‘cultural hybridity5 inherent in the third space “gives rise to something different, 
something new and unrecognisable, a new area of negotiation of meaning and 
representation55 (Bhabha, 1990, p. 211). The third space also provides a more 
nuanced view of hegemony. While we may expect Bhabha to denounce 
hegemony and call for its elimination, he surprises us by stating that it can 
actually be employed to enhance the cause of difference. His stance is quite 
practical here in that he acknowledges the futility of the quest for the elimination 
of hegemony and, instead, seeks to harness its potential. Bhabha5s treatise on 
‘multiculturalism’ is particularly apposite to the current debate. He demonstrates 
a certain obsolescence in the term and presents it as an inadequate liberal 
solution to the complexities of a multicultural society. I must acknowledge at this 
juncture that Bhabha’s separation of ‘diversity5 and ‘difference5 is not shared by 
other writers who may be otherwise sympathetic to his viewpoint. Parekh (2006), 
for example, uses the term ‘diversity5 throughout his work, and indeed as 
previously observed, retains the term ‘multiculturalism5 although his 
interpretation of the concept is at significant variance with the indulgent and
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paternalistic undercurrents of Bhabha’s musée imaginaire. This discrepancy in 
terms may be due to the fact that Parekh ultimately retains the liberal viewpoint.
2.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, I expanded upon the traditional concept of critical theory 
to include the singular and contingent, as well as the universal. This was 
achieved through the analysis of the writings of Foucault, Derrida and Bhabha. 
The notion of Being, implicitly or explicitly contained in the discourse of the 
universalists, is unsettled and displaced by a less definitive notion of reality. This 
endorses Kincheloe and McLaren’s (1994, p. 140) contention that “any attempts 
to delineate critical theory as discrete schools of analysis will fail to capture the 
hybridity endemic to contemporary criticalist analysis”. Foucault is more 
trenchant in his rejection of the universal, although ultimately and perhaps by 
default, he acquiesces to its reality. Derrida is more equivocal, accepting the 
unified whole as an essential part of existence but pleading the cause of pluralism 
within this unity. Bhabha, while engaging in a rejection of the universal that is 
similar to that of Foucault, is nevertheless closer to Derrida through his 
acknowledgement of the cultural hybridity encompassed in the ‘third space’.
Foucault demonstrates closer affinity with Lefebvre’s (1947) concept of 
the ‘everyday’ (as outlined by Irwin, 2009, in 2.2 above), in that he concretises 
concepts such as marginalisation and exclusion by placing them in the context of 
the asylum or the prison. However, Foucault avoids any alliance with existing 
norms or value systems and, like Derrida and Bhabha, demonstrates suspicion in 
relation to the structures in society and sidesteps the linearity of the 
metanarrative. The transmission of previously held values is, for him, to yield to
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existing power structures, manifested overtly in, for example, the Law, and, more 
covertly, in the ‘Normalisation’ of behaviours and practices. His critique is 
aimed at the transformation of society, and yet, the manner in which this 
transformation is to occur, is not addressed by him. Derrida, while questioning 
existing values and mores, is less trenchant, or perhaps, less obvious, in their 
rejection. Similarly, the direction of his writings in terms of effecting change in 
society remains obscure although differance gives us an insight into the means of 
exploring, if not operationalising, the concept. Bhabha’s ‘third space’ also serves 
as a locus of exploration.
Yet, both Foucault and Derrida emerge as significant challengers of 
hegemony. Hegemony is implicitly allied to social control in their writings and is 
thus dismissed as a pariah. However, social cohesion is a potential and, very 
likely, a probable casualty in their assault on hegemony. Neither Foucault nor 
Derrida seems to have taken this on board. While the rejection of hegemony has 
a legitimate basis in the pursuit of emancipation, they have avoided addressing 
the question of what will govern social order in the wake of its demise. The 
unpalatable question of whether effective government can take place without 
some degree of hegemony has been left unanswered, thus opening up the 
potential for anarchy. Bhabha adopts a contradictory and almost oppositional 
stance to Foucault and Derrida here. While endorsing the poststructuralist 
tradition in its critique of the effects of power, he nevertheless seeks to retain and 
even extend the influence of hegemony so that power can be extended to those to 
whom it has been denied. Here, Bhabha is cognisant of the insidious nature of 
hegemony in society and of the futility in trying to eliminate it. It should be 
recognised here that social cohesion is not specifically mentioned by Bhabha,
although his wish to work with rather than against hegemony is a means of 
retaining order in society.
The inclusion of Foucault, Derrida and Bhabha has particular relevance to 
a multicultural society and thus to the specific context of this dissertation. The 
themes of marginalisation, exclusion and confinement assume even more 
significance in a multicultural society. Foucault indicates to us the problems of 
homogenising different groups and imposing upon them the naïve and simplistic 
perspective of “undifferentiated sensibility”. Derrida unseats the dominance of 
Togocentrism’, thus ‘deheroizing’ the present and acknowledging the role of 
alterity. He avoids placing the absent or the ‘Other’ in binary opposition to the 
logos and instead presents the notion of dijférance as a space in which to explore 
alterity. This theme is reinvented by Bhabha in his creation of the ‘third space’ in 
which similar explorations take place. All three writers eschew the notion of 
exoticing or ‘celebrating’ difference and the provision of the middle voice of 
dijférance or the third space serve to provide a forum for the problematising of 
difference and at times engaging in a conflicting manner with it. Bhabha reveals 
the potential shortcomings of the concept of “multiculturalism” and demonstrates 
that the pursuit of this ideology does not ultimately serve the interests of cultural 
difference. Once again I acknowledge that the concept of multiculturalism is 
open to many different interpretations.
In a situation of heterogeneity, the totality of the universal, while an agent 
of order, can also become an agent of marginalisation and exclusion. The 
treatises of these writers serve to raise awareness of cultural difference in society 
and of the extent of political violence that may, either overtly or covertly, be 
levelled against various groups. They thus provide a reflexivity in terms of the
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current modus vivendi and challenge existing approaches to social cohesion as 
well as the accommodation of “multiculturalism” as an ideology.
In this chapter and the previous one, I have endeavoured to provide a 
comprehensive outline of critical theory as a theoretical framework for this 
dissertation. All of this was undertaken with a view to identifying the 
philosophical basis of Irish education. The relationship between the maintenance 
of social cohesion and the recognition of difference within the context of a 
multicultural society is the overarching theme or problem within the dissertation. 
At this juncture, I am conscious of the fact that, although I have emphasised the 
Irish context of this research, I have not so far provided any description of it. Nor 
have I included the contribution of Irish theorists to the debate. Before engaging 
in a detailed analysis of the chosen documents, I wish to devote a chapter to 
addressing these lacunae.
The next chapter will place the universalist perspective as outlined in 
Chapter One and the dissident perspective as outlined in the current chapter in a 
specific Irish context and will examine the impact of recent cultural change on 
the cohesion of Irish society. Ireland’s political context will be taken into account 
and the management and accommodation of cultural change will be measured 
against this backdrop. The contributions of a number of Irish theorists to the 
debate will be included. All of this will be undertaken with a view to determining 
the implications of cultural change for Irish educational policy.
Chapter Three: An Irish Response to the Challenges of 
Social Cohesion and the Recognition of Difference
3.1 Introduction
As observed in the Introduction to this dissertation, there is a need to 
foreground the realities of living and learning in an increasingly diverse Ireland 
and the role of primary schooling in shaping and contributing to such change 
(Lodge et al., 2004, p. 6). The 2006 census indicates that of the total population 
of 4,172,013 in Ireland, 419,733 residents are classified as non-Irish (CSO, 
2008). This equates with approximately 10% of our population. During the 
period 2002-2004 the population in Irish schools rose by approximately 5000 
(DES, 2005b, cited by INTO, 2006, p. 3). Some large schools have reported 
numbers of ‘newcomer’ children making up 25-30% of the school population 
(INTO, 2006, p. 5). Yet, insufficient debate has taken place in the Irish 
educational context in relation to the conflict, confusion, challenges to identity 
and the unseating of traditional, and hitherto, steadfast norms wrought by the 
advent of a multicultural society. Consequently, as will be outlined in Chapters 
Four and Five, Irish educational policy documents tend to be rather circumspect 
in the manner in which they address issues relating to cultural difference. In 
particular, they have failed to problematise such issues, thus reducing the 
possibility of critical dialogue. This may be due to the residual effects of 
consensualism that, despite increasing evidence of heterogeneity, still exerts a 
significant impact on the workings of Irish society.
However, consensus should be sought on the basis of the identification 
and resolution of problems, not on the basis of an avoidance of their existence.
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Nicholas Sarkozy, in endorsing the concept of a strong and unified Europe, 
observed that this concept is one that “rejects consensus based on pushing 
problems to one side” (Fitzgerald, 2008, p. 11). Yet, the avoidance of conflict 
seems to be an overriding aim in the deliberations of Irish policy makers. 
O’Sullivan sees this as one of the most striking features to emerge from the 
analysis of official Irish educational thinking from the 1950s. He comments on 
“its insulation from competing/contesting viewpoints, and the associated 
mechanisms [to achieve such insulation] such as those of editing, filtering or 
excluding discordant meanings, through which the orthodoxy of understandings 
was maintained” (O’Sullivan, 2005, p. xiv, brackets added). This serves to 
undermine the impact and effect of policy and is, in fact, an insidious 
manifestation of power (O’Sullivan, 2005, p. 18, referencing Lukes, 1974). 
Avoiding conflict may achieve social cohesion of sorts; however, it fails to 
engender the notion of dialogue needed for the type of unified community 
outlined in Chapter One. Habermas’s (1987a, in Chapter One) communication 
community, wherein consensus is pursued but not coerced, is not accorded 
sufficient recognition here. Indeed, Derrida’s reservations about community 
(Derrida, 1995, cited by Caputo, 1997, in Chapter Two) are resonant. He 
expresses scepticism about the existence of a community wherein there is 
consensus and fundamental agreement and sees in it as much threat as promise. 
Thus consensualism needs to be viewed with caution. The avoidance of conflict 
also tends to obscure the identification of a specific philosophical basis within 
Irish educational discourse. I will use specific examples to illustrate this point in 
later chapters.
My deliberations up to now demonstrate a significant lacuna in terms of 
Irish representation among the selected theorists. This may have conveyed the 
impression that there is a dearth of Irish theorists and that I was forced to confine 
myself to the international dimension. I defend my dependence upon the 
international perspective on the basis that I view the contributions of the chosen 
theorists as serving to highlight and problematise the theme which I am 
addressing in this dissertation: namely the maintenance of social cohesion in the 
face of increasing demands for recognition by different cultural groups. This is a 
significant political issue and as political theory impacts upon education, I 
needed to use it as the starting point in my deliberations. Nevertheless, there are a 
number of Irish theorists who can be linked with this theme and thus with the 
deliberations undertaken so far. Their observations will be included to 
complement the discussion and to place it more specifically within the context of 
Irish education. Before engaging with these theorists, I consider it necessary to 
elaborate on the concept of identity and also on the current political context of 
Ireland, as I believe that both of these issues impact significantly on our response 
to cultural difference. The influence of the Catholic Church and the Irish 
language will be explored in relation to our identity, while our status as a nation­
state, liberal democracy and republic will be debated in relation to political 
context.
Thus, this chapter sets out to describe the realities of the current Irish 
context, and specifically the impact of cultural difference and the pursuit of 
recognition upon the political and educational organisation of the country. It will 
look at the contribution and relevance of Irish educational theory within this
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context. This will serve as a backdrop to the analysis of the educational 
documents in the subsequent chapters.
3.2 Sustaining Identity, Accepting Change
The Report of the National Education Convention provides a vision of 
educational policy aimed at enabling each pupil to “appropriate from moral and 
spiritual tradition, and from the plenitude of human learning, something of an 
abiding and sustaining sense of identity, amid the ubiquity of change in 
contemporary society” (Coolahan, 1994, p. 8). The question that must be 
broached is whether it is, in fact, possible to achieve “an abiding and sustaining 
sense of identity” amid the unprecedented and accelerated change in Irish 
society. The challenge is to sustain a sense of identity so that it, in turn, will 
sustain us in a society in an almost constant state of flux, and thus contribute 
towards maintaining social cohesion. There are two issues emerging from this 
statement: the first is relatively predictable, that of concern with identity; the 
second is more sublime but yet points us towards a dilemma that becomes 
particularly problematic in relation to immigration policy (or lack thereof) in 
Ireland. This is the issue of the autonomy of the individual and the non­
intervention of the State that is indicated through the use of the verb “to 
appropriate”. This latter issue is intertwined with our political context. I will 
address the issue of identity first.
3.2.1 Irish Identity in 21st Century Ireland
Ireland is currently grappling with the Derridean conundrum posed by 
Caputo (1997, in Chapter Two) in relation to community. In a decade that has 
witnessed unprecedented demographic change, we are struggling to maintain a
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hold on our identity, on the culture and value system that has made us ‘Irish’, yet 
we wish to extend the hand of welcome to non-indigenous groups. However, as 
observed in Chapter Two, if we maintain a hold on our identity, we become 
unwelcoming, if we are too welcoming, we run the risk of losing our identity.
The meaning and implications of being Irish have evolved from being 
definitive and exclusive to being more nebulous and inclusive. Haran and 
Tormey (2002, p. 13) outline how an ethnocentric view of Irish identity is being 
countered by a more inclusive one. Waldron (2004, p. 210) observes that this is a 
liberating concept. However, she acknowledges the need to take control of the 
emergent Irish identity, and to name, discuss and debate its characteristics and 
consequences. It is reasonable to assume that in 21st century Ireland, for many 
Irish citizens, being “Catholic and Gaelic”, (Tovey and Share, 2000, in 
Introduction) is not at the forefront of their sense of identity.
Yet, one cannot simply dismiss the impact of the Catholic Church and the 
Irish language on identity, even if such a limited viewpoint is becoming 
anachronistic and anathema to cultural pluralism. Earley (1999, p. 150) advises 
us that we should be cautious about assuming that the decline in formal 
adherence to the Church is necessarily matched by an equal decline in its 
influence and observes that the value system of the vast majority of Irish people 
is still rooted in Catholicism. Seery (2008, p. 135) observes that although less 
explicitly invoked nowadays in Ireland, “the language of Christian education has 
occupied a privileged station in the past, and echoes and reminders of a 
theological idiom in educational language still persist in Irish education”. The 
Catholic influence is strengthened by the fact that most Irish schools are still 
owned by the Catholic Church (Lodge et al., 2004, p. 5).
The Irish language is also a significant aspect of our identity and its links 
with our heritage cannot be overlooked. Yet, its divisive characteristics are not 
new. McGorman and Sugrue (2007, p. 8) comment on the manner in which the 
Irish language was used to create a kind of indigenous apartheid long before the 
advent of immigrant groups. They observe that those belonging to the ‘Gaeltacht’ 
areas were somehow seen as being more Irish than those belonging to ‘Galltacht’ 
(literally meaning foreign) areas. It is interesting to note that The Report of the 
Review Body on the Primary Curriculum (NCCA, 1990) did not seek to 
problematise the ‘ GaeltachtV’Galltacht5 distinction. This distinction has residual 
effects. The premise that empathy with, and ability to speak, the Irish language 
defines how Irish we are, has implications for immigrant groups. Yet, as will be 
seen in Chapter Five, the Guidelines for Intercultural Education (DES, 2005a) 
endeavour to resolve these tensions and to present the Irish language as being 
sympathetic to the needs of a multicultural society, thus imbuing it with less 
anachronistic associations.
Haran and Tormey (2002, p. 13) observe that equating Irish culture with 
Catholicism and Gaelicism does not properly represent the diversity that has 
historically been present in Ireland, and that is currently on the increase. (It is 
interesting to note that these two writers, who eschew a limited perspective on 
multiculturalism, and whose deliberations are supportive of those of Bhabha, still 
retain usage of the word ‘diversity’). Yet, in order to achieve the “abiding and 
sustaining sense of identity” needed to cope with the current cultural uncertainty, 
and thus maintain social cohesion, we need to bring forward our rich, cultural 
traditions and retain a sense of their value and a sense of their potential 
contribution to a more evolved and inclusive notion of identity. In this way we
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can avoid Bauman’s (1997, p. 25) notion of a palimpsest identity; an identity that 
is constantly painted over and reinvented in order to cope with the transience of 
our social surroundings in which long-held social norms are rapidly becoming an 
anachronism. Bauman observes “this is the kind of identity which fits the world 
in which the art of forgetting is no less, if no more, important than the art of 
memorising.” This does not serve the interests of either existing or ‘newcomer’ 
cultures. We should also bear in mind that our ‘Irishness’ may be part of the 
reason why different cultural groupings come to Ireland in the first place. It may 
be that they wish to share in our national identity. Miller contends that the wish 
to share in a common identity reflects a fundamental psychological need to 
belong:
Minority groups want to feel at home in a society to which they or 
their forebears have moved. They want to feel attached to the 
place and part of its history, even if they feel some attachment to 
their place of ethnic origin....To see themselves only as bearers of 
a specific identity...would be to lose the chance to join a larger 
community whose traditions and practices have inevitably left 
their mark on the environment they inhabit (Miller, 1995, p. 138).
I consider this point to be often overlooked by the proponents of cultural 
difference. A flexible attitude to identity should not diminish into a self- 
depreciating one. All of these considerations relating to identity need to be taken 
into account when deconstructing current Irish educational policy and practice.
3.2.2 The Implications of Appropriation
The use of the verb “to appropriate”, in the quotation cited above, is an 
indicator of the non-interventionist stance adopted by the State in relation to
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issues concerning personal autonomy and responsibility. This may be deemed an 
acceptable route to follow in that identity is thus allowed to “blossom” in an 
unconstrained manner without any impositions being placed upon it by the State. 
This non-interventionist, non-prescriptive approach aligns with the principles of 
a liberal democracy and thus with the Irish political system. This may seem to be 
particularly apposite in a multicultural context where the issue of identity 
becomes an increasingly complex one. In the context of identity, the verb “to 
appropriate” may be acceptable. However, the overall concept of appropriation is 
problematic in a multicultural context, as it allows for a certain abdication of 
responsibility on the part of the State. The concession to personal autonomy and 
responsibility can be somewhat misleading, and far from serving the interest of 
the individuals, ends up in compromising such interest, as well as that of social 
cohesion as a whole.
This contention becomes more apparent if we apply it to the current 
lacunae in terms of immigration and integration policies in Ireland. The current 
laissez-faire approach evident in Ireland, in relation to the advent of non- 
indigenous cultural groups, does little to address either the need to maintain 
identity or to accommodate cultural difference in any constructive manner. There 
has been an ad hoc approach to facilitating integration and, despite the 
appointment of a Minister of State for Integration, Irish official integration policy 
at the beginning of 2008 is, according to Boucher, (2008, p. 2), more of a 
piecemeal, reactive response to immediate problems arising from immigration 
and integration, than a coherent, integrated policy framework for the short and 
long-term integration of immigrants and their descendants. This approach to 
immigration and integration aligns with the principles of ‘multiculturalisnT, as
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viewed by Bauman (2001, in Chapter One) and Bhabha (1990, in Chapter Two), 
as distinct from interculturalism as outlined in the Introduction of this 
dissertation.
Boucher is critical of the Irish State for failing to construct a systematic 
integration and immigration policy despite the fact that Ireland is statistically a 
country of net immigration since 1996. He contends that the resultant laissez- 
faire approach may lead to social exclusion rather than social cohesion (Boucher, 
2008, p. 2). Our Cead Mile Fdilte image is well and truly compromised by the 
lack of supporting policy. Once the immigrants have stepped beyond the 
welcome mat, it would seem that they are left to their own devices in terms of 
integrating into Irish society. Boucher expresses dissatisfaction with the report 
Integration: A Two Way Process, published by the Department of Justice, 
Equality and Law Reform (2000), and contends that, despite its stated concession 
to reciprocity, it is more concerned with “legitimising a laissez-faire integration 
strategy in which individual immigrants are meant to apply neo-liberal modes of 
governance to themselves by taking responsibility for their own economic, 
social, cultural and political integration” (ibid, p. 12).
This is where the discourse of appropriation becomes subversive, or at 
least, problematic. Boucher suggests that it is more likely that this neo-liberal 
approach will pressurise immigrants to ‘choose’ to integrate into Irish society by 
assimilating to Irish national culture and social practices (ibid, p. 13). Thus, the 
‘two-way process’ is, according to this interpretation, but a fallacy. Citing the 
National Economic and Social Council (NESC) (2006), Boucher presents the 
‘integration challenge’ as being more about maintaining social cohesion and 
social order by individual immigrants adapting to the existing Irish national
98
society, rather than the government or Irish society adapting to the changes 
arising from immigration and cultural diversity (ibid). This may seem to address 
the psychological need for belonging referred to in 3.2.1 above but it does so 
from a one-sided perspective and very much in the cause of the national interest. 
Irwin’s caution (2009, in Chapter Two) in relation to communication between 
cultures becoming distorted into a demand by the majority for minority cultures 
to conform to the overarching identity resonates here. The net result of 
integration should be that it serves the interests of those who endeavour to 
integrate as well as the interests of the host country. The conundrum posed by 
Derrida’s 4Hostipitality ’ becomes evident in that if immigration and integration 
policy is focused predominantly upon the national interest, our seeming 
hospitality to minority groups is undermined by the imposition of this condition.
McGorman and Sugrue (2007, p. xiv) place these concerns within the 
educational context. In a study focusing on the Dublin 15 area, an area of 
particular interest in relation to the challenge of cultural difference, they 
conclude that there is a clear necessity for appropriate legislative and policy 
responses if social fragmentation, and ghettoisation, exacerbated by ‘white 
flight’, are not to become established and entrenched. Their study shows the need 
to extend the responsibility for addressing cultural change beyond schools and 
into the overall political system. Their observations have particular resonance in 
the context of the Guidelines for Intercultural Education (DES, 2005a), which 
will be explored in detail later in this dissertation. The notion of taking 
responsibility requires a more proactive stance on the part of the State and does 
not synchronise with the concept of appropriation.
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Implicit in the notion of appropriation is the assumption that because 
there is a perception of choice, it is somehow an unproblematic process. The 
impression of choice tends to eliminate conflict and critical debate in relation to 
immigration and integration. This may leave us with the impression of a socially 
cohesive society, yet the elimination of conflict is, in itself, as noted by 
O’Sullivan, (2005, in 3.1 above), an insidious manifestation of power. Avoidance 
of conflict leads us into the chimera that immigration and integration are always 
positive events to be ‘celebrated’ by both immigrant groups and the host country 
alike. Even if some of the members of either grouping fail to see the positivity 
and the cause for celebration in these events, there is an unstated discouragement 
from voicing this dissent as this may be seen to be politically incorrect. I view 
this as a particular issue in relation to current educational policy in Ireland.
In a 2005 report, the National Economic and Social Council (NESC) 
identifies both the positive and negative aspects of recent immigration into 
Ireland (NESC, 2005, pp. 133-134, cf. Appendix A). It is interesting to note that 
all of the positive aspects relate to the national interest either in relation to the 
Irish economy or in relation to our international profile. This begs the question as 
to whether there is a concern by the State in relation to rendering the process of 
immigration a positive one for the immigrant. This would require a more 
proactive and interventionist approach by the State. The list of negative aspects 
of immigration mainly relate to the immigrants themselves and, while there is an 
acknowledgement of the additional demand on public infrastructure, Boucher’s 
later comments indicate that these concerns have not been addressed in any 
coherent manner and that the main emphasis in policy discourse has been on 
restricting the State’s role in the integration process (Boucher, 2008, p. 14). The
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call on the part of the NESC that each of the negative aspects of immigration 
should be “honestly faced, monitored and actively combated” (NESC, 2005, p. 
134) is still devoid of an adequate response. The notion of appropriation does 
little to further the cause of critical dialogue or of rendering the ‘two way 
process’ more meaningful. However, it occupies a significant role in relation to 
Ireland’s political status.
3.3 Ireland’s Political Status
Boucher (2008, p. 10) views the government’s main priority as that of 
protecting the national interest through its immigration and integration policies, 
while providing an intercultural framework within which individual immigrants 
integrate into the liberal, republican Irish nation. Any approach to immigration 
and integration cannot but be influenced by Ireland’s political status. The 
political categories of a nation-state, a liberal democracy and a republic are not 
unique to Ireland, yet the manner in which they influence our response to 
immigrant groups needs to be acknowledged. I have alluded to this in the 
Introduction to this dissertation and I will expand upon it here.
3.3.1 The Nation-State
Dunne (2000, p. 164) endeavours to clarify the term ‘nation-state’ by 
presenting the ‘state’ and the ‘nation’ as two separate concepts that fuse to create 
a somewhat uncomfortable synthesis. For Dunne, ‘state’ connotes a more or less 
concentrated system of power over a defined territory, whereas ‘nation’ connotes 
a social grouping held together by an amalgam of factors such as shared descent, 
historical experience and memory, language, custom and belief. I contend that 
the synthesis is uncomfortable whenever minority groups or cultures form a part
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of the population of the nation-state, as they tend to resist the ‘forcible 
homogenisation’ (Dunne, 2000, p. 165) that underpinned the success of the 
nation-state. Yet, it could be argued that the current laissez-faire approach to 
immigration and integration, despite its liberal characteristics of appropriation 
rather than imposition, is facilitative of such homogenisation. Boucher’s 
observations in relation to ‘choice’ cited in 3.2.2 above are relevant here in that 
the outcomes of such ‘choice’ are more likely to be the assimilation of the 
immigrant to Irish culture and society.
3.3.2 Liberal Democracy
Kymlicka (2001, p. 224) remarks on the coincidence of the emergence of 
the nation-state and that of liberal democracy as the prevailing form of 
government in the Western world. Williams (2003, p. 211) contends that the 
nation-state provides the context in which liberal democratic principles can be 
located. It could be argued that the liberal democracy has, in itself, adopted a 
palimpsest identity and attests to many meanings or interpretations, or 
conversely, to none at all. We have seen in Chapter One that this is an issue of 
considerable concern to Taylor. This nebulosity in relation to what liberalism 
actually means in today’s society may explain the ad hoc approaches to political 
organisation and management that are legitimated in its name. Kymlicka (2001, 
p. 5) observes that these practices have been adopted as ad hoc compromises “for 
reasons of stability rather than justice and without too much attention to their fit 
(or lack of fit) with basic liberal principles of freedom, equality and democracy”. 
This may well be a short-term solution to the advent of cultural difference.
We need to determine just what the concept of a liberal democracy means 
in the context of a multicultural society if we are to devise any form of
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meaningful policy. Dworkin (1984, p. 60) observes that liberalism is often now 
considered to be wishy-washy, an untenable compromise between the two more 
forthright positions of conservatism and radicalism, applying at best to only a 
limited number of political controversies it tries to explain. Although Dworkin 
does not agree with this perspective on liberalism, it is not difficult to understand 
why it may be shared by many people. The decade of Dworkin’s observations is 
noted. It can only be assumed that in the intervening time, such reservations in 
relation to liberalism are further accentuated in an increasingly complex society 
where minority rights and state nation-building are constant realities. Kymlicka 
(2001, pp. 4-5) endorses such reservations and states that in the real world of 
liberal democracies, liberal theory has largely ignored such realities. Thus it 
could be concluded that, in many instances, current practices do not necessarily 
reflect underlying theory. Subsequent analysis of educational documents will 
ponder the likelihood of extending this conclusion specifically to educational 
policy and practice.
The laissez-faire, non-interventionist approach of the Irish state to the 
advent of minority groups is indicative of a relativist, even a ‘wishy-washy’ 
manifestation of liberalism. Bhabha’s observations (1990, outlined in Chapter 
Two) are relevant here. The ‘toleration’ and ‘celebration’ of difference inherent 
in a non-interventionist State approach, wherein the immigrant is allowed to 
express his/her individuality, but is not necessarily or adequately supported by 
the host society, is reflective of the containment of difference outlined by 
Bhabha. This containment is located within the metaphor of the musee 
imaginaire within which cultures are collected and appreciated (Bhabha, 1990, p. 
208). This particular metaphor will be utilised specifically in relation to the
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educational approach to difference later in this dissertation. Suffice to say at this 
juncture that despite educational aspirations towards interculturalism, current 
State or political policy (or non-policy) seems not to have progressed much 
beyond the stage of ‘multi cultural ism’. Bhabha’s observations are worth 
repeating here:
Multiculturalism represented an attempt both to respond to and to 
control the dynamic process of the articulation of cultural 
difference, administering a consensus, based on a norm that 
propagates cultural diversity (Bhabha, 1990, pp. 208-209, original 
emphasis).
Although the past tense was used by Bhabha in the British context, I 
believe that it would be more apposite to use the present tense in relation to 
Ireland. The non-interventionist approach of the State, exemplified in the non­
provision of meaningful policy, represents a limited and qualified response to 
cultural difference, along with an attempt to control it. There is also an effort to 
perpetuate the consensualism, so long a feature of Irish society, in this instance 
by conveying the impression that the advent of different cultural groupings is a 
cause for unmitigated celebration and that any voice of dissent should be 
silenced. Watt (2006, p. 153) observes that evidence suggests that 
multiculturalism “only succeeded in embedding a superficial understanding and 
accommodation of cultural and ethnic diversity”. As a result, it has proven weak 
in promoting interaction or equality or in addressing tangible and concrete 
problems, such as poverty and unemployment, which tend to accompany the 
advent of minority groups (ibid, pp. 153-154). Crucially, Watt observes that, in 
this scenario, the State adopts the role of “neutral broker in what is essentially
104
defined as a conflict between communities” (ibid, p. 154). Attempts to obviate 
conflict in both Irish political and educational discourse can be viewed as either a 
manifestation of political correctness or an assertion of power or both, in that 
Bauman (2001, p. 106) would view emphasis on political correctness as a 
manifestation of power by the dominant group in society. In either case the result 
is the same; the power balance, and thus the status quo, are unaffected. This 
maintains social cohesion, but such cohesion is balanced in favour of the 
dominant group and is predicated upon the suppression rather than the 
elimination of problems. I would advocate the adoption of a Derridean 
perspective here (see 3.1 above), as I believe that such cohesion needs to be 
viewed with a certain degree of scepticism. In other words, I am posing a 
challenge to logocentrism, as I believe that unproblematic cohesion should not be 
accepted at face value.
The questioning of the operation of liberal democracy within the 
parameters of the nation-state, with the consequent implication of the role of the 
‘greater good’, heralds a challenge to the third premise of the Irish context, 
namely that of the republican ideal. I am unsure as to the extent to which the 
concept of the republic impacts upon the Irish psyche or indeed upon the policy 
making process. My uncertainty is underscored by the variations in interpretation 
of the term ‘republican’.
3.3.3 The Concept o f 'Republic9
Jefferson’s notion of the republic was that of a society where “the voice 
of the people would be fairly, fully and peaceably expressed, discussed and 
decided by common reason” of all of its citizens (Jefferson, 1816, cited by 
Arendt, 1984, p. 240). The sense of unity inherent in Jefferson’s vision is
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becoming increasingly difficult to sustain, due to the challenges posed upon the 
“common reason” by an amalgam of different groups. In addition, it is by no 
means certain that the right of decision is accorded to all in a given society. This 
is true of current Irish society wherein a significant proportion of those living 
here do not have citizenship rights and thus do not have the right to vote.
The concept of the republic is, paradoxically, under most threat from the 
very characteristic that most defines it, that is, the empowerment of its citizens. 
Arendt (1984, p. 242) contends that corruption and perversion are more 
pernicious, and at the same time, more likely to occur, in an egalitarian republic 
than in any other form of government. “Corruption of the people themselves -  as 
distinguished from corruption of their representatives or a ruling class -  is 
possible only under a government that has granted them a share in public power 
and has taught them to manipulate it.” Arendt’s perspective concurs with that of 
Taylor (1991/1994, in Chapter One) and Bauman (1997/2001, in Chapter One) in 
that whereas formerly this danger used to arise from the public realm, under 
conditions of rapid and constant economic growth, this is now more likely to 
occur from within the private realm. Using the observations of Jefferson, Arendt 
observes that, whereas the Bill of Rights in the American Constitution served to 
protect the private realm, it also, in Jefferson’s view, conferred all power on the 
citizens of America without giving them the opportunity of being republicans 
and acting as citizens (Arendt, 1984, p. 243, original emphasis). The Bill of 
Rights thus served to emancipate the individual, through the recognition of 
his/her rights, but at the same time compromised the cohesiveness of society.
This dilemma would seem to have been addressed by the French 
Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen (1789 and 1793). This declaration
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heralded a signal feature of the French République, namely the conviction that 
the Rights of Man and the Rights of the People were mutually inclusive 
(Kearney, 1997, p. 28). This is the form of republicanism that was espoused in 
Ireland. Kearney questions the extent of the impact of this legacy of rights on 
Ireland. He asks whether Irish Republicanism was historically capable of 
sustaining the delicate but indispensable balance between the Rights of Man and 
the Rights of the Nation. This is the dilemma that, instead of veering towards 
resolution, has become more acute in the current heterogeneity of Irish society.
The dominance of individualism in current society prevents successful 
and meaningful integration into the republican ideal, because the balance 
between the Rights of Man and the Rights of the Nation has become weighted in 
favour of the former. Our overall sense of citizenship, or solidarity, has been 
usurped by the dominance of the ‘Self, and participation in politics (if it occurs 
at all) is limited to Taylor’s (1991, pp. 114-115) conjunctural movements or 
single-issue agendas.
This loss of vision of the republic may explain why we have not provided 
any formal means of assisting immigrant groups to become active members of 
the Irish republic and, instead, allow them the ‘freedom’ to ‘appropriate’ aspects 
of Irish life and culture as they see fit. The recommendations of the European 
Commission in relation to the provision of a national integration programme 
have not been taken on board in Ireland. There are three main components to 
such a programme: language tuition, orientation or introductory courses and 
professional labour market training (CEC, 2003, cited by Boucher, 2008, p. 4). It 
could be argued that these components have not been operationalised out of the 
fear of a charge of usurping the Rights of Man in favour of the Nation. A
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Derridean challenge could undoubtedly be posed in that there are conditions 
imposed upon the migrant groups. A counter-argument would be that to 
implement these three components would serve both individual and citizenship 
rights. They would benefit the individual immigrant as well as the Irish nation. 
Thus the ideals of the French République would be sustained. Current Irish 
political and educational policy demonstrates an uncertainty in relation to how 
these ideals may be sustained with the consequence that the concept of 
republicanism is being accorded nominal rather than active significance. While 
the principles of liberté, égalité and fraternité may well be coming under 
increasing challenge in today’s society, this does not mean that they have to be 
cast aside, particularly when they have no defined successor.
Yet, we need to exercise caution in relation to reclaiming an active 
concept of republicanism, as this may not necessarily serve the interests of all 
those who live in Ireland today. Kearney (1997, p. 27) observes that there is a 
fundamental paradox within the concept of modem republicanism -  on the one 
hand it promoted “an enlightened universalism of world citizens.” On the other 
hand, it promoted “a separatist nationalism which subordinates the universal 
rights of the citizen to the rights of the nation-state (original emphasis).” Kearney 
states that by the end of the 18th century, in Ireland, the former vision had ceded 
incontrovertibly to the latter (ibid, p. 36). As a consequence, to reclaim the 
notion of active republicanism may be interpreted as an assertion of nationalist 
ideals and may serve to compromise the interests of non-indigenous cultures. 
Thus, the significance and implications of our appellation as a republic is 
something of a conundrum at this stage of our historical and demographic
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evolution. Nevertheless, the historical links between republicanism and another 
aspect of Irish society, that of our faith, merit further discussion.
3.4 The Catholic Church
Becoming a republic provided the Irish population with the freedom to 
practice its predominantly Catholic faith, a freedom that was hitherto suppressed. 
It should be borne in mind that the liberty to practice Catholicism emerged as a 
consequence of the republican revolution, not as a specified goal. Kearney (1997, 
p. 33) observes that Catholics were motivated by the doctrine of republicanism, 
not in defence of their religion, but because of their dire material circumstances. 
The result of the republican revolution was the liberation of a populace whose 
inspiration was obtained as much from Tridentine Catholicism as from 
Enlightenment ideals (ibid, p. 32). As a consequence, the politics of the nation 
were seen to be as dependent on the influence of God as much (if not more) than 
the influence of the State. This is evident, for example, in the opposition by the 
Church to Dr. Noel Browne’s Mother and Child scheme in the 1950s. The 
government at the time deferred to the rules of the Catholic Church and thus 
when “a minister who had clear views about the proper relationships between 
Church and State in a democratic society” (Browne, 1986, p. 142), asserted his 
views, a crisis ensued.
I am employing this event to demonstrate the very unequal relationship 
that existed between the Church and the State in Ireland at that time. It illustrates 
how the ‘natural’, (God-given) character of existing structures was accorded 
precedence over State intervention (Boggs, 1976, in Chapter One) and thus bears 
out Gramsci’s outline of the Catholic Church as an instrument of hegemony. It
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can be asserted that the charge of perpetuating hegemony, which could be 
levelled at the republican ideal (in the nationalist sense), was strengthened by the 
almost autocratic hold that the Church exerted on the politics of the nation. 
However, since the practice of Catholicism emerged as a consequence of 
republicanism, rather than as a specified goal, the assertion of the republican 
tradition does not necessarily mean the assertion of the Catholic ideal.
Neither should the decline of the influence of the Catholic Church, which 
has been occurring over the past three decades or so, be seen as a catalyst or a 
manifestation of the decline of the republican ideal. Yet, it could be argued that 
the two are occurring almost simultaneously. Ardagh (1994, p. 158) observes that 
many practising Catholics, while still believing in God, have grown critical of the 
Church as an institution and no longer follow its moral laws in their private lives. 
Nevertheless, the Church maintained a fairly tenacious hold on Irish society up to 
the mid 1990s, considering that homosexuality was not decriminalised until 1993 
and divorce did not become legal until 1995, and then only after a referendum 
which was passed by a very small majority. I have already referred to Earley’s 
observations in relation to the continuing influence of the Catholic Church on 
Irish society (Earley, 1999, in 3.2.1 above). This means that any influence the 
Church attempts to exert on the policy process is likely at least to be taken into 
account by those with whom the responsibility lies for policy decisions. Earley 
(1999, p. 150) identifies health and education as significant targets here. This is 
due to the fact that the Church continues to occupy a major role in the delivery of 
these services. As observed in 3.2.1 above, the vast majority of Irish schools are 
still managed by the Catholic Church and thus are still guided by Catholic norms 
and values.
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The influence of the Catholic Church has been, traditionally, almost 
inextricably intertwined with Irish education. Up to the 1960s the Church 
exercised almost unilateral control over schools although, as observed by Lodge 
et al. (2004, p. 3), in certain respects Irish education has become increasingly 
democratised in the last three decades at both local and national level. Yet, while 
the influence of the Church on education may have receded, it would be an 
overly naive assumption to assume that it has dissipated entirely. Just as the 
Church has a residual effect on Irish life in general, despite less formal adherence 
to its influence, so too is this effect perpetuated in Irish education. I now wish to 
look at Irish education in some detail, and, in particular, Irish educational theory. 
This is undertaken with a view to placing the theories hitherto presented within 
the context of Irish education.
Drudy and Lynch (1993, p. 26) present the education process as playing a 
crucial role in the socialisation of the young and in the transmission of culture. 
They distance themselves from this role of education. Instead, they put forward a 
neo-Marxist perspective and outline how the education system plays a significant 
part in the reproduction of the social relations of production (ibid, p. 27). 
Referencing Bowles and Gintis (1976), they observe that because these relations 
are often inequitable, schools play a part in reproducing social outcomes that are 
far from positive (ibid, pp. 27-28). They unveil, the emancipatory potential of 
education and reiterate O Suilleabhain’s vision of such potential in the Irish 
context:
3.5 Irish Education
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The essence of education is becoming, the gradual discovery of 
what it means to be human, the search for a personal identity, an 
identity which brings individual autonomy within a community 
structure (O Suilleabhain, 1986, cited by Drudy and Lynch, 1993,
P. 29).
From this quotation it can be observed that O Suilleabhain, and thus 
Drudy and Lynch, align themselves closely with Freire’s comments on problem- 
posing education, which he contends “affirms men as beings in the process of 
becoming -  as unfinished, uncompleted beings in and with a likewise unfinished 
reality” (Freire, 1972, p. 57). Like Freire, they place the pursuit of emancipation 
within the universal perspective. While the importance of the individual is 
acknowledged, so too, is the importance of community.
Yet, while retaining a perspective on community, Drudy and Lynch 
engage in a critique of the liberal approach to education and conclude that it does 
not suffice to address the structural inequalities in society. This critique is 
manifested through their rejection of the structural functionalist approach to 
education, an approach which, they contend, is predicated upon consensus in 
society (Drudy and Lynch, 1993, p. 30), and which confines its perspective on 
equality to that of ‘equality of opportunity’, thus supporting the concept of 
meritocracy (ibid, p. 31). O’Sullivan (2005, p. 316) cautions that the yardstick of 
educational success, while seemingly ‘culture fair’, is actually biased towards the 
middle classes. This means that pupils who suffer as a result are meant to view 
their failure to be a consequence of their own inability rather than any failing in 
the system. O’Sullivan concludes that this is seen as essential if society is to 
avoid dissent and political agitation.
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Drudy and Lynch (1993, pp. 35-36) challenge the avoidance of dissent by 
presenting the neo-Marxist perspective on education as an alternative to the 
structural functionalist (or liberal) approach. They contend that, within a neo- 
Marxist framework, the parameters of the debate shift from a more benign 
perspective on ‘equality of educational opportunity’ to the more challenging and 
conflict-laden ‘reproduction of class inequalities’. Tovey and Share observe that 
the Marxist approach focuses on how the education system operates as an 
institution for the creation and transmission of social inequality and the 
maintenance of the class system. Within this perspective
Schools are seen as a site for social control, both through the overt 
activities of reward and punishment and through the ‘hidden 
curriculum’ that stresses and rewards punctuality, obedience and 
respect for authority -  the very attributes required of a productive 
workforce (Tovey and Share, 2000, p. 200).
This perspective aligns quite closely with Foucault’s views on education 
in which the creation of ‘docile’ bodies was the predominant objective and where 
“the school became a machine for learning, in which each pupil, each level and 
each moment, if correctly combined, were permanently utilised in the general 
process of teaching” (Foucault, 1991b, p. 165, in Chapter Two). However, as 
acknowledged in Chapter Two, Foucault refused to align himself with the 
Marxist perspective.
The essence of the neo-Marxist perspective is to challenge the acceptance 
and reproduction of inequality on which the concept of meritocracy 
fundamentally rests (Drudy and Lynch, 1993, p. 37). It promotes the 
development of critical pedagogy in order to generate the political action which
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is required if the vision of education, as an agent of transformation in society, is 
to be realised. It thus asserts “the importance of making the pedagogical more 
political” (Giroux, 1994, p. 326). Drudy and Lynch’s treatise, although not 
focusing specifically on pedagogical issues, nevertheless aligns with the vision of 
writers such as Giroux (1994) and McLaren (1994). These writers focus on 
critical pedagogy and place the neo-Marxist perspective specifically within the 
context of a multicultural society.
While the contention that Irish educational theory is still located within 
the functionalist perspective may seem dismissive of recent initiatives, 
particularly in relation to educational disadvantage, there is evidence to suggest 
that little has changed in relation to the reproduction of the social relations of 
production. Tovey and Share (2000, p. 199) observe that while functionalist 
thinking has been sharply criticised from conflict and interpretative viewpoints, it 
enjoys considerable support among governments, policy makers and many 
researchers, as it does not challenge to any great extent the existing power 
relationships within society. Drudy and Lynch (1993, pp. 34-35) contend that, 
despite a rather ineffectual focus on the vague concept of ‘equity’ in the Green 
Paper, 1992, its underlying assumptions align with a human capital approach to 
education. This, in their view, does not adequately meet the problems of equality 
in class-based societies. In a later essay, Lynch (1999, p. 296) drawing from the 
work of a number of other researchers, contends that while a trickle of social 
mobility between social classes occurred, policies in relation to equality of 
educational opportunity have had no real impact on class structure. Baker, 
Lynch, Cantillon and Walsh (2004, p. 141) observe,
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schools continue to operate according to mutually contradictory 
principles in relation to equality. While they profess principles of 
basic equality of opportunity...at the same time schools and 
colleges select and stratify students in a manner that clearly 
defeats certain aspects of their equality remit,
3.6 The Limitations of the Liberal Agenda
The previous chapters have acknowledged the limitations of the liberal 
agenda, particularly in the context of cultural difference. The need to 
problematise this agenda was recognised. So too, does the notion of education, 
particularly education as a route to equality, need to be problematised. This is the 
task of critical theory. Lynch observes “writers within the critical tradition 
refocused the debate about equality in education from concerns about ‘equal 
rates of consumption’ to questions about the nature of knowledge and patterns of 
control within education itself’ (Lynch, 1999, p. 10, original emphasis). This is 
not to say that the intrinsic principle of equality is being challenged here, rather it 
is the question of where to place the emphasis in discussions about equality. 
Lynch and Lodge (2002, p. 5) acknowledge that equality is a principle to which 
there is deep commitment in education, and indeed, this is borne out in the White 
Paper on Education (DES, 1995). However, they also contend that it is one that is 
often ill-defined and minimally implemented.
Lynch (1999, p. 287) contends that the pursuit of liberal equality policies 
can be a mere distraction from the business of equality in a more substantive 
sense. Referencing Baker (1987), she observes that promoting equal 
opportunities in a highly unequal society makes systems of inequality seem
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reasonable and acceptable; it moves the debate away from inequalities of wealth, 
power and prestige to the question of how to distribute inequalities more fairly. 
Citing Tawney, she contends that policies of equal opportunity gain approbation 
on the understanding that the limited notion of equality that they propose will be 
content with ceremonial honours. It retains its throne on condition 
that it refrains from meddling with the profitable business of the 
factory and the market place. Its credit is good as long as it does 
not to cash its cheques. Like other respectable principles, it is 
encouraged to reign, as long as it does not rule (Tawney, 1964, 
cited by Lynch, 1999, p^  296).
I believe that Lynch’s observations link with the some of the concerns 
outlined in Chapters One and Two. Distracting attention from the substantive 
issue of equality and inequality has been demonstrated as serving the interests of 
the global elite in that critical debate aimed at the redistribution of resources is 
silenced. ‘Celebrating’ difference and placing it within the musée imaginaire of 
Bhabha, (1990, in Chapter Two) is to imbue it with “ceremonial honours”. This 
serves the strategy of disengagement characteristic of the global elite, a strategy 
emanating from “an abhorrence of the immobilizing impact of long-term 
commitments and of the cumbersome and messy ties of dependency which the 
now abandoned alternative would inevitably have entailed” (Bauman, 2001, 
p.107).
Baker et al. (2004, p. 24) acknowledge that a liberal approach to issues of 
equality can be interpreted in many different ways, thereby demonstrating how 
the concept of equality itself is difficult to confine to one particular definition. 
Lynch (1999, p. 289) outlines the concept of equality in terms of a continuum,
with basic equality (focusing on minimal equal formal rights) at one end, and 
radical equality, (focusing on equality of condition) at the other. The liberal 
egalitarian perspective occupies a mid-way position, with the weaker forms of 
liberalism veering towards basic equality, and the stronger forms having more of 
an affinity with its radical counterpart. Baker et al. (2004, pp. 32-33) recognise 
the challenge that the liberal egalitarian perspective poses to societal inequalities. 
Nonetheless, they posit that liberal egalitarian principles are insufficient to 
achieve the structural change required to eliminate major inequalities. This 
observation is endorsed by Tovey and Share (2000, p. 207) who observe that, 
despite three decades of educational reform, class inequality in Ireland remains 
largely unchanged.
Lynch (1999, p. 294) outlines liberalism as being mainly concerned with 
the removal of legal barriers to participation in society. In the context of this 
dissertation, it can be seen that this is far from adequate to the needs of 
immigrant groups, most of whom are here by virtue of the fact that legal 
constraints have already been removed at an international level — I refer in 
particular to the widening of access to participation in the European Union in 
2004. However, equality in terms of living standards and material resources did 
not necessarily derive from the removal of legal impediments. Nor does the 
removal of such impediments imply a change in attitudes in relation to the advent 
of different cultural groups. Lodge et al., (2004, p. 6) posit,
while legislation gives rights to minorities to access and 
participate in education, it is much more difficult to challenge 
people’s often unquestioned assumptions about the nature of
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status or rights of different groups.
Baker et al. (2004, p. 33) present what they consider to be a more 
ambitious approach to inequality than that of the liberal agenda. This is 
encapsulated in the pursuit of equality of condition. This requires recognition 
that “inequality is rooted in changing and changeable social structures, and 
particularly in structures of domination and oppression”. A key distinction lies 
within the premise that liberal egalitarianism tends to treat individuals as 
responsible for their successes and failures, while equality of condition 
emphasises the influence of social factors on people’s choices and actions (ibid). 
Lynch (1999, p. 295) contends that equality of condition is not part of the liberal 
agenda. The liberal agenda is thus presented as being preoccupied with 
maintaining the status quo, and while acknowledging the legal rights of 
marginalised or disadvantaged groups, there is an onus placed on such groups to 
adapt to the dominant social system and to the values which it projects. We can 
thus conclude that the liberal agenda is limited to providing hospitality to 
minority groups without concerning itself with alleviating the subordinate role 
that is imposed by hospitality. Derrida’s comments (2006, in Chapter Two) in 
this regard resonate here. Lynch (1999, p. 300) observes that the structures and 
mechanisms required to promote equality of condition would involve widespread 
changes in constitutional and legislative frameworks, as well as in the political, 
economic, social and cultural infrastructures of society. Taxation, legislation and 
education would be among the many mechanisms required to bring about 
change.
society, the purpose of education and expectations regarding the
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I am not sure about casting aside the liberal framework, as I believe that it 
is possible to generate societal change from within this framework. As observed 
in Chapter One, Taylor (1991/1994), while expressing many concerns about the 
limitations of liberalism, attributes its ineptitudes to the fact that it lacks 
determinism and tends to adopt a neutral, laissez-faire attitude and ultimately 
serves the interests of the market forces. He could be viewed as supporting 
Lynch’s contentions. However, as was also observed in Chapter One, Taylor’s 
solutions came from within liberalism itself, in that while conceding to its 
‘hospitable’ variant, he also called for more definition in terms of the liberal 
agenda, or in other words, a bottom line. As our political structure is dependent 
upon liberal principles, I view Taylor’s solution as being more realistic and 
feasible in current Irish society.
In any case, I view some of the solutions put forward by Lynch in 
advocating equality of condition as being possible from within the liberal 
perspective. For example, she calls for “a strong politics of presence for 
marginalised groups within all decision-making systems and government 
departments within the state” (Lynch, 1999, p. 301). The current lacuna in this 
regard does not require an abdication of liberal principles. What is required is 
that these principles be acknowledged, and if necessary, subjected to critical 
debate. It is interesting to note that Lynch, while espousing a more radical 
agenda, does not subscribe to the abolition of existing systems in order to hasten 
change. Instead, she sees the potential for change within existing systems, and 
endeavours to shake the education system out of what she calls ‘institutional 
lethargy’ (ibid, p. 306), which she sees as serving the interests of the status quo. 
This lethargy has been demonstrated above, in more general terms, as evidenced
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by the paucity of long-term strategies and policy in relation to the advent of 
immigrant groups. Analysis of educational documents will serve to illustrate 
Lynch’s charge in the educational context.
In the specific context of education, Lynch contends that if schools are 
not participatory democracies in their organisation, and dialogical in their 
pedagogical practice, then it is likely that equality goals pursued through the 
curricula will be self-defeating as the hidden curriculum of schooling will 
contradict the message of the formal curriculum (ibid, p. 303). If this proves to 
be the case, such curricular initiatives as the Social, Personal and Health 
Education curriculum and the Guidelines for Intercultural Education, will be 
symbolic gestures rather than innovative interventions. This juxtaposition of the 
hidden and formal curriculum is an example of the ambiguities that feature in 
current educational provision. Yet, once again, I am not convinced that an 
abdication of liberal principles is required to address this ambiguity.
The ambiguity alluded to above can be seen to span many decades of 
educational provision in Ireland, particularly post 1960s when our cultural 
certainties came to be challenged. Many of the educational documents of the era 
may be seen to subscribe to change; yet analysis of their discourse and their 
subsequent practice will also indicate an adherence to the status quo. For 
example, the concepts of active participation and dialogue referred to by Lynch 
above, have long been features of the discourse of educational documents, even 
as far back as the 1971 curriculum. Yet, Sugrue, (2004, p. 189, citing the OECD, 
1991), demonstrates that despite the innovations of this curriculum in theory, in 
practice they were not borne out and that emphasis was largely placed upon 
didactic approaches and a relatively narrow range of content. It remains to be
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seen as to whether a similar conclusion will be derived from the 1999 initiative. 
If this is so, the hierarchical structures between the teacher and the pupil will 
continue to be perpetuated and the issue of equality, particularly equality of 
condition, will continue to linger in academic forums rather than being 
operationalised in the classroom. To achieve equality of condition in the context 
of the accommodation of cultural difference will require “a change of 
management structure, of ‘school ethos’ and of the level of resourcing” (Tovey 
and Share, 2000, p. 223). The essential question here is whether this can be 
achieved from within the liberal perspective.
3.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, I looked specifically at the current situation in Ireland in 
the context of a developing multicultural society. A strong theme to emerge from 
my deliberations is the failure on the part of government departments to 
problematise the advent of cultural difference and the consequent dearth of 
formal policy in this regard. While both our formal political structures and our 
informal structures have become unsettled in the face of difference, there seems 
to be an official silence about the realities of a multicultural society. The lack of 
critical debate is tangible and the lack of policy and infrastructural support even 
more so. Officially, the advent of cultural difference is not a problem and to view 
it as such is actively discouraged. And so, we are exhorted to ‘tolerate’ and 
‘celebrate’ difference but ultimately we do little to accommodate its reality.
We are not ethnoculturally neutral and to pretend that we are renders us 
complicit in perpetuating the ‘liberalism of neutrality’ of which Taylor is 
trenchantly critical. While we have moved beyond the ethnocentric nationalism
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characterised by being Catholic and Gaelic, we cannot ignore these fundamental 
aspects of our identity. The Catholic Church still exerts a strong influence, either 
overtly or covertly on a significant part of the Irish population and the Catholic 
ethos is still a defining characteristic in the vast majority of Irish schools. 
Similarly the Irish language is still a significant aspect of Irish identity and 
occupies a significant part of Irish education.
In my deliberations, I have posed the question as to whether the liberal 
tradition is sufficient to achieve an intercultural society. The liberal tradition 
endorses the notion of ‘appropriation’ in which individuals are encouraged to 
‘choose’ to integrate into Irish society. This removes the onus on the State to 
provide resources and infrastructure to facilitate such integration. This is the 
‘neutral’ version of liberalism and is, in my opinion, an obstacle to the process 
and does not facilitate the achievement of the equality of condition outlined by 
Lynch (1999). Yet, it could be posited that a benign or neutral stance towards a 
multicultural society is a feature of many of the educational policy documents of 
the past decade. Referencing multiculturalism or interculturalism does not, in 
itself, achieve equality of condition. This can only be achieved through moving 
beyond a limited perspective on ‘equality of opportunity’ and through initiating a 
consequent and radical reorganisation of existing societal and educational 
structures. However, I am not necessarily advocating the dismissal of the liberal 
tradition, as I believe that the ad hocery of current approaches can be replaced 
with a more deterministic, but still liberal, perspective.
Liberal theory can be deemed to recognise cultural difference. However, 
many of the more radical, neo-Marxist theorists, for example, Bhabha and Freire, 
McLaren and Giroux, with whom Drudy and Lynch can be seen to link, consider
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that its perspective renders it inadequate to do more than engage in recognition. 
If this is the case, it may fall short of facilitating the achievement of 
interculturalism. The liberal endorsement of existing values and of social 
cohesion is anathema to the more radical perspective. Yet, an alternative society 
is difficult to conceptualise. This conundrum becomes evident in the Irish 
educational policy documents. The reality of the situation is that they have been 
developed in a liberal democratic context but yet seek to sidestep any of the more 
problematic aspects of liberal theory. This renders them ambiguous in terms of 
philosophical basis, an ambiguity which may serve to dissipate potential 
confrontation among opposing groups but which ultimately leaves us without 
direction in relation to how a multicultural society can become intercultural. It 
may well be that they have benignly engaged with the middle voice provided by 
différance and the ‘third space’, while they eschew the antagonism and conflict 
which needs to ensue if such a middle voice is to have any resonance. The 
following chapters will engage with this conundrum.
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Chapter Four: Towards a dialogue with difference (1): 
The Primary School Curriculum (1999)
4.1 Introduction
In the previous chapters, I have explored a diversity of perspectives with 
a view to devising a theoretical lens through which to analyse how Irish 
education meets the challenge of maintaining social cohesion while recognising 
difference in the context of a multicultural society. This has been undertaken 
through a broad and heuristic interpretation of critical theory (Kincheloe and 
McLaren, 1994, in Introduction) wherein a variety of perspectives are admitted. 
The underlying theme of critical theory is that of emancipation. However, it was 
observed in Chapter One that this theme, while laudable, is not without its 
problems and the pursuit of freedom without constraint can, in Hegelian terms, 
lead to ‘unfreedom’ through being shackled to the yoke of individualism. This 
leads to the demise of active citizenship. This is a significant concern of Hegel 
and of many of his followers. For those theorists, a vision of the ‘good life’ with 
attendant rules and boundaries is the means of maintaining social cohesion. For 
them, there is a ‘bottom line’ beyond which they will not go.
On the other hand, for the more radical theorists, such as Foucault and 
Derrida, this vision embraces the “certainty of absolutes” (Foucault, 2003, p. 
246, in Chapter Two), and for them, its reductionist viewpoint is insufficient to 
address what is localised, singular and contingent in a world of uncertainty. As 
observed in the concept of différance, Derrida disputes the existence of the 
‘bottom line’ as the ultimate arbiter in the workings of society. Thus, to reiterate 
a quote used in Chapter Two, for Derrida, “there is no support to be found and no
depth to be had for this bottomless chessboard where being is set in play” 
(Derrida, 2003, p. 237, in Chapter Two). For many of us, removing the safety net 
of the bottom line leaves us more open to the challenges relating to the workings 
of society. Perhaps this is what is needed to take place so that the complexities 
inherent in a multicultural society can be unearthed and addressed. Yet, the issue 
of an alternative to the bottom line remains a significant lacuna in the work of the 
more radical theorists. For them, their role as critics seems to suffice.
In this chapter and the subsequent one, I wish to use the intratheoretical 
analysis undertaken in the previous chapters as a way of locating the 
philosophical basis of Irish educational policy. Specifically, I am intent on 
determining the extent to which the overall theme or problem in this dissertation, 
namely that of maintaining social cohesion while recognising difference, is 
acknowledged and addressed by Irish education. This problem will be placed in 
the context of cultural difference. In order to pursue my objective, I intend to 
engage in an interrogation of a number of Irish educational policy initiatives 
undertaken in the past decade or so. In extending critical theory beyond the 
Frankfurt School, I have acknowledged Ball’s exhortation to embed policy 
discourse analysis in more than one good theory (Ball, 1994, p. 24). Specific 
excerpts from the documents under scrutiny will be employed as a means of 
focussing the discussion and of supporting my contentions. The intratheoretical 
analysis undertaken hitherto will assist in the process of “excavating hidden 
power circuits in Irish education that routinely escape identification and 
meaning” (O’Sullivan, 2005, p. xiii). The relevance of Foucault to this endeavour 
thus becomes evident, although as can be seen from my deliberations, I eschew 
the application of a solely poststructuralist approach to this task. I am using the
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term ‘policy’ in a broad sense, as it can be observed that the second of the two 
documents under scrutiny is accorded the more limited appellation of 
‘Guidelines’. Nevertheless, both documents can be aligned with the challenges 
and complexities of policy development. For this reason, I consider it apposite at 
this juncture to reflect on the meaning(s) inherent in the word ‘policy’ itself.
4.2 What is Policy?
Ball (1994, p. 15) observes that one of the problems featuring within 
policy research is that analysts fail to define what they mean by policy. It would 
appear that this difficulty is easily resolved by turning to the Oxford English 
Dictionary. The OED defines policy as a “course or general plan of action to be 
adopted by government, party, person etc.” (OED, 1984, p. 793). Although a 
concise and easily understood definition, it does not illustrate the complexity and 
ambiguity that are inherent features of policy. It also ignores its evolving nature. 
Ball refrains from offering his own definition of policy and admits to having 
“theoretical uncertainties” about its meaning. Instead he chooses to present 
policy in the context of a hermeneutical exercise. He cautions us that the 
“structure/agency dichotomy” within policy cannot be resolved by viewing them 
as binary opposites (Ball, 1999, p. 15). Policy analysis must therefore achieve 
insight into both overall and localised outcomes of policy (ibid, p. 21). Here, the 
universal becomes enmeshed with the singular and contingent, becoming more of 
a conceptual conundrum, thus according a more tangible significance to 
Derrida’s middle voice of différance.
Ball presents policy under two headings: as text and as discourse. Both 
observations are relevant to this discussion. In looking at policy as text, we
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acknowledge the complexity of hermeneutics as, “for any text a plurality of 
readers must necessarily produce a plurality of readings” (Ball, 1994, p. 16, 
citing Codd, 1988). Ball emphasises that “the policies themselves, the texts, are 
not necessarily, clear or closed or complete”, thus admitting the notion of “ad 
hocery, negotiation and serendipity” in policy formulation as well as 
implementation, and though only certain voices are heard at any point in time in 
the process, even within this constraint, there is still dissensus and blurring of 
meaning (ibid, p. 16). Here, he is implicitly acknowledging the “closure of 
presence, together with the closure of the conceptual order and denomination” 
(Derrida, 2003, p. 226), which is heralded by differance. Meaning changes with 
the passage of time and with the change of key protagonists in the formulation of 
policy (Ball, 1994, p. 17). Thus the historical aspect of discourse needs to be 
taken account of in analysis. Ball observes that, at all stages in the policy 
process, we are confronted with interpretations and reinterpretations of policy 
and that “these attempts to represent or rerepresent policy sediment and build up 
over time; they spread confusion and allow for play in and the playing off of 
meanings”. Here Ball effectively illustrates both a Foucauldian and Derridean 
perspective: the painstaking approach of the archaeological method as one sifts 
through the sediment of policy becomes evident, along with the ludic nature of 
deconstruction.
To engage with policy solely as text may result in a limited focus with 
much of the complexities surrounding policy being overlooked. Ball (1994, pp. 
21-22) contends that we run the risk of concentrating too much on what those 
who inhabit policy think about and missing and failing to address what they do 
not think about, thus obviating the notion of alterity. Chouliaraki and Fairclough
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(1999, pp. 14-15) observe that the social fragmentation of late modem society 
makes it difficult to sustain the characteristic earlier modem view that meaning 
resides in texts. Therefore, we need to embrace policy as discourse. According to 
Fairclough (1989, p. 24), what differentiates discourse from text is that text is a 
product rather than a process. It is the product of the process of text production. 
He uses the term ‘discourse’ to refer to the whole process of social interaction of 
which text is just a part. Therefore, in seeing language as discourse and as social 
practice
one is committing oneself not just to analysing texts, nor just to 
analysing processes of production and interpretation, but to 
analysing the relationship between texts, processes and their 
social conditions, both the immediate conditions of the situational 
context and the more remote conditions of institutional and social 
structures (ibid, p. 26).
In short, seeing language as discourse is to analyse the relationship 
between texts, interactions and contexts (ibid, original emphasis). This 
relationship is defined as ‘intertextuality’ (Fairclough, 1995, p. 189). O’Sullivan 
(2005, p. 319) distinguishes intertextuality from pastiche. Intertextuality is 
viewed as bringing diverse paradigms into contact with each other in order to 
generate an intersubjective dynamic, whereas pastiche is seen as a non- 
generative, consensual-driven mixing of traces of texts. O’Sullivan contends that 
“pastiche promotes little dissonance that cannot be eased by non-reflexive 
negotiation, compromise and pragmatism and allows intervention to be quickly 
foregrounded in discourse” (ibid, p. 199). In the exploration of the selected 
documents, I will endeavour to demonstrate how the analysis of discourse will
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demonstrate the story behind the text. Power balances and imbalances will 
become evident and the many ambiguities evident in policy as text will be 
explored, if not resolved. The impact of social context will be acknowledged as a 
key issue in the analysis that follows. Over the course of this analysis, it will 
become evident that I am employing some of the principles of Critical Discourse 
Analysis (CDA) to assist me in this undertaking. In doing so, I make reference to 
the work of Fairclough (1989/1995) and Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999). 
However, I have not confined the analysis solely to an exercise in CDA and have 
instead chosen to present it as a more specific application of the intratheoretical 
analysis undertaken in Chapters One and Two. Nevertheless, the influence of 
CDA will be seen in certain aspects of the analysis, an influence that I wish to 
acknowledge here. The focus of CDA on social context is particularly relevant to 
the current undertaking.
Two documents have been selected for review. These are the Primary 
School Curriculum (1999): Introduction and Social, Personal and Health 
Education; and the Guidelines on Intercultural Education in the Primary School 
(2005). I am justifying this choice to the exclusion of other significant documents 
of the decade, in that I view them as illustrative of the tensions between the 
maintenance of social cohesion and the recognition of difference in the context of 
an increasingly multicultural Ireland. Also, the Guidelines on Intercultural 
Education present a definitive link between the two documents, as they 
consistently refer to the earlier document as an ‘intercultural’ one (DES, 2005a, 
pp. 5-7, etc.). This interpretation is, in my opinion, open to debate. Other 
documents will be accorded acknowledgement where relevant, in order to 
substantiate the argument. However, their inclusion will, of necessity be brief. I
wish to add at this juncture that I do not propose to engage in a systematic 
analysis of the chosen documents. Instead, those parts of the documents that are 
deemed to impact either positively or negatively on the intercultural agenda, i.e. 
the active pursuit of an intercultural as opposed to a multicultural society, will be 
included. In undertaking this analysis of Irish educational documents, I aim to 
challenge what O’Sullivan (2005, p. x) terms the ‘gloss’ placed on the policy 
process that presents it as conceptually and procedurally uncomplicated.
Due to the fact that this dissertation is an exclusively theoretical one, the 
issue of validation does not assume the same significance as it would were action 
research involved. Nevertheless, a number of factors could still compromise 
validity and these need acknowledgement. In addition, ethical considerations 
need to be outlined.
4.2.1 Validation of Findings
In order to achieve validation in the context of critical theory, we are 
looking for criteria to judge the goodness or quality of the inquiry (Guba and 
Lincoln, 1994, p. 114). Guba and Lincoln identity the criteria as the historical 
situatedness of the inquiry (i.e. that it takes account of the social, political, 
cultural, economic, ethnic and gender antecedents of the studied situation), the 
extent to which the inquiry acts to erode ignorance and misapprehensions and the 
extent to which it provides a stimulus to action, that is to the transformation of 
the existing structure. I consider that my study takes account of these criteria, 
although I acknowledge that I do not focus specifically on gender issues.
The validity of this research could be compromised by a charge of 
ideological bias being levelled at me in my capacity as researcher. O’Sullivan 
(2005, p. xix) observes that analysts are “social actors and cannot be beyond
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culture/ideology”. I am aware of the potential bias that I may bring to this 
dissertation, writing as, in O’Sullivan’s terms, “an indigenous commentator”, as 
a former primary school teacher and as a lecturer in Social, Personal and Health 
Education. My inclusion of an expanded form of critical theory in this research 
allows for divergent views to be incorporated into the study of the selected 
documents, thus allowing for a more complete analysis, one that is less open to 
the charge of bias. However, it should also be borne in mind that critical theory is 
not a value-free or a value-neutral discipline. On the contrary, Guba and Lincoln 
(1994, p. 114) contend that values have a pride of place within critical theory as 
they are seen as ineluctable in shaping inquiry outcomes. To exclude values 
would be inimical to the interests of the powerless and of “at risk” audiences. 
Thus, in the case of critical theory, a charge of bias may be seen to strengthen 
rather than compromise the validity of the research.
In any case, Lincoln and Guba (1985, p. 329) caution us that naturalistic 
inquiry is by its very nature open-ended and that, unlike conventional inquiry, no 
amount of criteria for validity or in their words, trustworthiness, can ever 
compel, it can, at best, persuade (original emphasis). Thus the validity of the 
findings will be constantly open to challenge.
4.2.2 Ethical Considerations
As this is a theoretical study, ethical considerations are of lesser 
significance than if the study consisted of live participants. Nevertheless, Guba 
and Lincoln (1994, p. 115) observe that ethics is nearly instrinsic (original 
emphasis) to critical theory as implied by the intent to erode ignorance and 
misapprehensions and to take full account of values and historical situatedness in 
the inquiry process. This consideration will be borne in mind as the analysis
progresses. In addition, I consider that this undertaking has imbued me with an 
ethical responsibility of contributing to future policy development.
One other consideration that I consider to be relevant here relates to my 
use of the first person singular and plural throughout this dissertation. Lyotard 
(1989, pp. 315-316) observes that within the tradition of modernity, the position 
of the first person is, in fact, marked as being that of the mastery of speech and 
meaning. My use of “I” may imply an overly subjective and authoritative 
response to both the theory and the discourse, thus imposing my own ideological 
bias. However, at the same time, as observed above, I am aware that my response 
is just that, just mine, and that another reader may respond in quite a different 
manner to the selected texts. I will bear in mind Derrida’s observation (1984, in 
Chapter Two) that we can never be sure of what is meant by a written text and 
that it can have a multiplicity of meaning. I consider that an overly detached and 
neutral response may result in being diluted and thus less participative in critical 
dialogue. However, at the same time I do not consider myself to have The last 
word’. The implication of mastery can also be extended to the first person plural. 
Lyotard (1989, p. 317) sees an implication of tyranny in the use of “We” as 
“We” are decreeing laws to be applied to third parties, to those outside. Caputo’s 
observations in relation to the Derridean caution about the concept of community 
resonate here. He observes that the use of “we” (of community) can be 
interpreted as a defence against the “other” (Caputo, 1997, in Chapter Two). 
Thus, in the use of the first person (singular and plural), it could be inferred that I 
am imposing my voice on that of the marginalized and perhaps disempowering 
them rather than contributing to their empowerment. Fairclough (1989, pp. 126- 
127) expands on this consideration by challenging the analyst to reflect upon
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whether he/she is using what he terms the ‘inclusive We’ or the ‘exclusive We’, 
thus making an authority claim. I am open to the charge of using the ‘exclusive 
We’ in that I am using the pronoun to speak on behalf of minority groups, thus 
augmenting disempowerment. The actual voices of the relevant groups are not 
included in this study. However, acknowledgement of this consideration also 
allows me to see the potential for further research wherein those currently absent 
voices will be included.
4.3 In Pursuit of a Philosophical Basis
One of the main criticisms levelled at the Green Paper (1992) by the 
National Education Convention related to its lack of an adequate philosophy of 
education, resulting in an over-emphasis on utilitarian and commercial concerns 
(Coolahan, 1994, p. 7). The discourse of the market place took a dominant role in 
this document. In responding to change, Irish education was to be broadened so 
that students could be prepared for work in an enterprise culture, an overhaul of 
management practice was indicated, quality assurance became a significant 
consideration and openness and accountability were to be ensured throughout the 
system (Department of Education, 1992, p. 5, emphasis added). In addition, the 
school principal was to be seen as the chief executive (ibid, p. 19). While not 
refuting the economic concerns of the Green Paper, the National Education 
Convention emphasised the need for such concerns “to be balanced by the other 
dimensions which should be integral to educational policy making” (Coolahan, 
1994, p. 9). This would serve to provide a more adequate philosophy of 
education. Here, it can be observed that the Habermasian dilemma of rendering
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the purpose-rational world subordinate to the life-world (Habermas, 1971, in 
Chapter One) comes into play.
Although the White Paper (1995) sought to address the issue of a 
philosophical basis by presenting a philosophical rationale in the first chapter, the 
pervasive effects of purposive-rationality continue to be evident in Irish 
education. While concern with the purposive-rational model may seem to digress 
from the substantive issue of this dissertation, namely maintaining social 
cohesion while recognising difference, it will be seen that the two concerns 
actually coalesce. Olson (1989, cited by Gleeson, 2004, p. 126) concludes that 
within the technical rationality model, there is “tacit agreement” to assume 
consensus, emphasise techniques and avoid public debate about the fundamental 
values of schooling. Gleeson (2004, p. 125) applies this criticism to the Irish 
context. We are not far from the Freireian critique of education here, wherein 
“critical consciousness” (Freire 1972, p. 47) is demonstrated to be a notable 
absentee. If this is the case, the needs emerging from cultural difference will not 
be addressed in any constructive manner. In the analysis that follows, I will posit 
that the assumption of consensus and the avoidance of problematising 
controversial issues, are significant features of current educational policy. It will 
be seen that the concept of identity will be accorded priority in Chapter Four. 
This will be embodied in an exploration of the influence exerted by the Irish 
language and, in particular, by the Catholic Church. The associated issue of 
school ethos will be examined, along with the impact of individualism upon 
social cohesion. This exploration will employ the Primary School Curriculum as 
its focal point. Chapter Five will focus more specifically on Ireland’s political 
context and will link this to the Guidelines for Jntercultural Education.
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4.4 The Primary School Curriculum (1999), Introduction
The Primary School Curriculum (1999) is the culmination and product of 
the Report of the National Education Convention (Coolahan, 1994) and the 
White Paper on Education (Department of Education, 1995). As such, it should 
come as no great surprise that there is a dearth of specific focus on explicit issues 
of social cohesion and difference, particularly in the context of minority, non- 
indigenous cultures, as this was not a feature of the preceding documents. 
Nevertheless, at this juncture in Ireland, the impact of demographic change was 
becoming an increasing reality, as Ireland was a country of net immigration since 
1996 (Boucher, 2008, in Chapter Three).
An observation made by Sugrue (2004, p. 170) serves as an apposite 
preamble to my deliberations on the Primary School Curriculum. This relates to 
the official definition of the curriculum. The curriculum is defined as being 
‘revised’ and Sugrue queries why the stronger term ‘reform’, incorporating a 
transformative element, was sidestepped. He proposes that the term ‘revision’ 
was employed to mask more substantial reforms that remain unarticulated due to 
power relations within the system. I interpret from Sugrue’s observations here 
that what has actually taken place in the curriculum, is, in fact, stronger, than 
what the term ‘revision’ implies, but that the term has been used in order to keep 
the various interest groups on board. However, I contend that the term could also 
be interpreted at face value: it may well be that the curriculum has stopped short 
of transformation and is aligning itself more closely with the reproduction or 
transmission of the status quo. This interpretation renders the term ‘revised’ a 
more accurate description of the process which has taken place. This bodes
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poorly in terms of what Gleeson (2004, p. 105) terms “deep change” in relation 
to curriculum reform. Such change would be a far lengthier process and would 
imply a more concerted rupture with the status quo. Gleeson (2004, p. 126, citing 
Callan, 1995) contends that fundamental curriculum issues have been neglected 
in the pursuit of “piecemeal adjustments or alignments to a host of social and 
cultural issues... leading to an enlargement of curriculum contents with resultant 
pressures on schools to respond”. Such an approach indicates a philosophical 
deficit. I acknowledge that Gleeson was writing in the context of second-level 
education; however, his observations resonate with the argument presented here.
4.4.1 The Ambiguity o f ‘Flexibility *
The Primary School Curriculum undoubtedly attempts to call into 
question the purposive-rationality that characterised the Green Paper. In the 
Introduction to the 1999 document, we are informed, “the curriculum reflects the 
educational, cultural, social and economic aspirations and concerns of Irish 
society” (DES, 1999a, p. 6). This variety of concerns could be seen to bear 
witness to a concerted effort to downplay economic or technological influences. 
Yet, the discourse of the market place is retained, although it is presented in a 
more subtle manner than in the Green Paper.
There is a consistent focus on flexibility throughout the curriculum 
commencing with the Introduction (DES, 1999a, p. 6), in which we are informed, 
“the curriculum outlines a detailed and structured framework of content that is 
comprehensive and flexible”. Later we are told that the curriculum “affords 
flexibility to the school and teacher in planning the learning experiences that are 
useful to the individual child at the various stages of his or her development” 
(DES, 1999a, p. 10). Chouliaraki and Fairclough (1999, p. 3, referencing Harvey,
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1990) observe that ‘flexibility’ has become a key concept and practice that 
covers both intensive technological innovation in the diversification of 
production and the ‘flexibility’ of labour, where short-term and part-time 
working are increasingly the pattern. While the term may have a more nuanced 
signification in the educational context, there is no doubt about the many 
demands that ‘flexibility’ places upon current classrooms. In the context of a 
multicultural society, this can have two different and opposing effects: 
undoubtedly, the teacher needs to be flexible in attitude and approach to cater for 
the requirements of difference. Yet her flexibility may also obviate the need for 
investment and intervention at a more macro-level.
Ultimately, the promotion of a flexible approach to teaching could be 
viewed as a subtle way of maintaining the status quo and of endorsing the 
purposive-rational model. A flexible approach to teaching will serve to mask, if 
not eliminate, the problems that a multicultural classroom may pose -  problems 
that, as observed by McGorman and Sugrue (2007, p. xiv), require appropriate 
legislative and policy responses. I have already outlined Habermas’s distinction 
between the symbolic interaction of the life-world and the world of purposive 
rationality and the importance of the latter remaining subordinate to the former 
(Habermas, 1971, in Chapter One).
I contend here that a flexible approach to teaching runs the risk of 
conceding more in favour of the ‘system’ (embodied by purposive-rationality), 
than to the symbolic interaction of the life-world. The teacher as a ‘resource’ is 
being used to optimise returns. In responding to the call for ‘flexibility’, the 
teacher is expected to address the problems emanating from cultural difference 
without being allowed to enunciate them as such. Such enunciation would be
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commensurate with inflexibility. It could be argued that an overly flexible 
approach operates as a neo-liberal force, as the accordance of recognition is not 
sustained by the practice of redistribution.
McGorman and Sugrue (2007, p. 155) highlight the inadequacies of the 
current legislative and policy framework, in terms of providing a more 
comprehensive approach to inclusion, based on equality of participation. They 
conclude that, in many respects, principals and teachers have become pawns in a 
larger policy power struggle. Concessions to the demands for flexibility will 
result in the principals and teachers being confined to this subordinate role. 
Lynch (1999, pp. 302-303), in her critique of the liberal approach to education, 
contends,
the issue of equality is not just about getting working-class or 
other marginalised groups and individuals ‘in and out of the 
system’ successfully; it is about changing the nature of education 
itself in both its organisation and its curricular substance.
A flexible approach may help to get marginalised children ‘in and out of the 
system’, but too much flexibility may act as an impediment to change.
4,4,2 Individualism
I have so far presented the curriculum as retaining earlier characteristics 
of purposive-rationality, one that may serve to maintain a cohesion of sorts. I 
now wish to focus on a related feature of the purposive-rational model, one 
which could be viewed initially as sympathetic to the assertion of difference, but 
which ultimately subverts its accommodation. I am referring to the phenomenon 
of individualism; a phenomenon seen by O’Sullivan (2005, p. 108) to be a 
feature of what he terms the ‘mercantile paradigm’ of education.
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From the outset, the curriculum affirms the moral and spiritual 
development of the child. This could be seen to endorse the Hegelian notion of 
Sittlichkeit, in that “an ethical sense that will enable [the child] to acquire values 
on which to base choices and form attitudes” is fostered (DES, 1999a, p. 7, 
brackets added). Yet, I am not convinced that the Hegelian notion is upheld here, 
in that “the moral obligations I have to an ongoing community of which I am a 
part” (Taylor, 1984, p. 75, in Chapter One), is not, in my view, sufficiently 
highlighted. While there is a cursory reference to the good of society, the main 
benefits from the development of an ethical sense seem to relate to the child 
himself or herself. Children “will acquire knowledge and skills that will serve 
them not only in their lives as children but later as adults” (DES, 1999a, p. 7). I 
contend that these attributes should be explicitly presented as serving the 
community as well as the child so that Taylor’s sense of a “higher purpose” 
(Taylor, 1991, p. 4) may enter the equation. The concept of the greater good is 
not in evidence and the curriculum thus leaves itself open to a charge of 
endorsing individualism.
Pages 8 and 9 of the Introduction to the curriculum provide an outline of 
its principles. What is striking about the principles is that there is no reference to 
the child in the context of his or her community. All concern is with the child 
himself or herself. There are seventeen principles in all and they are outlined in 
detail in Appendix B. The principles are, in essence, based on those of the 1971 
curriculum, and retain the focus on “celebrating the uniqueness of the child” and 
of “ensuring the development of the child’s full potential” (DES, 1999a, p. 8). 
This may lend an emancipatory role to education, however it is to be queried as 
to whether Hegel’s ‘unfreedom’ (Habermas, 1987a, in Chapter One) may be a
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more accurate interpretation, as the subjectivity of the child seems to be the 
prevailing concern.
At this juncture, a vision of the common good is not provided and it 
would seem that the rights of the child take precedence over his or her duties and 
responsibilities towards the common good. In fact one has to go to page 23 of the 
Introduction before finding any reference to the child’s contribution to the 
community. This inclusion comes at the end of a lengthy and detailed outline of 
the principles of learning and appears as the final sentence in the final paragraph. 
Here, we are informed that school planning should “take cognisance of what the 
community has to offer in creating relevant and effective learning experiences 
for its children, and in identifying the contribution that children can, in turn, 
make to the community” (DES, 1999a, p. 23). There is an impression created that 
this inclusion occurred almost as an afterthought. This leads to a concern in 
relation to the dearth of priority accorded to the duties of citizenship, a dearth 
that has significant negative implications for future social cohesion and political 
engagement. There is little sight of the republican ideal here. Taylor, (1991, p.9, 
citing de Toqueville, 1981) observes, “a society in which most people end up as 
the kind of individuals who are ‘enclosed in their own hearts’ is one where few 
will want to participate actively in self-government”. The authentic dimension of 
the liberal agenda becomes eclipsed by what Taylor (1991, pp. 17-18, in Chapter 
One) calls “the liberalism of neutrality”, and which he views as axiomatic. This 
means that, as a liberal, one is deterred from questioning, challenging and, much 
less, making a judgement on the values and practices of others. This obviates a 
common consensus on what constitutes the good life. It may be worth
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reproducing a quote from Taylor here and applying it to the context of the 
school:
The good life is what each individual seeks, in his or her own 
way, and government would be lacking in impartiality, and thus in 
equal respect for all citizens, if it took sides in this question 
(Taylor, 1991, p. 18).
It could be argued that the curriculum, in endeavouring to manifest liberal 
principles, is veering towards the ‘liberalism of neutrality’ outlined above. The 
teacher is viewed as the neutral, impartial facilitator of the development of the 
child as an individual. For example, it is stated that the teacher
has a complex role as a caring facilitator and guide who interprets 
the child’s learning needs and responds to them. This role is 
informed by a concern for the uniqueness of the child, a respect 
for the integrity of the child as a learner and by a sense of 
enthusiasm and a commitment to teaching (DES, 1999a, p. 20)
I contend that the role of the teacher should also be informed by a concern for the 
community and for the principles of active citizenship. The excessive focus on 
the individual could result in the neo-liberal agenda being allowed to 
predominate.
I wish to acknowledge at this juncture that the predominantly 
individualistic focus that can be witnessed in the curriculum is not without 
precedent. As observed in Chapter One, Seery (2008, pp. 134-135) posits that 
this prioritising of the individual can be attributed to the discourse of 
developmental psychology, which is the dominant informing discipline in 
education of the twentieth century. He identifies its extensive usage by the
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National Council for Curriculum and Assessment and also as the lingua franca of 
initial teacher education in Ireland. Yet, he observes that there are a number of 
difficulties associated with this discourse. On the one hand, “the overemphasis 
on the individual and catering for individual needs neglects an ancient 
understanding of the role of education in the reproduction of traditions, 
solidarities and identities” (ibid, p. 135). On the other hand, for critical pedagogy 
theorists, “the concerns of an individually based developmental psychology mask 
the political and emancipatory potential, even duty, of education” (ibid). If this 
contention is to be accepted, we are left with the rather pessimistic conclusion 
that the predominant discourse and, indeed, structure, of the curriculum does 
little to facilitate either social cohesion or the recognition of difference.
The liberal agenda does not preclude the assertion of core values. This is 
consistently maintained by Taylor (1994, in Chapter One). For him, the 
imposition of a ‘bottom line5 is crucial to the workings of society and for the 
liberal agenda to be a meaningful one. Consideration of the features of this 
‘bottom line’ is significant in order to avoid a charge of ethnocentrism. Thus, I 
wish to look more closely at the issue of ethnocentrism as, despite my contention 
that a ‘liberalism of neutrality’ emanates from the focus on individualism, shades 
of the ethnocentric agenda could, paradoxically, also be seen to be in evidence in 
the curriculum. This is where confusion in terms of philosophical basis, begins to 
manifest itself.
4.4.3 An Ethnocentric Agenda?
As observed in the Introduction to this dissertation and also in Chapter 
Three, being “Catholic and Gaelic” (Tovey and Share, 2000, p. 330) is no longer 
deemed to be sufficient to a definition of Irish identity. Yet, it was also
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acknowledged that these essential parts of our identity cannot be overlooked. The 
key issues in primary education as outlined in the curriculum (DES, 1999a, p. 9 
and pp. 26-31) include a significant focus on Irish identity. While being quite 
unspecific in the general outline of identity (thus aligning with the more neutral 
features of liberalism and thus eschewing a charge of ethnocentricity), the 
curriculum then goes on to focus specifically on the Irish language and on 
spirituality. While the statement on the Irish language is unequivocal in relation 
to the role of Irish in the curriculum, thus risking a charge of ethnocentricity, the 
statement on spirituality is less so. As will be seen from the deconstruction of the 
statement below, it presents itself as a manifestation of the confusion and 
uncertainty surrounding religious and spiritual matters in current society. I will 
now examine the two statements in more detail.
The statement on the Irish language asserts its importance in developing a 
sense of identity. We are informed that
It is a particular feature of Irish primary education that children, 
from the beginning of schooling, have an experience of language 
learning in two languages. An engagement with the Irish language 
throughout the period of primary education extends the child’s 
linguistic experience and deepens cultural awareness. The 
curriculum recognises that an experience and a knowledge of Irish 
are important in enabling the child to begin to define and express 
his or her sense of national and cultural identity 
(DES, 1999a, p. 27).
There is no consideration given to the fact that for some children, the Irish 
language is not a feature of their national and cultural identity. There is a
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presumption of homogeneity that, by 1999, was becoming a less tenable feature 
of Irish society. In this respect, it can be seen that the curriculum has not 
advanced significantly from the pronouncement on the Irish language by the Irish 
Free State in 1922, which decreed that Irish should be taught as a medium of 
instruction in all national schools for at least one hour a day (Hyland, 2000, pp. 
24-25). Thus, the assertion of the importance of the Irish language could be 
interpreted as an assertion of nationalist ideology and, consequently, as an 
imposition of hegemony. However, this is not necessarily the case. O’Sullivan 
(2005, pp. 201-202), in his outline of the rise of the Gaelscoileanna movement, 
demonstrates how the Irish language can be used to highlight the cause of 
minority rights and choice. Irish was viewed by both those from within the 
movement, and those from without, as a matter of choice rather than prescription. 
Consequently, it was seen as a means of asserting the rights both of those who 
wished to use Irish as their chosen medium of communication and those who 
wish to eschew involvement with the language. Thus it can be concluded that it 
is the manner in which Irish is defined in the curriculum, rather than the 
acknowledgement of Irish itself, which legitimises a charge of ethnocentrism and 
of imposing a hegemonic perspective. As will be seen in Chapter Five, the 
potential for Irish to serve the cause of minority groups is further highlighted in 
the Guidelines for Intercultural Education.
The section on spirituality in the curriculum merits attention in that it may 
well be that, here, the core societal values, and thus a philosophical basis, which 
are proving elusive in other parts of the curriculum, can be found. Some of this 
section is reproduced below:
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For most people in Ireland, the totality of the human condition 
cannot be understood or explained merely in terms of physical and 
social experience. This conviction comes from a shared 
perception that intimates a more profound explanation of being, 
from an awareness of the finiteness of life and from the sublime 
fulfilment that human existence sometimes affords. The spiritual 
dimension of life expresses itself in a search for truth and in the 
quest for a transcendental element within the human experience 
(DES, 1999a, p. 27).
This section sidesteps a definitive association with the Catholic Church and 
endeavours to present a less partisan interpretation of spirituality. Nevertheless, 
while not explicitly Catholic in its presentation, the section may be seen to be 
embedded in the language of Christian education. This is not a particularly novel 
revelation. Seery (2008, p. .135, in Chapter Three) reminds us, “echoes and 
reminders of a theological idiom in educational language still persist in Irish 
education....” Seery goes on to observe that Christian education is directed “at 
full understanding in order to come to an understanding of God so its aims go 
beyond this-worldly ends” (ibid, p. 136).
This section bears out Seery’s observation. It can be seen to attribute the 
meaning of life to transcendent or metaphysical influences and could thus be 
interpreted as discriminating against those who espouse a humanistic perspective, 
as the meaning of life is denied to them. A potential charge of hegemony 
emerges here but is mitigated by a sense of restraint from providing a definitive 
stance on spirituality. This renders the language in this section particularly 
obscure and it does little to convey to either the teacher or the child a sense of
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what the development of the spiritual dimension of life actually means. However, 
the neutrality that it is hying to convey results in what Rorty (referenced by 
Fanning, 2007, p. 241) views as the ‘muddle’ that emanates from the application 
of a non-definitive stance. In any case, Foucault, (1974, cited by Rabinow, 1991, 
in Chapter Two) would contend that institutions that appear to be neutral and 
independent are open to suspicion.
I wish to critique this segment in more detail in order to include an 
Enlightenment and poststructuralist perspective. The subordination of the 
“physical and social experience” could be viewed as the subordination of the 
Enlightenment to metaphysics. If the Enlightenment is viewed solely in terms of 
the Horkheimer and Adorno perspective, that is, in terms of purposive-rationality 
and the individualism which accrues from it (Horkheimer and Adorno, 2003, in 
Chapter One), then this segment could be viewed as an antidote to the charges 
levelled at the curriculum up to now. Yet, if we accept the broader and more 
positive view of the Enlightenment, for example, that presented by Habermas, it 
can be seen that meaning can be found without recourse to metaphysics but 
through the “far from contemptible compulsion of a reason that...assumes a 
procedural form -  a compulsion induced by the rationalisation of world views 
and life-worlds...” (Habermas, 1987a, p. 113). Those for whom religion and 
metaphysics are not significant features of their lives need more inclusion here. 
For these individuals and groups, the “physical and social experience” of life, 
and thus the life-world, is their source of meaning.
A universal perspective is retained throughout the segment. It is extended 
by the reference to the “shared perception which intimates a more profound 
explanation of meaning”. This “shared perception” can no longer be assumed in
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Irish society. Also, the reference to the “more profound explanation of meaning” 
aligns with Seery’s observations above on the metaphysical nature of Christian 
education. Paradoxically, a Foucauldian challenge emerges within this universal 
perspective in that as the sentence delves more deeply into the meaning of the 
spiritual dimension of the curriculum, the meaning becomes more elusive. It is 
left up to us to continue uncovering this explanation by digging and sifting 
through the words and phrases. This is a feature of the genealogical approach, an 
approach which demands “relentless erudition” but which at the same time 
“opposes the search for ‘origins’” (Foucault, 2003, p. 242). The metaphysical 
object of the search is thus challenged. Foucault questions the notion that 
“beyond any apparent beginning, there is always a secret origin -  so secret and 
fundamental that it can never be grasped by itself’ (Foucault, 1989c, p. 27).
I consider that the metaphysical object of the search is retained in the 
sentence under scrutiny but that the verb “intimates” illustrates the elusiveness of 
meaning and implies that it is not available to all, only to those who are bound 
together by the ‘shared perception’ and thus intimates of each other. This 
presents a notion of exclusivity by conveying the impression of a privileged 
group, one that may engage in dialogue with others who share the same 
convictions. However they are unlikely to engage in the critical dialogue that will 
generate the notion of reciprocity that Habermas (2006, in Chapter One) 
considers necessary to extend recognition beyond the notion of paternalistic 
toleration. The language of the dominant group, those that purportedly render the 
quest for meaning a metaphysical exercise, is the only one to be heard, with the 
consequent marginalisation of other groups; groups who are making their voices 
increasingly resonant in Irish society.
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In engaging in the above critique, I am cognisant that the Foucauldian 
challenge, namely “to give a new impetus...to the undefined work of freedom” 
with the consequent possibility of going beyond the “limits that are imposed 
upon us” (Foucault, 1991a, in Chapter Two), is not an easy one to embrace. This 
is a challenge which, in the Irish context, demands the unseating of values and 
beliefs which, until relatively recently, tended to define Irish society. It is a 
challenge with which the writers of the curriculum are, understandably, reluctant 
to engage, particularly when the provision of alternatives is a significant lacuna 
in the work of theorists such as Foucault.
I view the sentence under scrutiny as implying that the ‘profound 
explanation of being’ already exists as a discrete entity to be uncovered but not 
changed or moulded. The Hegelian notion of a ‘presupposed ethical totality’ 
(Habermas, 1987a, in Chapter One) is in evidence here. The idea that tradition 
could be reshaped to meet the needs of future generations is absent. 
Consequently, we have a model of profundity that will be transmitted unchanged 
from generation to generation. In the latter part of the sentence, we are accorded 
a perspective on “the sublime fulfilment that human existence sometimes 
affords”(emphasis added). This clause conveys a more Derridean focus, through 
the middle voice of differance or undecidability presented by the adverb 
‘sometimes’. Two interpretations are possible: one being that everyone achieves 
a sublime fulfilment at some time in their lives; the second being that the sublime 
fulfilment is restricted to certain groups. Given the overall focus of the segment, 
I consider the latter interpretation to be the more likely one. This renders the 
segment open to a charge of hegemony, a charge that other sections of the
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document are trying to resist, through the adoption of a seemingly neutral and 
non-definitive stance.
Yet, as observed in Chapter One, fear of a charge of hegemony should 
not impede the establishment of core societal values, encapsulated in Hegel’s 
Sittlichkeit (Taylor, 1984, in Chapter One), but becoming increasingly difficult to 
locate in today’s society. Such core values are at the kernel of social cohesion. 
The difficulty that seems to be evident in the curriculum lies not in the 
affirmation of core values, but where and how to define them. It would seem that 
the decision was made to assign them to the spiritual dimension of the 
curriculum. This serves to deflect a charge of hegemony from other aspects of 
the curriculum as the spiritual dimension is confined to a very limited part of the 
Introduction, parts of the Social, Personal and Health Education curriculum (cf. 
4.5 below) and to Religious Education. The development of the latter is assigned 
to the relevant Church authorities (DES, 1999a, p. vi). To equate the 
establishment of core societal values to spirituality, and, in particular, to religion 
(and even now, in Ireland, to the Catholic Church) is a catalyst for protest from 
many quarters, and in particular, from the poststructuralists. Indeed, Nietzsche, 
for example, would dispute the very existence of such values as he contends 
“there are no moral facts whatever” (Nietzsche, 1895, cited by Norman, 1998, p. 
130, original emphasis). (I acknowledge here Norman’s (p. 128) caution that 
Nietzsche would also dispute being categorised within any philosophical 
tradition). However, the association between core societal values and religion has 
many historical links, and, even today, can be seen to be beneficial to society.
In the past, religion tended to provide guidance in relation to the 
identification of core values. This premise is particularly relevant to the Irish 
context. It informed the working of Irish society and thus, according to Gramsci 
(1988, p. 330), can be accepted as an ideology, but “on condition that the word is 
used in its highest sense of a conception of the world that is manifest in art, in 
law, in economic activity, and in all manifestations of individual and collective 
life”. Gramsci problematised the preservation of the ‘ideological unity of the 
entire social bloc’ and located the resolution of this problem within religion. He 
viewed the strength of the Catholic Church to be the fact that it saw the need for 
doctrinal unity among the whole mass of the faithful and strove to ensure that 
there was no segregation between the intellectual strata of society (Gramsci, 
3988, in Chapter One). Gramsci equated the Church with the maintenance of 
social cohesion and did not see the ‘immanentist’ philosophies as providing a 
plausible alternative. We need to consider whether this scenario has changed in 
current society. While religion no longer overtly occupies the role it once did in 
the lives of many people, it would seem that the secular alternative has not 
adequately replaced it in terms of the provision of core societal values. In the 
context of the curriculum, Gramsci’s contention that immanentist philosophies 
have not even attempted to construct a conception that could replace religion in 
the education of children would seem to be borne out (Gramsci, 1988, in Chapter 
One), in that the provision of such values has been sidelined.
The above analysis indicates that it is very difficult to identify a definitive 
ideology within the curriculum apart from the endorsement of moral relativism, 
which could be seen to emanate from the language of developmental psychology, 
and which, on a more negative note, could be aligned with Horkheimer and
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Adorno’s perspective on the Enlightenment. Thus, in the absence of alternatives, 
for example, a concerted reflection on what is meant by the moral ideal, or in 
Taylor’s terms, ‘‘the ideal of authenticity” (Taylor, 1991, p. 17), a return to 
spirituality may be what is required. In the Irish context, as in Gramsci’s Italy, 
the role of the Catholic Church is, whether or not we care to admit it, still 
significant.
The role of the Catholic Church could be viewed as a barrier to the 
accommodation of cultural difference. However, I consider this conclusion to be 
too obvious and too simplistic. There are other, more subtle influences in play, 
namely State or government influences which seem to align themselves more 
with the liberal agenda, particularly the type of non-interventionist, ‘neutral’ 
liberalism which Taylor views as being endemic in current society. This agenda 
affirms the assertion of difference and independence. Yet, the non­
interventionist, disengaged approach of the policy makers serves to bring about 
the societal division accruing from individualism, which Gramsci (1988, in 
Chapter One) viewed the Church as trying to eliminate.
The Conference of Major Religious Superiors (CMRS), now the 
Conference of Religious in Ireland (CORI), views society as “made up of 
interdependent rather than independent units...and recognises that the 
circumstances of poor people will not change until the circumstances of people 
who are not poor also change” (CMRS, 1992c, cited by O’Sullivan, 2005, p.197). 
The words of Habermas (1987a, in Chapter One), along with those of Bauman 
(2001, in Chapter One) resonate strongly here as the principle of reciprocity is 
endorsed. CORI adopts a confrontational stance against the subtle but pervasive 
policies (or non-policies) of neo-liberalism and what O’Sullivan (2005) terms the
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‘mercantile paradigm’ and provides an example of how the ‘theocentric 
paradigm’ (O’Sullivan, 2005) may well be more closely attuned to the needs of 
minority groups, despite the problems associated with the ownership of schools 
and the perpetuation of a particular ethos.
Thus, while the Church may be seen as a more obvious impediment to 
the achievement of an intercultural society, and a more obvious target of censure 
in this regard, the pursuit of the neo-liberal agenda is a more subtle barrier. Here, 
Bauman’s cynical depiction o f ‘multiculturalism’ is acutely resonant: for him the 
learned classes have adopted a ‘hands-off approach to the needs of minority 
groups, remaining silent about the preferred shape of the human condition. In 
doing so, they have aligned themselves with “increasingly extra territorial 
economic powers” (Bauman, 2001, p. 125) and thus with the neo-liberal agenda. 
I wish to add here that the time of writing of these comments coincides with the 
closure or curtailment by the State of key organisations concerned with 
defending the rights of the most deprived groups in Irish society (O’Brien, 2008, 
p. W2).
In this section of the chapter, I have explored how the philosophical basis 
of the 1999 curriculum remains elusive. While purposive-rational influences 
were deemed significant, these were tempered by the more ethnocentric concerns 
of language and religion. These tend to be seen as anathema to difference. Yet, 
the ensuing argument suggested that perceived ethnocentricity (and hegemony) 
may, in fact, be more conducive to social cohesion and the accommodation of 
cultural difference than the type of liberalism which permeates current society. 
The vagueness and value neutrality of the latter may, in fact, constitute the 
greater threat. It is suggested that the Church, in particular, may be a means of
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eliminating the type of social divisions that may occur when assertions of 
difference are met with official silence and disengagement. It may thus be seen 
as an aid in resolving the dilemma of this dissertation, namely that of maintaining 
social cohesion while recognising difference. However, it would be unfair at this 
juncture to present this as the overall conclusion without giving consideration to 
the part of the curriculum which also reflects on morality and spirituality and 
which concerns itself specifically with the issue of difference. Therefore, I will 
now turn to the Social, Personal and Health Education curriculum to explore 
more comprehensively the issue of maintaining social cohesion while 
recognising difference.
4.5 The Primary School Curriculum (1999), Social, Personal 
and Health Education
The Social, Personal and Health Education (SPHE) curriculum may be 
viewed as the most obvious location for issues pertaining to societal change to be 
addressed. It was introduced as a new area of the curriculum and its ‘newness5 
could be seen as an endeavour to acknowledge and address the change occurring 
in Irish society on the cusp of the new millennium. However, SPHE is 
definitively linked with the ethos of the school from the outset (DES, 1999b, p. 
2), and thus, in most cases, with the Catholic Church. We are also informed on 
page 11 that children will “become aware of how particular beliefs and values 
are important in their lives and how they influence the decisions and choices they 
make55. If Earley’s observations in relation to the ongoing, if less overt, influence 
of the Catholic Church (Earley, 1999, in Chapter Three) are to be taken on board, 
we can conclude that the influence of the Catholic Church will be significant
153
here. While contributing to the maintenance of social cohesion, this could be 
seen, by some, to compromise the cause of difference. However, as observed in 
the previous section, this need not be the case.
4,5.1 Cultural Difference and SPHE
Ethnic and cultural difference is given explicit acknowledgement in the 
SPHE curriculum. Yet, while seeking to accord specific recognition to 
difference, such recognition is accorded from a distance and avoids direct 
confrontation with the more problematic and less attractive aspects of cultural 
difference. I view this as a barrier on the route towards interculturalism. I have 
chosen a segment from page 4 of the SPHE Guidelines to illustrate this point: 
Children live in a diverse society and this diversity requires the 
development of mutual understanding and a sense of respect for 
the dignity of every human being. The SPHE programme provides 
a context in which children can learn about various ethnic, social 
and cultural groups and can recognise and appreciate the 
contributions of these groups to society. As they acquire a deeper 
understanding of their own traditions and heritage, they are 
encouraged to act in ways that foster inclusiveness and to have 
regard for the heritage and perspective of others. Through SPHE 
children can discover the role each person has to play in 
counteracting prejudice, discrimination and inequality as they may 
experience it in their own lives (DES, 1999b, p. 4).
The use of the word ‘diversity’ instead of the word ‘difference’ 
demonstrates, according to Bhabha, (1990, in Chapter Two), an ideological bias 
that, in Bhabha’s view, is more in line with multiculturalism than
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interculturalism. Bhabha endorses the problematising of difference so that the 
dominant perspective, that of liberal relativism, can be confronted. I argue that 
this task is eschewed by the curriculum in order to avoid conflict. As observed by 
O’Sullivan, (2005, in Chapter Three), the reduction or elimination of conflict can 
have a subversive influence that aids the maintenance of the status quo. This 
liberates the statutory groups, including government departments, from having to 
address the less attractive aspects of cultural difference and also from having to 
invest resources into the process of integration. Evidence of inadequacies in this 
regard has been presented in Chapter Three. The neo-liberal agenda is in the 
ascendancy here. The transformation of society can only be achieved through the 
active engagement of different groups with each other as, to reiterate the 
observation of the CMRS (1992) referred to above, they are ‘interdependent’ 
rather than ‘independent’. Such engagement yields the potential for antagonism 
and conflict that will then have to be addressed rather than contained by the 
various parties. The ‘bottom line’ may slacken but this does not signal its 
disappearance, as may be the case under the auspices of the neutral liberalism of 
relativism which approaches difference as something to be allowed to ‘flower’ 
under the benevolent (and non-interventionist) gaze of the dominant group. I 
wish to add here that I am not predicating the above observations solely on the 
use of the word ‘diversity’.
Later in the SPHE Guidelines (DES, 1999b, p. 17), the celebration of 
difference is identified as one of the features of citizenship education. It could be 
contended that the authors have acknowledged Bhabha’s concerns about 
terminology here. However, both words occur in one sentence in the SPHE 
curriculum itself. We are informed that “diversity and difference characterise the
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society in which children live” (DES, 1999c, p. 4, emphasis added). Fairclough 
(1989, p. 115) contends that ‘overwording’ may be indicative of ideological 
struggle. This sentence could be deemed to encapsulate such a struggle, which is 
generated by the wish to maintain the liberal perspective while addressing the 
concerns of a multicultural society in a constructive manner.
In the segment, we observe the acknowledgement of mutual 
understanding. This endorses the principle of reciprocity and may serve to 
counteract the more indulgent and patronising undertones, which may 
accompany the concept of diversity. Mutual understanding implies a concerted 
effort on the part of all concerned to engage with each other in the pursuit of an 
intercultural society. The task of reaching an understanding among different 
groups removes the notion of Bhabha’s (1990, in Chapter Two) musée 
imaginaire in which cultures are placed as objects of curiosity and wonder and 
can, instead, be predicated upon Habermas’s (1987a, in Chapter One) view of a 
communication community that seeks, but does not coerce, consensus. Yet as 
previously observed, the Habermasian viewpoint, while maintaining social 
cohesion, is open to the charge of hegemony as it is dependent upon universally 
valid norms, the application of which becomes problematic in a multicultural 
situation. On the other hand, a community which ‘celebrates diversity’ thus 
eliminating conflict, but which does not engage in meaningful communication, is 
one which can be deemed to succumb to the Habermasian charge of indirect 
control with the resultant manifestation of conditioned behaviour (Habermas, 
1971, in Chapter One). Such a community is in the thrall of hegemony just as 
much as one that engages in a more overt imposition of a universalist 
perspective.
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4.5.2 Active Engagement with Difference
The achievement of mutual understanding and respect is a key element in 
the achievement of an intercultural society. The constructivist methodology of 
the SPHE curriculum facilitates the pursuit of this society as it helps the children 
to realise that the achievement of mutual understanding and respect are active 
rather than passive constructs. In the words of the curriculum “active learning 
promotes action” (DES, 1999b, p. 55). Yet, I am not sure that critical pedagogy 
is sufficiently emphasised here. Giroux (2003, p. 384) observes that critical 
pedagogy involves providing students with the opportunity to develop the critical 
capacity to challenge and transform existing social and political forms, rather 
than simply adapting to them. For this to occur, I believe that the potential for 
critical pedagogy should be explicit in the discourse of educational policy rather 
than simply implicit in its methodology. In the SPHE Guidelines, we are told that 
active participation helps children to put health-related messages into their own 
lives and to become active members of their communities (DES, 1999b, p. 55). 
However, the potential for transformation of society remains undisclosed. In 
addition, the teacher’s role as critical pedagogue is not realised. While the 
teacher is acknowledged to be the guide and facilitator of the work (ibid), the 
potential for political action is not acknowledged.
The acknowledgement of mutual understanding is somewhat 
compromised by the statement that “the children learn about various ethnic, 
social and cultural groups...” (emphasis added). I consider that the inclusion of 
the preposition ‘about’ accentuates a sense of distance between the dominant and 
minority cultures. It also conveys the impression that a multicultural society is 
more of a theoretical construct than an existing or an impending reality. A more
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inclusive (and thus intercultural) perspective would have been achieved were the 
word ‘learning about’ to be replaced with the word ‘engagement with’ or 
‘learning from’. The concept of mutual understanding would have been 
developed. Instead, we are left with the impression of one community learning 
about others but at a distance. I acknowledge that this may be more in line with 
the still homogenous profile of many schools in the late 1990s. However, the 
portents of the future were becoming manifest by then.
Learning ‘about’ a concept or an issue shields the learner from 
engagement with change. There is little sense of the learning being a reflexive 
exercise generating a review of the individual’s own values and beliefs in order 
that the reality of cultural change can be effectively incorporated into his/her 
worldview. Learning ‘about’ difference will not necessarily generate the sort of 
political awareness or activism which is implied in the final sentence in the 
paragraph under scrutiny and which is necessary to lead to societal 
transformation. Giroux (1994, p. 329) outlines the “new language” of “a 
democratic or insurgent multiculturalism”. This language
challenges the boundaries of cultural and racial difference as sites 
of exclusion and discrimination while simultaneously rewriting 
the script of cultural difference as part of a broader attempt to 
expand and deepen the imperatives of a multicultural society.
This is the type of challenge which Drudy and Lynch (1993, in Chapter Three) 
and Lynch (1999, in Chapter Three) consider to be absent from the liberal 
approach to education. The individual as an agent of change is not presented 
here. The language of critical pedagogy, while in evidence in the final sentence
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in the paragraph (cf. 4.5.6 below), is somewhat diluted by those which precede it, 
in that the reality of cultural change is addressed in a benign and passive manner.
4.5.3 The Meaning of Recognition
The insertion of the verb ‘to recognise5 in the selected segment, may be 
construed as responding to the demands of minority groups, yet, according to 
Habermas (1987a, in Chapter One), without validity claims, assertions of 
difference lose their meaning. Taylor (1994, in Chapter One) expands upon this 
and eschews the accordance of recognition on demand without the imposition of 
a ‘bottom line5. In any case, the second verb annuls the possibility of difference 
being accommodated or addressed in a constructive manner. To ‘appreciate5 
reiterates once again the concept of the musée imaginaire. There is a sense that 
the dominant group is observing the minority groups separated by a one-way 
glass conveying the impression that the minority groups are there for the 
amusement and entertainment of the majority. Bauman (1997, in Chapter One) 
observes that for some groups in society, strangers are the purveyors of 
pleasures. Their presence is a break in the tedium. As observed in Chapter One, 
the appreciation of the contributions of minority groups is limited to those for 
whom the arrival of these groups does not pose a significant threat. It is too 
optimistic to assume that the advent of a multicultural society is a source of 
appreciation for all. This is not acknowledged in the SPHE curriculum or indeed 
in the curriculum overall, thus indicating once again that the containment of 
problems accruing from difference is prioritised. Drudy and Lynch (1993, p. 54) 
observe that recognising difference, in itself, does not amount to identifying 
conflicts of interest as central dynamics of society.
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There is an implicit assumption or prescription in the statement that all of 
the groups will make a contribution to Irish society, contributions that will 
enhance its well-being and overall social cohesion. This would bring the 
statement closer to Taylor’s treatise on recognition and his imposition of a 
‘bottom line’ in terms of criteria for gaining recognition. This may be deemed an 
acceptable premise for recognition and, without doubt, it serves to maintain 
social cohesion. Yet, the implicit expectation of contribution leaves itself open to 
challenge by Foucault and Derrida as it can be viewed as an imposition of limits 
and an impediment to unconstrained freedom. Once again, Foucault’s 
exhortation to critique “the limits that are imposed upon us” and to experiment 
“with the possibilities of going beyond them” (Foucault, 1991a, p. 50, in Chapter 
Two), becomes significant. If we do not go beyond those limits, we risk 
marginalising certain groups, namely those who do not contribute to society, 
those who, in Foucault’s vision, were confined to the Hôpital Général (Foucault, 
1989b, in Chapter Two). The possibility of such groups is not admitted in the 
statement above. We can thus conclude that communication between such groups 
and the dominant one is silenced. For Foucault, this is a manifestation of power 
on the part of the dominant group (ibid). Derrida’s observations on the 
conditionality of hospitality (Derrida, 2006, in Chapter Two) could also be 
deemed to be borne out by the expectation of all groups contributing to society. 
Derrida equates the imposition of conditions with a manifestation of hostility. 
Yet, making a contribution to society is an integral feature of active citizenship, 
upon which a cohesive society depends. Neither Foucault nor Derrida take this
4,5.4 Contribution as a Condition
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concept sufficiently on board. Admission of Foucauldian or Derridean concerns 
would render social cohesion a far more elusive construct.
4.5.5 The ‘S e lf and the ‘Other*
The next sentence from the segment under scrutiny juxtaposes the notion 
of the children acquiring a “deeper understanding” of their own cultural heritage, 
with them “having regard” for the heritage of others. This could be seen to 
respond to Taylor’s almost Derridean-like call for “something midway between 
the unauthentic and homogenizing demand for recognition of equal worth, on the 
one hand, and the self-immurement within ethnocentric standards on the other” 
(1994, p. 101). It also highlights the tensions between identity and difference and 
I consider that it is illustrative of the Derridean conundrum posed by Caputo 
(1997, in Chapter Two). It demonstrates our wish to welcome other groups while 
retaining our own identity.
Yet, despite its laudable and pluralistic aspirations there is an imbalance 
in the phrase. The juxtaposition of the two abstract nouns ‘understanding’ and 
‘regard’ demonstrate the imbalance. The dominant group is focused on reaching 
a deeper understanding of its own culture and with having a ‘regard’ for others. 
The effort intrinsic to reaching understanding is confined to one’s own culture. 
Having a regard for something is a more cursory activity, less contingent upon 
effort and equating, at best, with appreciation. The ‘other’ is thus placed at a 
distance. Reaching mutual understanding is compromised. Understanding is 
aligned with the indigenous culture only. We can conclude here that the notion of 
identity overrules that of difference. While a sense of identity is an essential 
component of social cohesion, one’s sense of identity needs to evolve in order to 
meet the demands of a multicultural society, and as observed by Waldron (2004,
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in Chapter Three), one needs to take control of this emergent identity. I am not 
sure that this sense of evolving identity is in evidence here. I contend that the 
concern with tradition and heritage outweighs concern with difference. ‘Having 
regard for’, while not quite indicative of the indifference that Bauman (2001, in 
Chapter One) equates with multiculturalism, certainly falls short of the level of 
engagement required for the achievement of interculturalism. Once again, critical 
pedagogy does not enter the equation.
The absence of critical pedagogy is further highlighted by the emphasis 
on individualism which is implicit in the confinement of “deeper understanding” 
to one’s own traditions and heritage. As I have observed, the sentence under 
scrutiny here tends to veer in favour of a more introverted perspective, focusing 
on the ‘Self in terms of identity rather than on the ‘Other’. This preoccupation 
with the self becomes more manifest as one progresses through the curriculum. 
Much space is accorded to raising the child’s sense of self and while there is an 
effort to include a community focus, I contend that the concern with self 
significantly outweighs other concerns. If we look at the overview of the Strands 
and Strand Units for SPHE (DES, 1999b, p. 9) we can observe that issues of 
personal interest are given most attention, with half of the Strand Units being 
accorded to the ‘Myself Strand. In addition, the manner in which the three 
Strands are named (Myself, Myself and Others, Myself and the Wider World) 
can be seen to facilitate an individualistic focus. (This overview is provided in 
Appendix C). The preoccupation with the self is further endorsed in the final 
clause under scrutiny wherein the addressing of prejudice, discrimination and 
inequality is limited to the child’s own experience.
We are informed that through SPHE the children can “discover the role 
each person has to play in counteracting prejudice, discrimination and inequality 
as they may experience it in their own lives” (emphasis added). The choice of 
verb undermines the potential for critical pedagogy and transformation that 
occurs in the sentence. The notion of political activism is diluted to a body of 
abstract knowledge. We are left pondering as to what the children will do 
subsequent to their discovery of the role to be played in bringing about a society 
which supports the rights of all those who live in it. There is no sense that the 
children will actually be led to embrace or adopt this role themselves, thus the 
notion of learning about rather than engaging with is sustained.
The choice of verb may serve to preserve the existing social cohesion and 
to diffuse the potential for disorder ensuing from a more active engagement with 
political activism. It may also be a tacit acknowledgement of the fact that not all 
teachers are able or willing to lead the charge towards political change and that, 
in any case, such change is not necessarily the aim of the policy makers. There is 
a certain neutrality posited by the verb as making a discovery is not synonymous 
with the results of such a discovery being put into action. While the issues that 
impede the achievement of an intercultural society are rendered explicit in this 
final section of the segment, creating the potential for transformation, this 
potential is not subsequently fulfilled.
It is, therefore, questionable as to the extent to which the SPHE 
curriculum can be deemed to address the notions of social cohesion and the 
recognition of difference. The prioritising of the child’s individuality undermines 
social cohesion and while seeming to facilitate the assertion of difference, does
4,5.6 Critical Pedagogy or Not?
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little to address the issue in any constructive manner. We are consequently left to 
turn to other, possibly anachronistic, features of education to resolve this 
dilemma. I will now turn to one which is a regular target for criticism, but one 
which has been deferred to from very early on in the Social, Personal and Health 
Education curriculum and also in the earlier Relationships and Sexuality 
Education curriculum (NCCA, 1996, p. 8). I refer to the “ethos and characteristic 
spirit of the school”(DES, 1999b, p. 2). This deference removes the potential for 
controversy and antagonism from the documents, thus facilitating their 
legitimation and publication. However, it also compromises their usefulness and 
their potential for innovation. I wish, at this juncture, to explore the concept of 
ethos in some more detail in order to identify its impact on social cohesion and 
the recognition of difference.
4.6 School Ethos
Williams (2000, p. 74) observes “every human institution has its own 
ethos in the sense of a dominant, pervading spirit or character that finds 
expression in the habits or behaviour of those who are part of it”. This is no less 
true of schools and Williams goes on to say that, although impalpable, “the ethos 
of a school touches the very quality of our lives and can constitute an abiding 
element in the fabric of our very identity” (ibid, p. 76). While ethos is not 
necessarily contingent upon religious beliefs, it would be naïve to contend that, 
in the majority of schools in the Irish context, ethos is immune from religious 
influence. Williams contends, “a school with a religious ethos aims, as a matter 
of policy, to influence in young people a commitment to a particular religion and 
the religion in question is reinforced as part of the school’s ethos” (ibid). Yet,
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adhesion to, or affirmation of school ethos, does not, or should not preclude the 
possibility of moving beyond the status quo. Such a possibility is dependent upon 
our understanding of the concept of ethos.
Norman (2003, pp. 1-16) provides a comprehensive insight into the 
subtleties of meaning that are intrinsic to the concept. For him, “ethos is an 
essential and implicit entity; it is unavoidable and cannot be separated from the 
school” (ibid, p. 3). School ethos is essentially a democratic and inclusive 
concept “nourished by a healthy dialogue so as to inform and give vision to the 
life of the institution” (ibid, p. 5). Norman presents the Catholic understanding of 
ethos as being in line with this understanding of the concept (ibid, p. 7). Yet, he 
stops short of imbuing Irish Catholic schools with this notion of ethos, and, using 
the contributions of the Irish Catholic Church to the National Education 
Convention (1993), demonstrates reluctance on the part of the Church to allow 
the notion of ethos to evolve (ibid, p. 12). Church ownership of the schools was 
reiterated and there was a strong resistance to allow the State to increase its 
influence over schools (ibid). Norman concludes that a paternalistic 
understanding of ethos was adopted by the trustees of Irish Catholic schools 
(ibid, p. 13). He contends that this understanding of ethos results in an attitude of 
compliance among those who work in these schools. As a result, teachers do not 
challenge the status quo and are slow to bring themselves or their students into 
dialogue with the tradition of the school (ibid, p. 15). The Education Act (1998) 
endorsed the system of patronage in the schools, but according to Devine (2005, 
p. 58), this is not a system, which is dealing with the lived realities of our society 
and the changes that have taken place there.
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Deference to school ethos may be an adroit and subtle way of affirming 
core societal values and also of maintaining the status quo. In this way, the 
curriculum itself avoids censure from groups who may consider themselves 
disenfranchised by the imposition of such values. If Norman’s contentions are to 
be accepted, a justifiable charge of hegemony may be levelled, but not 
specifically at the curriculum. Yet, I view the curriculum to be complicit in this 
scheme in that the ethos of the school is presented as a fixed or absolute entity, 
one that is resilient in the face of change. There is little consideration given to the 
Derridean challenge to logocentrism (Kearney, 1986, in Chapter Two) or to the 
Foucauldian critique of the ‘heroization’ of the present (Foucault, 1991a, in 
Chapter Two). The Hegelian notion of a “presupposed ethical totality” 
(Habermas, 1987a, in Chapter One) needs to be relinquished.
The curriculum needs to acknowledge the necessity and the role of 
dialogue in the definition of ethos and also its potentially evolving nature. For 
this to happen, the curriculum and ethos need to be at one in relation to the nature 
of the education being provided to the children. This means that its philosophical 
basis needs to become more evident and more transparent. However, as 
demonstrated above, there is an uncertainty, even a fear, in relation to being 
definitive in this regard. I acknowledge that, as observed above, the Church has 
much to offer schools, and in the absence of an alternative philosophy, the value 
system that it presents may have to suffice. The introduction of more dialogue 
and the challenging of unquestioning and compliant attitudes among all those 
involved in the working of the school would make ethos a concept less open to 
challenge by the proponents of difference.
This brief and selective commentary on the 1999 curriculum serves to 
demonstrate that the discourse of this potentially pivotal document was more 
concerned with avoiding controversy and confrontation than with addressing the 
implications of demographic and cultural change. We can observe that, overtly, 
the State has occupied the central role in educational policy formulation with the 
Church’s role becoming less significant than it was in previous decades. This, in 
itself, could be interpreted as a forward step in addressing the implications of 
demographic change. My reading of the curriculum has left me to conclude that 
this was not, in actual fact, the case. The portents of instrumentalism, embodied 
in particular in the emphasis on individualism, served to compromise both the 
establishment of core societal values and the meaningful accommodation of 
difference. The overall characteristic to emerge was a reluctance to present any 
overarching philosophy apart from the endorsement of laissez-faire. The 
reaching of consensus and fear of censure seem to be the key influences 
informing the discourse. I thus conclude that the documents under scrutiny are 
more representative of pastiche than intertextuality (O’Sullivan, 2005, in 4,2 
above).
The distance from difference evidenced in the documents under scrutiny 
in this chapter can be attributed to two reasons. The first is the fact that the 
impact of demographic change had not yet made itself felt. Thus, cultural 
difference was not yet a reality in Ireland. Yet, the portents of difference were 
becoming manifest and thus the lack of substantive engagement with the issue 
could be deemed to be, at the very least, short-sighted. A more subversive 
interpretation would be that the disengagement from the problems and
4.7 Conclusion
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complexities associated with difference could be attributed to a wish to avoid the 
political and economic implications of resolving them. The musée imaginaire is 
thus retained and the subsequent claim of the Guidelines for Intercultural 
Education, that the Curriculum itself is ‘intercultural5, is not borne out in the 
evidence presented here. Instead, Devine's comment (in 4.6 above) that we have 
an education system that is structured for a different type of society may be more 
apposite.
Paradoxically, the more ethnocentric (or hegemonic) aspects of our 
identity (being Catholic and Gaelic) and their associations with the Church and 
the Irish language, may be the aspects which serve to accommodate difference 
and address the issue of minority rights and discrimination while at the same 
time maintaining social cohesion. The Irish language, while a significant 
manifestation of ‘Irishness5, was also presented as a means of highlighting 
minority rights through the operation of the Gaelscoileanna, A more significant 
portion of the chapter was accorded to the issue of spirituality and its association 
with the Church. While the language of this particular segment was particularly 
difficult to analyse, ultimately, the conclusion was reached that the Church 
demonstrated an ideological affinity with the discourse of social cohesion and the 
accommodation of difference in a meaningful way. The associated issue of 
school ethos (for the vast majority of schools) was discussed with the conclusion 
that in the absence of a set of definitive societal values in the curriculum, the 
significance of school ethos becomes acute.
While a paternalistic notion of ethos may be seen as an impediment to the 
accommodation of difference, it was postulated that the intrinsic concept of 
ethos, even with religious affiliations, did not stand in binary opposition to
168
difference and change in society as long as it was imbued with the potential for 
dialogue. It was also postulated that the Catholic Church may be more concerned 
with the addressing of problems emanating from difference, through, for example 
the redistribution of goods, than the curriculum, for which acknowledgement of 
difference seemed to suffice. The focus accorded by the SPHE curriculum to 
different cultures in society can be viewed as a response to, rather than an 
engagement with, cultural difference, as it tends to romanticise and exoticise the 
arrival of different cultures to Ireland, but ultimately to become susceptible to 
Bhabha’s (1990, in Chapter Two) charge of containment. Admittedly, the 
possibility of critical dialogue through “the development of mutual 
understanding and a sense of respect for the dignity of every human being” 
(DES, 1999b, p. 4) demonstrates the potential for engagement with difference. In 
addition, the potential for critical pedagogy materialises in the final sentence of 
the segment. However, these potentials recede again with the sense of distance 
from difference that is imposed by other words and phrases in the segment, for 
example, learning about different groups and appreciating their contribution to 
society. While the curriculum as a whole, and, in particular the introduction of 
SPHE as a discrete curricular area, could be viewed as a being an innovative 
initiative, it is uncertain as to whether it led to major changes in terms of the 
accommodation of difference. Gleeson (2004, p. 105, referencing Fullan, 1991) 
observes that the adoption of innovation, without the realisation of change, is a 
common occurrence.
In the next chapter, I intend to turn to the Guidelines for Intercultural 
Education to determine whether progression along the route towards an 
intercultural society has occurred through a more tangible attempt to resolve the
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tensions between the maintenance of social cohesion and the recognition of 
difference. In the 1999 curriculum minority groups are presented as groups to be 
recognised and appreciated but the problematising of cultural difference is 
notably absent. This reduces the potential for negotiation and critical dialogue. I 
will endeavour to find out whether this distance from difference continued to be 
the predominant approach in the decade that followed.
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Chapter Five: Towards a dialogue with difference (2): 
The Guidelines for Intercultural Education in the 
Primary School (2005)
5.1 Introduction
The analysis in the previous chapter yielded the less than satisfactory 
conclusion that a philosophical basis is not clearly identifiable in the 1999 
curriculum. This rendered its response to the overall theme or problem of this 
dissertation, namely the maintenance of social cohesion while recognising 
difference, difficult to ascertain. However, what was revealed in the chapter was 
that the reality of a multicultural society composed of non-indigenous as well as 
indigenous groups had not yet made significant inroads into Irish educational 
policy discourse by 1999. This conclusion is mitigated by the fact that up to the 
mid-1990s cultural difference was mainly represented by indigenous minority 
groups, of which the Travelling Community is the most significant.
I view the non-problematising of cultural concerns to be a consistent 
feature of Irish educational discourse. This may be due to the fact that, according 
to Gleeson (2004, p. 102, referencing House, 1981), cultural concerns tend to be 
overshadowed by technological and political issues. The tensions between the 
purposive-rational world and the life-world (Habermas, 1971, in Chapter One) 
become evident here with the purposive-rational world emerging as the more 
dominant force. Callan (1995, cited by Gleeson, 2004, p. 109) observes that the 
main concern of Irish political forces has been “with fitting people into a society 
that is allowed to remain unproblematic”. This is borne out in Irish educational 
policy. Issues that of their very nature are problematic (the achievement of an
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intercultural society being a prime example) are divested of their more difficult 
and controversial characteristics and presented to practitioners in their most 
benign form in anticipation of unquestioning acceptance and implementation. 
This serves to maintain social cohesion but it does little to address the needs that 
emanate from cultural difference.
The ‘distance from difference’, which became manifest in the analysis of 
the 1999 Social, Personal and Health Education curriculum, endorses this 
contention and bears witness to O’Sullivan’s observation (2005, p. xiv, in 
Chapter Three) on the propensity of Irish educational thinking to insulate itself 
“from competing/contesting viewpoints”. In addition, as could be seen in the 
analysis in Chapter Four, there is a significant dearth of what O’Sullivan (2005, 
p. 199) terms “theorised intentional language”. He observes that concepts such as 
equity, inclusion, and cohesion, among others, “continue to operate in a form of 
knowledge production that relies on action, programmes, protocols and selection 
criteria for its realisation and advancement”. However, without the support of 
theory, the likelihood of implementation is lessened.
The dearth of ‘theorised, intentional language’ could be explained by a 
wish to achieve consensus among policy makers. The presentation of a 
phenomenon as a fact, a ‘given’ or an absolute obviates the necessity to provide 
empirical or statistical evidence as support. Drudy and Lynch (1993, pp. 51-52) 
provide a substantial list of documents that embody the consensus mode. These 
include Curaclam na Bunscoile (1971) and the Report of the Review Body on the 
Primary Curriculum (1990). In addition, I contend that the Report on the 
National Education Convention (Coolahan, 1994) manifests the same 
characteristic. We are informed that, “to the great credit of the participants,”
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there was a concerted engagement with the process (Coolahan, 1994, p. 1). There 
is an almost palpable sense of relief that the convention did not cause untoward 
upset, antagonism or conflict. There is also an impression conveyed that to raise 
controversial or antagonistic issues would somehow have discredited the process. 
I am imposing a Foucauldian or Derridean challenge here, as I believe that the 
crediting of participants for the obviation of conflict, is, in itself a manifestation 
of power. The presence of forty-two different organisations at the convention 
would lead to an expectation of some level of dissensus. The disposition towards 
unproblematic consensus in the 1999 curriculum should therefore come as no 
great surprise.
The drive towards consensus by educationalists has significant 
implications for a multicultural society as it represents society as “an 
undifferentiated whole”, within which “it is assumed that there is agreement 
within all sectors of that whole on what is the ‘public interest’ or ‘collective 
interest’ in education” (Drudy and Lynch, 1993, p. 50). This model does not 
admit conflicting class, gender or other interests as potent forces determining the 
direction of the education system (ibid). This was evidenced in the analysis of the 
curriculum. Throughout the analysis, it became evident that issues of cultural 
difference were subdued in the interest of maintaining social cohesion. This begs 
the question as to whether “deep change” (Gleeson, 2004, in Chapter Four) in 
terms of school culture and classroom practice compromises the cohesion of the 
school, and if so, whether such change can actually be implemented or whether it 
remains within the confines of academic debate. The Guidelines for Intercultural 
Education in the Primary School (2005) provide an indicator of the possibility of 
deep change, and thus are the subject of analysis in this chapter.
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5.2 The Guidelines for Intercultural Education in the Primary 
School
The National Action Plan Against Racism (NAPAR) recommended, as 
part of its national intercultural education strategy, the development of guidelines 
for teachers on how best to mediate and adapt the curriculum to reflect 
expanding cultural diversity in Ireland (NAPAR, 2005, p. 107). The Guidelines 
for Intercultural Education in Primary Schools (henceforth referred to as the 
Guidelines) were published in 2005 as a response to this recommendation. Jones 
(1975, cited by Matland, 1995, p. 159) observes that politicians react to demand 
for action by producing action. The production of the Guidelines in response to 
the NAPAR bears out Jones’s contention. However, the extent to which they 
respond to the needs of different cultures merits further exploration.
The Guidelines, at first glance, are indicative of a transformative 
approach to education and a concrete effort to advance the cause of 
interculturalism. They manifest many of the principles put forward by writers 
such as Foucault, Derrida and Bhabha and thus pose a challenge to the universal 
values of the majority culture. The notion of alterity becomes manifest early in 
the Guidelines as, in considering the significance of the ‘hidden’ curriculum, we 
are exhorted to focus on what is absent just as much as on what is present (DES, 
2005, p. 4). In general, the Guidelines call into question existing practices both 
by individuals and society and invite us to critically reflect on the diversity of 
issues that emerge from a multicultural society and to change our practices 
accordingly. However, a closer analysis of the Guidelines is required in order to 
determine whether the potential for transformation is ultimately built upon. My
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critique of the Guidelines is based (as before) upon selected words and passages. 
This critique begins with the very title of the document.
5.2.1 A Titular Conundrum
From the outset, the Guidelines embody the Derridean conundrum of 
4undecidability’. While they align with the OED definition of policy outlined in 
Chapter Four, the word policy is conspicuously absent from this document. So 
we are unsure as to whether they can be viewed as policy or not. I think that this 
may well be a strategic move on the part of the Department of Education and 
Science (DES) as the term 'Guidelines’ does not have the legislative implications 
of the word ‘policy’ and, consequently, it releases the DES from the duty of 
providing supportive resources in relation to implementation. In addition, there 
would be more pressure on the DES, along with other organisations, to address 
significant challenges unearthed by intercultural policy. These include ownership 
of schools, the status of the Irish language in the curriculum, the current profile 
of the majority of teachers and, consequently, the admissions policies of the 
colleges of education. Retaining the term ‘Guidelines’ serves to highlight these 
challenges but to eschew the difficulties in addressing them. This indicates that 
the purposive-rational model of society may be the dominant influence at this 
juncture as the element of choice or appropriation, which is implicit in the term 
‘Guidelines’, is indicative of a neo-liberal perspective designed to place the 
responsibility for the accommodation of difference on the school, but 
independent of significant state intervention.
This indicator is further strengthened by the use of the interrogative tense, 
which is sustained throughout the document. Significant issues for addressing 
cultural difference appear at various intervals in the forms of ‘checklists’ to
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which schools can respond either positively or negatively (see, for example, 
pages 28 and 33 of the Guidelines and Appendices D and E of this dissertation). 
We are informed, “negative answers identify opportunities for further 
development” (DES, 2005, p. 28). However, there is little provided in the way of 
support to those schools that provide a negative response. Thus, in my view, the 
appellation of ‘Guidelines’ leaves us unsure in relation to their likely outcomes. 
However, in view of the fact that Ireland did not have and still does not have a 
coherent immigration and integration policy (Boucher, 2008, in Chapter Three), 
the sidestepping of a defined educational policy in this regard is not unexpected. 
5,2.2 The Role of the Guidelines
The Guidelines, from the outset, are placed in a subordinate role to the 
1999 curriculum and continually identify the latter as being inter cultural: “These 
guidelines support the Primary School Curriculum (1999) and identify the ways 
in which intercultural education permeates that curriculum” (DES, 2005, p. 5). 
Later, we are informed, “the curriculum itself is an intercultural curriculum” (p. 
19). The language of consensus emerges here and is indicative of a wish to 
maintain social cohesion in the form of the status quo. I acknowledged in 
Chapter Four that while an intercultural perspective may emanate from the 
approaches and methodologies of the curriculum, such a perspective is absent 
from its discourse, in that difference is presented as a distant construct, one to be 
learned about and appreciated but not necessarily engaged with. In addition, the 
word ‘interculturaT itself is conspicuous by its absence. Thus, the seamless 
transition of a document which just about aligned itself with ‘multiculturalism’ 
(in the sense attributed to the term by Bauman and Bhabha), to becoming an 
Intercultural document poses a challenge to credibility. The Guidelines
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endeavour to address many of the anomalies in the curriculum while not overtly 
acknowledging them. I consider that they would have done much for their own 
credibility had they outlined the anomalies first and then presented themselves as 
a means of addressing them.
I wish to engage with the notion of alterity here by endeavouring to 
interpret the motivation behind identifying the Guidelines as a support to the 
existing curriculum. Here I am adopting a genealogical perspective in that I wish 
to challenge the “heroization of the present” (Foucault, 1991a, in Chapter Two) 
and “make visible discontinuities that cross us” (Foucault, 2003, in Chapter 
Two). The appellation of ‘intercultural’ may serve to assuage teachers’ concerns 
about an ‘overloaded’ curriculum and thus render the use of the Guidelines more 
feasible. This approach demonstrates to teachers that applying a more 
intercultural perspective to lessons is undertaken with relative facility. A 
quotation from the teachers involved in a pilot project preceding the publication 
of the Guidelines bears out this contention: “By seeing the opportunities that 
exist in our lessons for an intercultural perspective, we can easily make our 
lessons intercultural...The opportunities for an intercultural perspective are 
always ,in our lessons but can be easily missed if we don’t look for them” 
(Celebrating Difference, Promoting Equality Project, cited by DES, 2005, p. 37).
However, a more subtle and subversive agenda could also be in question 
here: if the accommodation of cultural difference is presented to teachers as an 
easy undertaking, they are less likely to call for support. This means that the 
issue is addressed with minimal investment of resources. This is to confine the 
issue of cultural difference to the classroom and to confer responsibility on to the 
(flexible) teacher. While we are informed that “it is important that the members
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of the community of the school, children, parents, teachers, support staff and 
management, are included in the process of creating a school that values cultural 
diversity” (DES, 2005, p. 26), there is no reference in the Guidelines to the need 
for change in terms of school governance, ownership of schools or infrastructure. 
The research undertaken by McGorman and Sugrue (2007, in Chapters Three and 
Four) bears witness to the limitations of this confined approach. Their study of 
schools in the Dublin 15 area demonstrated that responsibility for addressing 
cultural change needed to be extended beyond the schools and into the political 
arena. The redefining of the curriculum to the category of an intercultural one 
could, therefore, be viewed as the most cost-effective manner of addressing the 
issue of cultural difference within the school. The Guidelines could be seen to 
succumb to the instrumentalist exigencies of the purposive-rational world.
5,23 School Policy and Cultural Difference
School organisation is addressed in the 1999 SPHE Curriculum, albeit 
without a specific reference to cultural difference. Nevertheless, there is a 
comprehensive outline of the stages in developing a school approach to SPHE 
(DES, 1999b, p. 29) with the importance of school policy accorded recognition. 
This is expanded upon in the Guidelines (DES, 2005, p. 29). Yet, there is 
insufficient guidance or even acknowledgement in relation to some of the areas 
of policy-making that are rendered problematic through the advent of different 
cultures. A list of policies is provided, which it is stated that schools may have. 
First of all, some of these policies are mandatory and should have been 
acknowledged as such: I refer in particular to the policies on admissions and on 
discipline and anti-bullying. Many of the policies become problematic when 
different cultures are involved, in particular, policies relating to discipline,
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religious education, uniform and specific healthy eating habits, yet the potential 
problems are not highlighted.
A study undertaken by the Development and Intercultural Education 
Research Committee in 2006 highlighted the inadequacy of policy measures in 
relation to the accommodation of different religions, also cultural differences in 
relation to discipline and school uniform. The lack of consistent departmental 
policies was acknowledged by the researchers (DICE, 2006, pp. 19-20 and 25). 
The more recent evidence presented by Boucher (2008, in Chapter Three), in 
relation to Ireland’s laissez-faire approach to integration and lack of coherent 
immigration and integration policy, indicates that this lacuna has not been 
addressed in the interim. In addition to the issues outlined above in relation to 
policy, three policies which are mandatory in all schools have been omitted from 
the list: these are Child Protection, Relationships and Sexuality Education and 
Substance Use.
5,2,4 Individualism versus Communitarianism
So far my analysis of the Guidelines indicates that they, while seemingly 
innovative, defer to the exigencies and the fallibilities of social cohesion. I 
believe that this is not an irreconcilable difficulty as, if the theorists in Chapter 
One are to be believed, social cohesion and difference can be addressed through 
critical debate, perhaps resulting in a new and less fallible form of social 
cohesion. Further analysis of the Guidelines will determine the extent to which 
this is facilitated. The more worrying proposal which I have put forward relates 
to them being subordinate to the influences of purposive-rationality and 
consequently to neo-liberalism. The rest of this analysis will endeavour to temper 
this proposal.
What I wish to determine now, is whether the excessive focus on the 
child as an individual, witnessed in the curriculum, is sustained in the Guidelines. 
As observed in Chapter Four, a focus on the individual can be seen to be an 
acknowledgement of the uniqueness and difference of each child. Yet, without a 
sufficient focus on community, this focus operates in the interests of purposive- 
rationality as it deflects the individual’s focus from the needs of the community 
and thus allows neo-liberal interests to prevail.
While the Guidelines are built upon the vision of the curriculum and 
reiterate its key aims, its focus serves to mitigate a charge of excessive 
individualism. Intercultural education, by its very nature, deflects focus from the 
individual towards his or her interactions with others. In addition, the very 
structure of the Guidelines starts off with a community or societal focus. 
Intercultural education is placed within the realities of the Irish context (DES, 
2005, pp. 9-17). There is a focus on current Irish society rather than on the child 
as an individual. The rationale for Intercultural Education is supported by 
statistical evidence in relation to the demographic changes that have occurred in 
Ireland in the past decade or so (pp. 10-11).
In outlining the role of intercultural education in the curriculum, the 
development of the child as a social being through living and co-operating with 
others is emphasised from the start, along with the necessity of all children living 
within and contributing “to the evolution of our growing intercultural society” 
(DES, 2005, p. 21). Here, I see the Guidelines as developing significantly from 
the curriculum. While still influenced by the language of developmental 
psychology, I see the Guidelines as beginning in a place which recognises the 
value of cultural difference but also accords priority to the socialisation of the
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child, thus contributing towards the maintenance of social cohesion through 
facilitating the child’s active participation. Thus, the Guidelines could be seen to 
resonate with Gramsci’s vision of education.
As observed in Chapter One, in his Prison Notebooks, Gramsci reflects 
upon the educational principles of the ‘old’ primary school wherein children 
were taught the rudiments of natural science and the idea of civic rights and 
duties. “Scientific ideas were intended to insert the child into the societas rerum, 
the world of things, while lessons in rights and duties were intended to insert him 
into the State and into civil society” (Gramsci, 1971, pp. 33-34). He adds that 
lessons in civic rights and duties also combated tendencies towards individualism 
(ibid, p. 34). There is a sense in the Guidelines that a more defined philosophical 
basis is emerging. The tensions between the maintenance of social cohesion and 
the recognition of difference are beginning to be addressed in a coherent way. 
However, teachers need to be cognisant of this philosophical dilemma. Gramsci 
expresses doubts as to whether the primary school “yielded all its fruits” (1971, 
p. 35) or whether teachers were aware of the nature and philosophical content of 
their task. As observed in Chapter One, Gramsci did not demonstrate much 
optimism in this regard. Whether the situation has changed much in the 
meantime is difficult to say and is beyond the remit of this particular dissertation. 
Yet, I view the Guidelines as endeavouring to provide an indicator to teachers of 
the philosophical and political nature of their task.
5,2.5 A ims of the Guidelines
While I acknowledge that the Guidelines represent a progression from the 
individualistic focus of the curriculum and represent difference as a central rather 
than a peripheral societal issue, I wish now to analyse in greater detail the extent
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to which they further the cause of the recognition and accommodation of cultural 
difference. I have chosen a segment outlining the aims of the Guidelines as the 
focus of my analysis:
The aim of these guidelines is to contribute to the development of 
Ireland as an intercultural society based on a shared sense that 
language, culture and ethnic diversity is valuable. They aim to 
contribute to the development of a shared ability and sense of 
responsibility to protect for each other the right to be different and 
to live free from discrimination (DES, 2005, p. 5).
The verb “to contribute to”, which appears twice in this short segment, 
highlights the fact that education plays a significant part in the development of 
Ireland as an intercultural society but that there are other key players also. It 
indicates awareness on the part of the authors that the school is not the sole locus 
of resolution for issues relating to cultural difference. The verb prompts us to 
challenge logocentrism by contemplating the absent stakeholders, those who 
have the power to render the Guidelines a significant advancement towards an 
intercultural society or to confine it to being a tokenistic gesture masquerading as 
something more radical. The Guidelines need support from the other 
stakeholders, in particular the relevant government departments along with the 
dominant religious groups. Without such support, the latter status, namely a 
tokenistic gesture in the guise of something more radical, is the likely one for the 
Guidelines. I thus interpret this verb as a subtle ‘call to action’ directed at 
statutory and non-statutory groups. This is a call to universal action, with a vision 
of many different agencies working together with one common aim: that of 
contributing to the development of Ireland as an intercultural society. If this call
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is answered, I contend that the Guidelines could be viewed as part of the 
Gramscian vision of an organic movement with attendant political implications 
and action, rather than a conjunctural one which gives rise to minor political 
criticism but no more (Gramsci, 1988, in Chapter One). It is only then that the 
transformative potential of the Guidelines will become evident. Their existence 
as a discrete entity renders them a far less effective agent of change and more 
facilitative of Bhabha’s (1990, in Chapter Two) musée imaginaire. A notable 
lacuna in the Guidelines is the omission of a list of those organisations and 
groups who could be seen as having an interest (either positively or negatively) 
in their development. This, in itself, could be seen as a manifestation of power or 
control as these organisations are shielded from censure.
The notion of a shared sense of value relating to language, culture and 
ethnic diversity endorses the notion of a universal perspective within which one 
can observe a search for consensus. There is a sense of prescription and 
imposition here that eliminates discordant voices. The impression is conveyed 
that there is unanimous agreement on the value of cultural difference. Yet, it is 
somewhat unrealistic to propose that a sense of the value of cultural difference is 
shared across all sectors of society. Bauman’s observations (1997, in Chapter 
One) are again of relevance here. He contends that those who can afford to do so, 
those “secure in their burglar-proof homes in leafy suburbs”, will welcome the 
advent of the ‘stranger’. However, the already disenfranchised and 
disempowered groups in society, “experiencing the world as a trap, not as an 
adventure park” will react to the ‘stranger’ in a defensive manner (Bauman, 
1997, pp. 28-29). This reality has not been accorded significance by the 
Guidelines. It is unlikely that those who are most likely to feel disenfranchised
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by minority groups will place the same sense of value on the advent of a 
multicultural society as those whose lives are affected the least by these groups. 
In any case, it is unlikely that the ‘shared sense5 of value will occur 
independently of action outside of the classroom, action which leads to the 
redistribution of resources so that the concerns of all those who may feel 
disenfranchised can be alleviated. A shared sense of value cannot be prescribed 
by those in power. Those who may not feel such a sense need to be 
acknowledged and their voices heard. I consider there is an anti-dialogic tone in 
this sentence that serves to silence but not eliminate dissent. Cohesion of a sort is 
achieved but predicated upon imposition rather than communication. It thus 
becomes a fallible concept.
Associated questions in this problematic relate to just how the sense of 
value is defined and who benefits from it. Bhabha (1990, p. 208) states that there 
is a transparent norm constituted by the host society that says that ‘these other 
cultures are fine, but we must be able to locate them within our own grid5. 
Hence, power is retained by the majority culture. If, as argued above, the sense of 
value is accepted as being imposed by the majority group, then it is reasonable to 
assume that the sense of value is defined by this group and is of value to this 
group. It is unclear as to whether the sense of value is to be interpreted as an 
economic or social variable. As indicated in Chapter Three, the NESC (2005) 
provided an outline of the positive and negative aspects of recent immigration. 
The positive aspects tended to align with the national interest while the negative 
aspects pertained to the situation of the immigrants themselves. We are thus left 
to ponder as to whether the sense of value accorded to interculturalism is 
predicated upon the contribution that the immigrant makes to the national
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interest. The conditionality of Derrida’s ‘Hostipitality’ (2006, in Chapter Two) 
again becomes evident here. Those on the margins of society, be they indigenous 
or non-indigenous groups, are unlikely to experience, define or benefit from, the 
value of ethnic diversity, particularly if it is determined by economics. 
Consequently, in accepting the ‘shared sense’ of value without question, we 
could be seen to be acting in the interests of the majority rather than the minority 
group. We are thus confronted with a subtle example of hegemony. Gramsci’s 
(1988, in Chapter One) charge of “a willed and knowing deception” of the 
subordinate groups is taking place, as the affirmation of the value of cultural 
difference masks the need for awkward questions to be posed and for the less 
attractive aspects of cultural difference to be unearthed. Here, inequalities are 
recast as cultural differences that we are exhorted to “cherish and obey” 
(Bauman, 2001, in Chapter One). There is a sense of coercion towards consensus 
here thus undermining Habermas’s (1987a, in Chapter One) notion of a 
communication community.
On the other hand, the Habermasian vision could be deemed to be 
endorsed by the notion of reciprocity that emerges in the endorsement of the 
children “protecting for each other the right to be different”. This alleviates the 
somewhat problematic aspects of the final sentence in the segment from the 
SPHE curriculum, cited in Chapter Four, wherein the children are invited to 
counteract inequality as they may experience it in their own lives. Here, the flaw 
has been addressed in that the children are now exhorted to assume responsibility 
beyond themselves and to engage with their community. The Hegelian notion of 
‘absolute’ freedom emerges here: freedom which is placed under restraint but 
which ultimately yields a greater harvest, both to the individual and his or her
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community (Taylor, 1984, pp. 191-192). There is an implication that each 
individual or group is aware of groups who are different to themselves and are 
willing to work in the interests of the others. This presents a less fallible notion 
of social cohesion as each group retains the sense of the ‘bigger picture’. In 
addition, the sense of indifference to difference which is embodied in Bauman’s 
swarms, who act in a coordinated but not an integrated manner (2001, in Chapter 
One), is eliminated here. The sense of reciprocal responsibility is reiterated later 
in the Guidelines with an acknowledgement that the assertion of one’s own rights 
is not sufficient for membership of the human community. The responsibility of 
the minority as well as the majority group to protect and promote the rights of 
others is clearly and unequivocally stated:
The recognition that responsibilities come with rights is essential.
If any group, the majority or an ethnic minority, is to demand of 
other people that their rights be respected, members of that group 
have, in turn, a responsibility to protect and to promote the rights 
of other groups. (DES, 2005, p. 64).
The Habermasian contention that rights do not come “free of charge” is 
endorsed here (Habermas, 2006, in Chapter One). This clarity is testimony to a 
progression in the discourse of Irish educational policy in relation to the 
achievement of an intercultural society as issues of difference are addressed in a 
constructive rather than a paternalistic manner. The notion of the dominant group 
bestowing rights upon marginalised groups is firmly refuted: “rights are not 
simply an issue for the needy or those discriminated against: we each have 
rights...” (DES, 2005, p. 64). The realities and attendant problems of a 
multicultural society are beginning to be foregrounded.
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My above observations are somewhat compromised by the absolutist tone 
of the phrase in which “a sense of responsibility to protect for each other the 
right to be different” is endorsed. The assertion of difference seems to be made 
just for the sake of being different and thus could be seen to endorse indifference 
both to other cultures and to the greater good. If this is the case, social cohesion 
becomes compromised as consideration of the ‘good’ cedes to the ‘right’. As 
observed in Chapter One, this is insufficient rationale for Habermas. Here, there 
is no demonstration of “why it is false or incorrect or bad to recognise the 
sovereignty of the ideals of science and universalistic morality” (Habermas, 
1987a, p. 125, in Chapter One).
At the same time, the assertion also gives rise to critique from Derrida 
and Bhabha as it brokers little negotiation. There is little evidence of the middle 
voice of differance or the hybridity of the ‘third space’ (in Chapter Two). Instead 
of the hybridity of the situation and its attendant potential for antagonism being 
acknowledged, I contend that some ‘glossing over’ as referred to by O’Sullivan 
(2005, in Chapter Four) occurs here. We are informed that “significant minority 
ethnic, linguistic and religious groups have long been part of Irish society” and 
this cultural diversity has contributed to making Ireland the country it is today 
(DES, 2005, p. 9). This is presented as an unproblematic fact and fails to embody 
the reality of previous encounters between different cultural groups as they 
struggled to gain recognition for their own cultural mores and beliefs. Such 
struggle gave rise to much upheaval and rebellion over the centuries; the 
religious divide has occupied a significant part of our history and there are still 
underlying tensions in this regard in some parts of Ireland. The contention that
5.2.6 The Right to be Different
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ethnic, religious and cultural groups have been part of Irish society is, in my 
opinion, a prime example of O’Sullivan’s ‘gloss’. This implies inclusion and 
accommodation. I believe, that, if anything, the opposite has been the case, and, 
although these groups have existed in Irish society, they have been, and continue 
to be, marginalised. Thus they have still to be empowered to become a 
meaningful part of Irish society.
The current ‘hands off approach of the government under the guise of 
liberalism does little to facilitate such empowerment. As observed by Boucher, 
(2008, in Chapter Three), the main emphasis in the policy discourse, and in the 
few policy statements on integration has been on restricting the state’s role in the 
integration process through the legitimating of a laissez-faire strategy. The 
Guidelines' assertion of the right to be different, without problematising its 
implications for social cohesion, can be seen as a subtle endorsement and 
reflection of overall state policy in this regard.
The assertion of difference can be interpreted as a gesture of 
emancipation, of freeing oneself from the shackles of hegemony, yet we are 
running the risk of being left with nothing but “difference itself and its 
accumulation” (Friedman, 1999, cited by Bauman 2001, p. 76). Bauman 
contends that demands for redistribution voiced in the name of equality are 
vehicles of integration, while claims to recognition stripped to the bare bones of 
cultural distinction promote division, separation and ultimately a breakdown of 
dialogue (p. 78). Without doubt, the Guidelines promote dialogue, particularly in 
the methodology chapters. Yet at this point, the stark call for the assertion of 
difference, independent of any acknowledgement of social justice or 
redistribution of goods, serves to disembed those groups asserting their rights
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from society as a whole. Thus the pursuit, and even the achievement, of 
recognition in itself is not an antidote to marginalisation. Nor does it serve the 
cause of citizenship.
5.2.7 Citizenship and the Irish Context
While the principles of citizenship are implicit in the approaches and 
methodology section of the Guidelines, I consider that the complexities and 
challenges of citizenship need to be outlined and placed in context, in particular 
in political context, in order to render the concept meaningful. The concept of the 
nation-state and the corresponding concept of nationalism may be anathema to 
the proponents of difference (and indeed, also to the proponents of 
individualism). Yet, whether or not we care to acknowledge it, this is our 
political reality. The Guidelines are not operating in a political vacuum. Thus, the 
implications for the nation-state, which emerge from the assertion of difference, 
in particular the assertion of difference from non-indigenous groups, merit 
acknowledgement. However, according to Kymlicka (2001, p. 221), many 
theorists, while writing within the context of the nation-state, do not see the need 
to make it explicit.
Yet, the assertion of cultural difference, particularly non-indigenous 
cultural difference, may give rise to antagonism in a context wherein the concept 
of ‘nation’ invokes uncomfortable memories and a defensive reaction. The 
struggles that Ireland experienced in the pursuit of nationhood still exist in the 
collective memory. For that reason, the concept of the nation tends to evoke a 
sense of nationalism which was predominantly based upon the Irish language and 
the (Catholic) Church and which tended to be exclusive rather than inclusive. 
Haran and Tormey (2002, p. 14, referencing Gillespie, 1998) view this as ethnic
nationalism and present civic nationalism as a means of preserving links with the 
nation but reconceptualising it so that it is predicated upon a common set of ideas 
rather than on common ethnicity.
Each presents a different view of what it is to be Irish -  one is 
based around shared ideals and is open and inclusive of 
difference. The other is based around a shared culture and can be 
narrowly defined and exclusive (Haran and Tormey, 2002, p. 14).
I view the Guidelines as being developed on the basis of civic nationalism 
although a possible weakness in this regard is the fact that the role of the Church 
is ignored and any reference to spirituality omitted. The ideas that have emanated 
from our religious traditions merit acknowledgement. A different approach is 
taken with the Irish language. Here, the significance of the Irish language is 
retained but is redefined to align with the exigencies of cultural change. The 
difficulties relating to the learning of a second language are outlined with 
supporting evidence and the approaches used in the teaching of Irish as a second 
language are extended to include English (DES, 2005, p. 163). In addition the 
learning of Irish is acknowledged as helping the indigenous children to develop a 
positive sense of their own cultural identity and thus facilitating them to engage 
positively with other cultures and also to recognise the value of multilingualism 
(ibid). In this manner, the Guidelines helps the reader to see that the Irish 
language curriculum, rather than being a catalyst for division, can actually help 
to support the accommodation of non-indigenous children in the school. (I 
acknowledge that the compulsory nature of Irish may still be seen by some 
groups as problematic).
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While the Guidelines can be seen to retain a nationalistic perspective in 
the form of civic nationalism, I am unsure as to their role in relation to the 
ideology of liberalism. I believe that they do endeavour to shake the liberal 
agenda out of the lethargy and inaction that tends to define it currently. The 
introductory chapters indicate an effort to impose a ‘bottom line’. We are 
informed from the outset that intercultural education “is education which 
promotes equality and human rights, challenges unfair discrimination, and 
promotes the values upon which equality is built” (DES, 2005, p. 3). Yet, I 
believe that this ‘bottom line’ sometimes tends to fade from view and is 
compromised in my view by the eschewal of a definition of morality or an overt 
reference to the common good. Once again this task is seen to be defined by the 
(religious) ethos of the school, and, consequently, has been placed outside of the 
remit of the Guidelines (DES, 2005, p. 86). This may present the Guidelines as 
acquiescing to the ‘hospitable variant5 of liberalism that, according to Taylor 
(1991, in Chapter One) endorses the liberalism of neutrality and precludes any 
debate on what constitutes the ‘good life’. Yet, I believe the focus on 
responsibilities as well as rights prevents the Guidelines from falling into this 
category. Nevertheless, there is a somewhat hollow ring to its defence of the 
right to be different independent of either an acknowledgement of the common 
good or a concerted approach to equality issues. While equality issues are 
accorded acknowledgement, they are not pursued to any great extent. We are 
informed that intercultural education “emerges naturally from existing 
educational policy and is in keeping with other equality legislation issues” (DES, 
2005, p. 17). Such legislation is mainly concerned with eliminating 
discrimination and does not really address the material inequalities in Irish
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society (see, for example, the Equal Status Acts, 2000 to 2004). Thus in taking 
their lead from this legislation, I contend that the Guidelines stop short of 
embracing the liberal egalitarianism, embodied in the redistribution of resources, 
which renders the liberal agenda a definitive champion of difference rather than a 
nebulous ‘wishy-washy’ concept. This impacts on the republican ideal.
The extent to which the republican ideal of liberty, equality and solidarity 
is upheld in the Guidelines tends to fluctuate. Undoubtedly the Guidelines 
subscribe to the principle of liberty. The form of liberty that emerges in the 
document (although in my view is not sustained throughout) is commensurate 
with the Hegelian notion of absolute freedom which is predicated upon 
commitment to and participation in society. Responsibility is emphasised as well 
as rights. This type of freedom facilitates solidarity, which, at the same time, is 
compromised by the assertion of difference for difference’s sake. This does not 
mean that solidarity is a finite and unchanging construct. Rorty (1991, p. 22) 
acknowledges the contribution of the “objectivist tradition” brought about by the 
Enlightenment, to the interrogation of the concept of solidarity in order to 
obviate parochialism.
The concept of equality is reiterated throughout the document. 
Nevertheless, it merits further exploration in order to determine whether it is 
imbued with the significance that is commensurate with the Republican ideal. 
This concept of equality empowers all citizens by according them all a voice. I 
defer to Jefferson’s notion of ‘elementary republics’ where “the voice of the 
whole people would be fairly, fully, and peaceably expressed, discussed and 
decided by the common reason” of all citizens (Jefferson, 1816, cited by Arendt, 
1984, p. 240).
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The Guidelines, following the Education Act (1998), extend the notion of 
equality of opportunity to include equality of access and participation (DES, 
2005, p. 29). This would indicate a concerted effort to keep the equality agenda 
on view, yet I believe that this agenda is not subsequently maintained throughout 
the document. In any case, it should be borne in mind that current Irish society is 
significantly different from the context in which the Education Act was 
developed. As observed in Chapter Four, Devine (2005, p. 58) reminds us that 
the Education Act enshrined the status of the different patrons within the school 
system, a system which, she contends, is not dealing with the lived realities of 
our society. Enshrining the patrons within the school system renders access and 
participation problematic for an increasing number of children as patronage is 
retained, in the vast majority of cases, by the Catholic Church, and in the 
majority of the remainder, by other denominations. This anomaly seems to have 
been overlooked in the Guidelines, just as it has in the Education Act itself. 
While the schools cannot exclude children on the basis of religious beliefs, the 
fact remains that for many children, the ethos of the school conflicts with their 
own values or mores. While they may have access to the school, they do not 
participate fully as there are some aspects of the curriculum from which they are 
excluded. Yet, there is limited choice available to these children and their parents 
and so it must be concluded that they are denied access to an environment that 
would be more supportive of their needs. That is not to say that I am identifying 
the Catholic Church or other denominations as opponents of difference. As 
acknowledged in Chapter Four, CORI has done much to signal the 
interdependent nature of society. What is required in Ireland today, is not the
5.2. S Equality Issues
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subversion of traditional Church values, but instead a greater choice of schools in 
order that access and participation can become a reality for all children.
5.2.9 Tackling Racism
The Guidelines take a definitive stance against racism from the outset. 
They provide a broad ranging definition of the concept, one that admits the 
notion of alterity:
It [Racism] encompass a range of attitudes or beliefs on one 
hand and practices or rules on the other. This means that the 
term ‘racism’ actually includes some things that may not have 
appeared as such to many people at a first glance (DES, 2005, p.
13, original emphasis).
In addition, statistics on racism in Ireland are given (ibid, p. 14) along with 
examples of racist practices by individuals and institutions (ibid, p. 16). The 
Guidelines also focus on the impact of indirect discrimination, thus revealing the 
potential racist practices within organisations and institutions that may not appear 
overtly racist. The notion of alterity becomes evident here. The Guidelines use 
the example of schools that allocate priority of access to children who already 
have siblings in the school and demonstrate how this disadvantages nomadic 
groups (ibid). It is observed, “while the practice did not originate from the 
prejudiced intention of reducing the numbers of Traveller children, this will be 
the effect”. Here the relevance of the Foucauldian exhortation to criticise the 
working of institutions that may appear to be neutral and independent in order to 
unmask the political violence that may operate covertly within them (Foucault, 
1974, cited by Rabinow, 1991, in Chapter Two) becomes evident.
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While the section on racism is comprehensive and informative, I consider 
that care needs to be taken that critical dialogue in relation to cultural diversity is 
not subverted out of a fear of being accused of being racist. People may fear 
censure if they express an oppositional or ill-thought out remark in this regard 
and thus choose to remain silent. Thus those who may have concerns in relation 
to demographic change, concerns that may not necessarily be racist, may find 
themselves on the margins of debate. Callan (2006, p. 3) queries the point at 
which a charge of racism becomes apt and observes that the demarcation of 
racism may generate a mood of suspicion and recrimination which proves not to 
be conducive to the achievement of racial reconciliation. Here he calls into 
question blanket assertions of individual or institutional racism, a concern also 
enunciated by Bhabha, (1994, in Chapter Two).
What is noteworthy about this quite substantial section on racism is that 
teachers and pupils seem to have been exempted from the equation. While there 
are some references to resistance to difference (DES, 2005, pages 21 and 26), the 
overall impression that is conveyed is the advent of cultural difference has been 
embraced with positivity and efficacy in schools. Little acknowledgement and 
attention is accorded to those who take a negative view. Indeed, the reference on 
page 21 relates to negative reactions to the past:
When people (children, teachers, parents, and others in the 
community of the school) explore their own attitudes and values, 
and when they look at their own past reactions, they may get 
defensive and angry (p. 21).
While the statement on page 26 recognises the potential for resistance to 
intercultural education and the possible need for further support and training for
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staff, it seems that it is left up to the staff themselves to pursue such training, 
again demonstrating that the Guidelines view such ‘dissenters’ as being outside 
of their frame of reference.
I see the likely outcome here to be that teachers will bury any 
oppositional attitudes they themselves may have towards difference and will 
avoid discussion of difference in the classroom for fear of their own inadequacies 
in dealing with negative comments from the children. There is no support 
provided in the Guidelines for such an event. Yet difference-related negativity on 
the part of both children and teachers needs to be admitted and problematised. 
Lodge and Lynch (2004, p. 72) observe that while there is little available 
research on the extent of racist behaviour and harassment in Irish educational 
institutions (such a lacuna in itself being symptomatic of a wish to avoid the less 
attractive aspects of the impact of cultural difference), the emergent research is 
not encouraging. Devine, Kenny and McNeela (2004, p. 183), present evidence 
of how children’s behaviour can be “exclusionary and derogatory of minority 
ethnic groups as well as respectful and inclusive of ethnic difference”. To 
suppress admission of these realities does little to help the cause of recognition.
The methodology of the Guidelines has moved beyond the benign 
‘celebration’ of difference to addressing it in a more constructive manner. 
Children are encouraged to look at the issue of difference from different 
perspectives rather than to simply accept difference on a superficial level. There 
are a number of exemplars provided throughout the Guidelines which pose such 
challenges to the children, for example, Exemplar One, Who is the real 
Pocahontas? (DES, 2005, p. 48) and Exemplar Nine, First Impressions, (ibid, p. 
71). Exemplar One challenges the children to explore a number of different
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perspectives from which the story of Pocahontas could be viewed, while 
Exemplar Nine helps the children to realise that ‘first impressions’ may have to 
be reviewed and revised. These and other exemplars promote critical discussion 
of difference and the challenging of stereotypes. Yet, there is no reference in the 
Guidelines in relation to the management of such discussions or the tackling of 
inappropriate remarks. Again, such discussions appear to be predicated upon the 
assumptions that such events do not occur. The lack of subsequent training for 
teachers becomes an issue here. Ultimately if teachers do not feel empowered to 
conduct such discussions, they are likely to avoid them and if this occurs, the 
likelihood of achieving real change is significantly compromised. The issue of 
‘undecidabity’ emerges again here. We are left unsure as to whether the 
Guidelines are a portent of significant change or whether they, while moving 
beyond the discourse of the 1999 curriculum, remain a symbolic gesture.
5.2.10 ‘Undecidability9
There are a number of ‘undecidables’ to be observed in the Guidelines. I 
have already demonstrated the ambiguity evident in the title. What I also find 
difficult to decide, if not ‘undecidable’, is the level of recognition accorded to 
difference in the Guidelines. It has been established that they have moved 
beyond the level of appreciation evident in the 1999 curriculum and are assuming 
a more definitive role in relation to the accommodation of cultural difference in 
the school. However, it remains unclear as to whether systemic change is in 
question here. While the Guidelines (cf. Appendices D and E) pose questions in 
relation to school planning and organisation, it is left up to the school to answer 
(or not answer) these questions. Thus the Guidelines can be seen as stopping 
short of providing an interventionist approach thus aligning with what seems to
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be overall State policy in this regard. The more focused, deterministic approach 
that is undoubtedly in evidence in the document is confined to the classroom and 
more systemic issues ultimately cede to the influence of laissez-faire. In addition, 
it is unclear as to whether the children will be sufficiently empowered to become 
politically active, or indeed if this is an aim of the Guidelines. Out of nineteen 
exemplars, only one, Exemplar Fifteen, Working Together for Change, (DES, 
2005, p. 137) extends beyond discussion and reflection to action.
This ‘undecidable’ is accentuated by the reiteration of the words 
‘diversity5 and ‘difference5 through the use of an excerpt from the SPHE 
curriculum (DES, 2005, p. 27). As observed in Chapter Four the use of both 
words demonstrates an ideological confusion with the result that we are uncertain 
as to whether the document is seeking to deconstruct previously held perceptions 
and understandings in relation to difference or whether it is simply 
acknowledging difference within the status quo. The transformational aspirations 
of difference are reined in by the more benign forces of diversity. Again, I 
acknowledge that I am following Bhabha5s interpretation here and that other 
writers, such as Parekh, retain the term ‘diversity5 while still seeking 
transformation. These writers retain the liberal perspective. It would seem that 
the Guidelines (like the curriculum) are unwilling to indicate for sure their 
philosophical affiliations and thus prefer to use both terms as a means of 
dissimulation.
We thus remain unsure as to whether the Guidelines represent a radical 
challenge to existing social cohesion or whether ultimately there is an unstated 
concession to the status quo. Throughout the document, there is an absence of 
reference to existing core values and while the development of moral and
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spiritual values is acknowledged (DES, 2005, p. 20), there is little subsequent 
reference to these. It may well be that, like the 1999 curriculum, the Guidelines 
direct us elsewhere to locate core values. They mirror the curriculum in their 
eschewal of religious issues (ibid, p. 86), conceding to Church authority in this 
regard. However, unlike the curriculum, references to school ethos are 
conspicuous by their absence. This may indicate a concerted wish to avoid 
specific religious connotations, since, as indicated in the previous chapter, there 
tends to be a link between ethos and religion, specifically the Catholic religion. 
Yet again, I cannot be unequivocal in my conclusion. The “theorised intentional 
language”, which O’Sullivan, (2005, in Section 5.1) seeks, is more present in the 
Guidelines than in previous documents and provides a set of core values 
(elimination of racism from society, emphasis of responsibilities as well as 
rights). Yet, I consider that there needs to be more links made with previously 
held values and mores and acknowledgement that these may be challenged by 
different cultural groups.
Throughout the document, there is an effort to avoid confrontation or 
even acknowledgement that there may be attitudes or behaviours manifested in 
the classroom which “may call into question our philosophical boundaries” 
(Taylor, 1994, p. 96, in Chapter One). Our philosophical boundaries are our 
bottom line, the core values upon which the operation of our society depends. 
Undoubtedly the advent of cultural difference will expose their fallibility and 
require them to be renegotiated and possibly redefined. However, it does not 
mean that they fade into insignificance. While I believe that the Guidelines have 
successfully redefined the role of the Irish language while retaining its
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significance, their eschewal of a similar course of action in relation to core values 
and the greater good compromises their impact.
This critique of the Guidelines has been undertaken in the knowledge that 
they were written within a broader socio-political context and thus were bound to 
operate within these parameters. Yet, I see the Guidelines as throwing down a 
gauntlet to existing education policy and practice. They pose enough questions to 
schools to unsettle them out of a sense of complacency in relation to their 
existing modus operandi when confronted by cultural difference. The discourse 
on difference has progressed from being vague and benign in the 1999 
curriculum to being more clear and explicit in the Guidelines. The document 
becomes more credible through the provision of supporting references and 
numerous explanatory notes and statistics. Nevertheless, there are a number of 
realities which could be viewed as potential impediments to the achievement of 
an intercultural society and these have been sidestepped by the Guidelines. The 
needs and concerns of teachers; the political reality of Ireland as a liberal 
democracy operating in the context of a nation state; the reality of the religious 
ethos of most schools and the social and economic inequalities in society need 
more acknowledgement and focus. Miller (1995, p. 139) observes that “behind 
multi-culturalist rhetoric, there seems to lie the assumption that to expose an 
injustice is already to have created the constituency to abolish it”. Without 
acknowledgement of current realities in Ireland, and without the involvement of 
other agencies, this constituency does not exist. While the Guidelines indicate a 
challenge to the power balance at micro-level, this is not yet mirrored at macro­
level.
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The Guidelines for Intercultural Education in the Primary School 
demonstrate a significant progression from the 1999 curriculum in terms of the 
recognition and accommodation of difference. There is a sense of rapprochement 
with difference that is absent from the former document. This is understandable 
given the changes in the Irish demographic since 1999. Yet, despite the 
commitment of the Guidelines to the recognition of difference, and despite the 
potential in the discourse of the document, it is placed under considerable 
constraints. There are a number of barriers to be overcome and a number of 
realities to be acknowledged in order to realise its potential for transformation.
First of all, the Guidelines have been developed in the context of a post­
colonial state, whose relatively recent past has rendered her protective of her 
identity. The Church exerted a significant influence on this society for many 
years and this influence has residual effects that could be seen to be in opposition 
to cultural change. The influence of the Church on education impacted 
significantly on schools until the 1960s and, after that period, the State still 
tended to concede many decisions to the Church. Thus, the Guidelines are 
grappling with the non-interventionist strategies of a liberal democratic state and 
the still pervasive influences of the Church.
While the principles of liberalism could be seen to be a sympathetic 
foundation upon which to develop a set of guidelines aimed at creating links 
between cultures, it becomes apparent that supporting the assertion of difference 
is not commensurate with its accommodation. Non-intervention or laissez-faire 
approaches do little to further the cause of difference. There is little investment 
of resources and, while claims of recognition are facilitated, there is no guarantee
5.3 Conclusion
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of a response to such claims as a response may be seen to compromise the 
national interest, which is increasingly viewed in economic terms. While the 
concept of republicanism could be seen to be upheld in the Guidelines as liberty, 
equality and solidarity feature in the discourse, these principles require support 
beyond the rhetoric of the Guidelines in order to render the concept of 
republicanism normative rather than nominal.
The subordinate relationship of the Guidelines to the 1999 curriculum 
poses somewhat of a conundrum in that the curriculum, which was devoid of any 
specific reference to cultural change in the Irish context, subsequently and 
seamlessly evolved into an intercultural curriculum. The presentation of the 
Guidelines as an adjunct to the curriculum undermines their significance and 
their potential for transformation.
Thus, the Guidelines, while endeavouring to pursue some fairly radical 
ideals, could be seen to become a victim of the market forces and neo-liberal 
ideals as the lack of support accorded to their implementation compromises their 
transformative potential. The Guidelines support the assertion of difference and 
identify one of the most evident and significant barriers to that assertion, namely 
racism. However, they fail to identify more subtle barriers. In particular, I 
consider that they fail to highlight the need for the dominant group to unite with 
minority cultures in order that the claim of recognition can be rendered 
meaningful. As both Habermas (1987a, in Chapter One) and Bauman (1997, in 
Chapter One) have observed, such claims have little long-term impact without 
support from more privileged groups in society.
We need to avoid what Bauman (1997, p. 81, in Chapter One) views as a 
“series of soliloquies with the speakers no more insisting on being heard but
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refusing to listen into the bargain”. Such “soliloquies” threaten the cohesion of 
society. We need, instead, to find a common voice and a common purpose in 
order to bring together the cause of difference with the cause of social order. In 
this way, order becomes an intrinsic part of the person or group, their “inner law” 
(Foucault, 1989a, in Chapter Two) rather than an externally imposed construct 
likely to generate resistance. This is a difficult task in the current climate of 
disengagement (under the guise of liberal policy) of the State and of 
individualism on the part of civil society. I acknowledge that it will take a far 
greater initiative than the production of a set of guidelines to overcome these 
barriers. While the Guidelines manifest a concerted aspiration to advance along 
the liberal continuum in the pursuit of a more equal society, they will remain 
aspirational until the State divests itself of its mantle of neutral disengagement 
which, on closer examination, is not in fact neutral at all but a concession to the 
status quo and the sublime exigencies of a deregulated society.
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6.1 Realising Objectives
Having reached this point in a dissertation, the expectation would be that 
one would have realised the objectives as outlined in the Introduction. In this 
instance, this is not the case. I may have been rather naïve in my original 
aspirations in that I expected to uncover a definitive philosophical basis in the 
discourse of educational policy. Instead, I have found that such definition has 
proven to be elusive. It could be argued that an eschewal of definition may, 
paradoxically, be the defining feature of the documents under scrutiny and that I 
may have to content myself with this conclusion. It thus behoves me, in this 
concluding section, to reflect upon the inconclusiveness of the documents and to 
present some reasons as to why the policy makers opted for a lack of definition 
as their preferred modus operandi. This involves an analysis of the choices and 
tensions with which the policy makers were presented.
First of all, the inconclusiveness of the documents may have served the 
interests of consensus and legitimation and ultimately have facilitated the 
publication of the documents. This, presumably, was one of the main objectives 
of the process. At the same time, the lack of definition may also have 
compromised the relevance and usefulness of the documents. This calls into 
question whether policy makers are concerned with the achievement of change or 
with the achievement of unproblematised consensus. I contend that the latter 
concern tends to dominate. Yet, this form of consensus is unhelpful to the 
workings of society. I consider that consensus needs to be reached through the 
acknowledgement of problems, not through their suppression. The avoidance of 
problems emerges as a consistent feature of both of the documents under review.
Chapter Six: Conclusion
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Drudy and Lynch (1993, p. 30) observe that a major concern of consensus 
theory or structural functionalism is with the question of order -  with the manner 
by which societies remain cohesive and maintain themselves from one generation 
to the next. They are critical of the structural functionalists due to their 
dependence on consensus. However, I believe that the main concern of society 
must be with its cohesiveness and that instead of dismissing the concept of 
consensualism, we should, as observed above, be more concerned with the 
maimer in which it is achieved and with problematising potential barriers. Only 
in this way can the fallibility of the concept of social order be addressed in a 
meaningful manner. This is where the views of Foucault and Derrida become 
significant as they expose the weaknesses of political organisations that are based 
upon the deliberations of the dominant majority. As observed in Chapter Two, 
Foucault (1974, cited by Rabinow, 1991, p. 6) sees the real political task in 
society as criticising “the workings of institutions which appear to be both 
neutral and independent” so that “the political violence which has always 
exercised itself obscurely through them will be unmasked...” Foucault is thus 
challenging the means by which consensus is reached.
By challenging existing values, both Foucault and Derrida serve to 
champion the cause of the marginalised. Yet, Gramsci’s caution in relation to the 
conquering of existing power relations through revolution needs to be 
acknowledged; namely that in rejecting one set of standards, a new set needs to 
be formulated (Gramsci, 1988, in Chapter One). This is where both Foucault and 
Derrida fall short. They thus remain in the category of ‘ludic’ postmodernists 
(McLaren, 1994, in Introduction), whose deliberations constitute “a moment of 
self-reflexivity in deconstructing Western metanarratives” (McLaren, 1994, p.
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198) but which do not yield any significant outcomes. I wish to retain a 
perspective on the ‘bottom line’, or on the Hegelian (or neo-Hegelian) notion of 
the common good, which is needed to achieve a workable society. This is a 
perspective which I believe exists in Irish educational policy but which tends to 
slacken in order to keep all of the stakeholders on board.
6.2 A Workable Society
Irish educational policy, while concerned with the formation of the child, 
is ultimately contributing to future society. This will happen regardless of 
whether societal concerns are focused upon or not. The propensity of Irish 
educational discourse to focus on the child as an individual and to de-emphasise 
the focus on society and the community will still contribute to the formation of 
future society, in that it will be a society, which, due to the “atomism of the self- 
absorbed individuals]” (Taylor, 1991, p. 9) which it encompasses, yields to the 
‘soft despotism’ which ultimately facilitates market forces and a neo-liberal 
society. This leads to a social cohesion of sorts, but one that perpetuates 
inequalities, indifference and exclusion. In this scenario, social cohesion is not 
concerned with the accommodation or even the acknowledgement of difference. 
The individual is so concerned with himself or herself that he or she gives little 
thought to the vicissitudes of social cohesion. Yet, in an increasingly 
heterogeneous society, we need to give it more, not less, consideration. Sachs 
(1991, cited by Miller, 1995, p. 138) contends, “the more plural a society we 
become, the more we need to reflect on what holds us together”. I believe that 
this needs to be given more consideration in Irish educational policy as I view
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this as the means by which the cause of difference can be meaningfully 
supported and protected.
This dissertation has looked at the meaning and implications of social 
cohesion and its, sometimes fraught, relationship with difference and with 
freedom. As observed through the works of Hegel, the maintenance and 
prioritisation of social cohesion leads to a particular type of freedom (absolute 
freedom) that is not without its conditions, namely, universal and total 
participation in society (Taylor, 1984, p. 191). This constrained notion of 
freedom tends to be seen to subvert the cause of difference and thus the more 
radical champions of the latter focus on the achievement of recognition, 
independently of concerns with social order. It was seen, for example, that 
Derrida (2006, in Chapter Two) opposed the conditionality that a host society 
imposes, either implicitly or explicitly, upon a non-indigenous group. Yet 
conditions are necessary if society is to work.
While Foucault (1989a, p. xxi, in Chapter Two) argues that order “is that 
which is given in things as their inner law”, this becomes problematic when the 
inner law becomes detached from a sense of moral laws and community. This 
compromises authenticity and endorses moral relativism. The conundrum which 
emerges from endeavouring to maintain social cohesion while simultaneously 
recognising difference is thus reconceptualised as the tensions between the 
‘good’ and the ‘right’, tensions to which I consider that Irish educational policy 
has not accorded sufficient attention. Conceding to individual or group rights 
tend to overrule societal concerns. As observed in Chapters Four and Five, a 
conclusive reason for this disposition remained elusive; I was unable to 
determine whether concessions to rights independent of social cohesion were
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made in the interest of political correctness and from fear of censure, or whether 
they were made in the interest of deflecting attention from global concerns 
through the facilitation of localised and ultimately ineffectual skirmishes wherein 
“the weak meet and confront the weak” (Bauman, 1997, p. 29) but ultimately 
effect little change in the status quo and thus prove to be “politically 
demoralising” (Jameson, 1989, cited by McLaren, 1994, p. 207). In any case, 
concerns with political correctness serve as a distraction from substantive issues 
such as structural inequalities, so the final result is the same, with no gain for 
those who would benefit most from critical discussion on such issues.
A preoccupation with social cohesion can be viewed as an endorsement 
of a universal perspective, a perspective that tends to be viewed as anathema to 
difference by some of its more radical proponents such as Foucault and, perhaps 
to a lesser degree, Derrida. This is not to place the universal perspective and the 
cause of difference in binary opposition. Indeed the value of the universal 
perspective is retained by many of the champions of difference. McLaren, (cf.
6.1 above), distances himself unequivocally from ‘ludic5 postmodernism and 
contends that not all forms of totalisation are democratically deficient (McLaren, 
1994, p. 207). He believes that, without a shared vision of democratic 
community, we risk endorsing struggles in which the politics of difference 
collapse into new forms of separatism. He cites Best to endorse this point: 
Without some positive and normative concept of totality to 
counter-balance the poststructuralist/postmodem emphasis on 
difference and discontinuity, we are abandoned to the seriality of 
pluralist individualism and the supremacy of competitive values 
over communal life (Best, 1989, cited by McLaren, 1994, p. 207).
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I consider that we can take a lead from McLaren here. He endorses the 
need “to retain some kind of moral, ethical and political ground -  albeit a 
provisional one -  from which to negotiate among multiple interests” (p. 207). It 
is within this framework that the recognition of difference must be pursued if 
society is to continue working. While such a framework or vision may be 
implicit in Irish education policy, this needs to become explicit, and the 
implications of belonging to a specifically Irish society need to be outlined if 
different cultures are to be accommodated in a meaningful way.
6.3 Belonging to Irish Society
Claims to recognition need to take place in context, and not in a political 
and social vacuum. However, it is within just such a vacuum that 
acknowledgement and ‘celebration’ of difference takes place in Irish educational 
discourse. The reality of Irish society and Irish culture, while featured, tends to 
be ‘glossed over’ (O’Sullivan, 2005, in Chapter Four) when placed in discussions 
about difference. Little reference is accorded to the problems that an immigrant 
group may encounter in relating to Irish societal mores. Indeed, there is little 
reference to such mores in the first places as the teaching of moral values is 
placed outside of the remit of the curriculum.
I believe that meeting cultural difference provokes a nervous, 
uncomfortable and even self-depreciatory response on the part of the indigenous 
Irish population. Because the advent of ‘newcomer’ groups is a very recent 
phenomenon, we are left unsure as to how we should respond to their arrival. The 
response of Irish educational policy is, as observed above, to retreat into a 
cocoon of neutrality, wherein difference is subjected to a non-confrontational and
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non-problematic discussion. Yet ‘newcomer’ groups are entering a specifically 
Irish society with accompanying values and mores. Instead of adopting a 
somewhat apologetic stance in this regard, we need to be aware that there are 
bound to be positive reasons as to why non-indigenous groups choose to come to 
Ireland in the first place. This requires us to retain pride in our Irish identity, and 
while allowing it to evolve, we need to avoid allowing it to become subordinate 
to competing cultures and value systems. To subdue our national character and 
values may be to subdue the features that rendered us attractive to non- 
indigenous groups in the first place. I have already referred to Miller’s contention 
that minority groups wish to feel an attachment to their new community as well 
as to their place of ethnic origin (Miller, 1995, in Chapter Three).
Such a perspective places the recognition of difference within a broader 
social and political context and thus aligns with Sachs’s vision of social cohesion 
(cf. 6.2 above). It serves as a meeting place for nationalists and multiculturalists 
and, in Bhabha’s (1994) terms, facilitates the process of negotiation rather than 
negation. For Miller, like Habermas, the principle of reciprocity is the key to 
retaining social cohesion in a society composed of different groups:
What must happen in general is that existing national identities 
must be stripped of elements that are repugnant to the self- 
understanding of one or more component groups, while members 
of those groups must themselves be willing to embrace an 
inclusive nationality, and in the process to shed elements of their 
values which are at odds with its principles (Miller, 1995, p. 142, 
original punctuation).
Miller is critical of radical multiculturalism, which he views as having the 
potential to subvert the causes of both minority and majority groups. It overlooks 
the desire for belonging on the part of minorities while placing unrealistic 
demands on the majority groups, in terms of equal respect and treatment. Here 
Miller expresses Taylor’s concerns in more stark language. He challenges the 
notion of equal respect and treatment by the majority “to groups with whom they 
have nothing in common beyond the fact of cohabitation in the same political 
society” (ibid, p. 139). He contends that these concessions should be made on the 
basis of a shared identity and belonging to the same community. This is Miller’s 
notion of citizenship.
Williams (2003, p. 218) is less convinced that the accommodation of 
difference can take place within a framework of shared identity and instead 
argues strongly for such accommodation to be placed within a framework of 
“shared fate”. This concept of citizenship is based upon the premise that “we find 
ourselves in webs of relationships with other human beings that profoundly 
shape our lives, whether or not we consciously choose or voluntarily assent to be 
enmeshed in these webs” (ibid, p. 229). Here, I view Williams as presenting a 
Foucauldian alternative to Miller’s more Hegelian vision. People in “their 
relations, their links, their imbrication” with the other contingencies of life 
(Foucault, 1979, p. 11 in Chapter Two), contingencies which may preclude a 
shared identity, are presented as the basis for a citizenship of shared fate. Yet 
Williams cannot be unequivocally aligned with Foucault. Indeed, ultimately, she 
aligns herself more closely with Habermas and Bauman, as she envisions a 
society in which people “acknowledge their interdependence and choose to live 
with it rather than fight against it” (2003, p. 230). Here, there is a relationship of
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“reciprocal interdependence and interconnection” (ibid, original emphasis). 
Thus, in a society wherein people acknowledge their shared fate, there is an 
intermingling of groups and classes in society, which both Habermas and 
Bauman view as integral to the meaningful accommodation of difference.
6.4 Irish Educational Policy Documents in the Context of
Shared Fate
I believe that the Guidelines for Intercultural Education, and, to a much 
lesser degree, the 1999 curriculum, could be aligned with Williams’s vision of 
citizenship as shared fate. In Williams’s framework, the members of the 
community are not bound to each other by shared values or moral commitments, 
but by relations of interdependence. While cultural identity may be a feature of 
shared fate, it is not the only one. Williams outlines institutional and material 
linkages as other features. In the Guidelines, we are presented with situations 
where shared values and mores are eschewed and instead the children are bound 
together by virtue of their institutional linkage with the school. The issue of 
identity becomes subordinate to other linkages between members of society:
A person can be at the same time, a mother, a Traveller, a 
childcare worker, an artist, a sister, an Irish person, and a fan of 
‘Anyone But Manchester United’. Usually we have something in 
common with members of other groups and should therefore be 
able to relate to and empathise with them (DES, 2005, p. 59).
The activities that are presented in the Guidelines are based upon the 
premise that the children will work together in pursuit of a shared aim. There is a 
focus on citizenship (although as observed in Chapter Five, I am not sure that
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this is sufficient to generate political action), and an effort to create what 
Williams terms “networks of interdependence” (p. 230). Being members of a 
community of shared fate
Entails telling ourselves (true) stories about how we came to be 
connected to particular other human beings, and believing that we 
are responsible for constructing that connection in a manner that is 
justifiable to them. Telling those stories truthfully and 
conscientiously, in a manner that acknowledges others’ 
perspectives on past and future, requires effort and intentionality 
(Williams, 2003, p. 231).
A number of the exemplars in the Guidelines align closely with this 
concept of story. I refer, in particular to Exemplar One: Who is the real 
Pocahontas? (DES, 2005, pp. 48-49); Exemplar Seven: Developing a Charter o f 
Rights (pp. 66-67) Exemplar Eleven: Developing win-win situations (pp. 76-77); 
Exemplar Eighteen: All the Ones They Do Call Lowly (pp. 145-146); Exemplar 
Nineteen: The Troll 's Story (pp. 147-148).
It is more difficult to make the link to citizenship as shared fate in relation 
to the 1999 curriculum although the eschewal of the definition of values and 
mores could again be seen to align more with the notion of shared fate. However, 
the excessive focus on the individual precludes real empathy with any conception 
of citizenship. In addition, the ‘distance from difference’ that has been observed, 
precludes the type of engagement and dialogue envisioned by Williams.
This possible linkage with citizenship as shared fate could be seen (in the 
case of the Guidelines at any rate) as evidence of a philosophical basis in Irish 
educational policy, one that could be incorporated into future documents. This
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will serve to address what Williams terms the “involuntariness of shared 
membership and pluralism” which are “palpable realities” of multicultural 
democracies (p. 236). However, the concept of shared fate is not stated explicitly 
in the Guidelines. We are therefore left in the state of uncertainty and 
inconclusiveness to which I referred at the outset of this chapter.
While Williams’s concept of shared fate may be more acceptable to the 
proponents of difference, it cannot be viewed as an independent entity and thus it 
needs to be aligned with the context in which it is operating -  in this case, Irish 
society. Just as shared identity is a concept of citizenship, so too is shared fate. In 
both instances, a sense of belonging to a particular society is relevant, although 
this is not acknowledged by Williams. In Irish education and in Irish society in 
general, there are a number of impediments to the achievement of this sense of 
belonging, for non-indigenous groups, but also possibly even for the indigenous 
Irish themselves.
6.5 Achieving a Sense of Belonging
Achieving a sense of belonging to Irish society requires action on the part 
of the State as well as on the part of the individual. It is not enough for the 
individual to appropriate some or all of the aspects of being Irish, the result of 
which could be assimilation. Instead, the State needs to be proactive in relation to 
the meaningful accommodation of ‘newcomers’. This requires policy on 
immigration and integration, policy which, as observed by Boucher (2008, in 
Chapter Three), still does not exist. In the absence of a national policy on 
immigration, it is not difficult to understand why the school-based initiative has 
been limited to the production of guidelines.
214
Insufficient consideration has been given to Sachs’s concern (cf. 6.2 
above), namely consideration of what it is that holds us together in a plural 
society. This could be a concept of shared identity; it could be a concept of 
shared fate. Both merit acknowledgement in national and educational policy. 
Both imply the establishment of a set of core values in society. However, the 
excessive concession to the individual that is evident in society in general, and 
reflected in Irish education, has usurped the sense of belonging and the attendant 
sense of duty to society. Indifference to the needs and concerns of others is one 
of the main manifestations of individualism. This severs the bonds of social 
cohesion and undermines the cause of difference.
Reflection on societal bonds will be problematic in a plural society, due 
to different beliefs and value systems. Such reflection requires a critical and, at 
times, a confrontational approach that allows conflict to emerge. In this manner, 
fundamental problems can be identified and discussed and a meaningful 
consensus achieved, thus leading to a sense of belonging. This will not occur in 
the current climate of political correctness wherein constructive dialogue is 
impeded or even silenced through fear of censure. This fear is tangible in many 
written or spoken discussions on difference and limits us to the notion of the 
‘celebration’ of difference and to Bhabha’s (1990) musée imaginaire. Structural 
inequalities have, in Bauman’s (2001, p. 107) words, been recast as “something 
to cherish and obey”, thus obviating the need for resources and support, which is 
an inevitable outcome of problematising difference. Teachers are a specific target 
in this masquerade. Expressions of opposition are quelled before they are uttered, 
through a subtle but tangible threat of censure. I refer again to the examples 
outlined in Chapter Five wherein oppositional reactions and emotions were either
relegated to the ‘past’ (DES, 2005, p. 21) or accorded a cursory 
acknowledgement in relation to the need for future training, such training being 
provided by the school itself and not by the Department of Education and 
Science (ibid, p. 26). The fact that the possibility of opposition is mentioned only 
twice in the entire document is a further indicator of a wish to silence or ignore 
such a possibility. In addition, the suggestion that intercultural education can be 
undertaken with facility (ibid, p. 38) obviates reservations in relation to its 
implementation and consequent demands for resourcing. This is not serving the 
cause of intercultural education, as the most likely outcome is that it is not 
sufficiently taken on board by the school.
We need to reflect on the concept of 'celebrating' difference. Those who 
coined the phrase make explicit the need for ‘celebration’ to be accompanied by 
critical assessment and dialogue and caution against following the route of 
political correctness wherein all difference is cherished (Baker et al., 2004, p. 
35). Yet, I posit that the notion of critical dialogue has been subsequently (and 
perhaps conveniently) overlooked. This serves the interests of neo-liberalism in 
that it obviates the need to address the less attractive aspects of difference. As 
observed in Chapter One, Bauman (2001, p.106) contends that if attention is 
focused on civility and political correctness in encounters with difference of 
mores, it will absolutise the difference and bar all debate about the relative 
virtues and demerits of coexisting forms of life. Bauman contends that there is a 
covert agenda here: that of placing all debate on difference out of bounds “in 
case it is aimed at reconciling the extant differences so that overall standards 
binding human life can be lifted onto a higher (and presumably better) 
level”(ibid). Thus, the champions of political correctness can also be seen as
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champions of the status quo as the suppression of debate acts as an effective 
impediment to change. This approach serves the market forces in that it mirrors 
the “new strategy of detachment, distantiation and non-commitment” (Bauman, 
2001, p. 107) so favoured by the global elite. The achievement of a higher 
standard of living for disenfranchised groups thus becomes sidelined.
6.6 Liberalism: An Inconclusive Concept
It seems to me that much political and educational inactivity is defended 
on the grounds of liberalism. The general theme running through the curriculum 
is that of appropriation rather than prescription. This may seem a far more 
acceptable and more democratic modus operandi as it is based upon the premise 
of choice, and, ostensibly, of empowerment. This gives sustenance to the concept 
of liberty. Yet, a non-interventionist approach based on the right to choose, 
results in the perpetuation of inequalities in society. This formula, according to 
Bauman (2001, pp. 108-109) relates to the abandonment of ‘good society’ 
blueprints and what it leaves unsaid is that
inequality is its own most potent cause, and that representing the 
divisions it spawns as an inalienable aspect of, rather than a 
paramount obstacle to, freedom of choice is one of the principal 
factors in its self-perpetuation.
As I observed above, a claim of liberal politics can be made as a response 
to critique of State inaction. Yet, such a claim can be rendered meaningless due 
to the inconclusiveness that surrounds the definition of liberalism itself. As 
outlined in Chapter One, Taylor (1991) opposed the neutral stance that tends to 
be espoused by liberal politics particularly when confronted with difference. He
217
demonstrated that this laissez-faire approach served neither the cause of social 
cohesion nor that of difference. Boucher (2008, in Chapter Three) concurred with 
the concerns of Taylor and criticised Ireland’s laissez-faire approach to the 
advent of different cultural groups. Bhabha (1990/1994) queried the concept of a 
liberal democracy as an acceptable modus vivendi for a multicultural society. 
Drudy and Lynch (1993) also distanced themselves from the liberal model. Here, 
a neo-Marxist alternative to political organisation was presented in which the 
State became the active rather than the benign protagonist.
While I am critical of the non-interventionist and laissez-faire approach 
of the State in the current Irish liberal context, I am reluctant to adopt a neo- 
Marxist approach as I consider that there is much in the liberal model that can 
meet the needs of a multicultural society. This requires the appellation of ‘a 
liberal democracy’ to be reimbued with meaning and its principles put into 
practice. The significance of being a liberal republic needs to be internalised and 
operationalised by the policy makers. A vision of the common good must be 
maintained with the principle of reciprocity featuring as an essential element in 
such maintenance. Citizenship must assume normative significance.
We are a liberal democracy and we must place our approach to cultural 
difference within this framework in order to maintain the cohesiveness of 
society. Parekh (2006, p. 361) contends, “the liberal society represents a 
rationally defensible way to organize human life, and that is a strong enough 
reason to stand up for it”. He provides “good internal and external reasons” to 
support it. Internal reasons include “the society’s history, cultural and religious 
heritage, traditions, level of economic development and the moral character and 
aspirations of its members”. External reasons comprise “known facts about
human beings, lessons of history, experiences of other societies, and those 
universal values for which compelling reasons can be given”. Parekh advises, 
“these reasons need not convince all human beings; it is enough if they are 
publicly debated, withstand critical scrutiny, and carry conviction with most 
members of a liberal society” (ibid). In my view and in my (limited) analysis of 
Irish educational policy documents, neither the internal nor external reasons 
supporting liberalism have been aired sufficiently. Instead there have been 
extensive avoidance tactics so that the public debate and critical scrutiny 
advocated by Parekh have been suppressed.
For Parekh (2006, p. 362), the explicit recognition of culture is an 
effective means of generating a spirit of reciprocity. He observes that, in this 
scenario, immigrants can “legitimately argue that when they are able to offer 
good reasons for their cultural beliefs and practices, these should be respected 
and suitably accommodated”. In addition, the liberal society can “legitimately 
ask immigrants to respect the prevailing cultural beliefs and practices when good 
reasons are given for them”. This is the type of dialogue that I believe is 
currently absent from political and educational policy on cultural difference in 
Ireland. The configuration of the consultative committee that produced the 1999 
curriculum favoured the majority group in society, while the Guidelines for  
Intercultural Education did not present any account of its consultative 
committee. As the Guidelines were presented as an extension of the curriculum, 
it can be presumed that the configuration of its committee was similar, if not 
identical. In addition, Lodge et al. (2004, p. 4) observe, “there is no place in the 
current partnership model for the inclusion of groups representing the interests of 
minorities...” This undermines the principles of liberalism as outlined by Parekh.
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6.7 The Development of Future Educational Policy on 
Difference
This chapter, and this entire dissertation, have focused on the 
inadequacies and limitations of current educational policy in relation to the 
recognition and meaningful accommodation of difference within the social order 
that is a liberal democracy. This has been undertaken with a view to rendering 
the development of future educational policy a more transparent endeavour, one 
that is more useful and relevant to schools. This requires more clarity in the 
development of the documents and in relation to the role of schools and 
education with regard to future society, particularly a society that will be 
composed of many different cultures. Although this is acknowledged in the 
curriculum (DES, 1999a, p. 7), concerns with the child’s present life as a child 
and as an individual, tend to subsume concerns relating to his/her role as a future 
adult. Walzer (1998, p.48) opines that schools have a double task: First of all of 
providing students with a clear and firm understanding of the substantive values 
and also of the constraints and burdens that make up their common citizenship 
and then to facilitate the growth of the child as an individual through the 
development of their critical capacities. This pertains to all students irrespective 
of background or culture. Rorty (1999, p. 118) endorses Walzer’s vision of 
education. He contends that socialisation has to come before individualisation, 
and education for freedom cannot begin before some constraints are imposed. 
This aligns with Gramsci’s vision of education as outlined in Chapter One. 
Gramsci (1971, p. 33) contends that in the first phase of school, the child needs 
to learn discipline before embarking on the creative phase which expands the
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personality and allows for autonomy but which is predicated upon solid moral 
and social conscience. This is the foundation for the active citizen.
In my opinion, the 1999 curriculum, in particular the SPHE curriculum, 
reversed this process. The expectations of social cohesion were overlooked and 
the excessive focus on individualisation ultimately did little to maintain order or 
to recognise cultural difference. I am aware that the writers were following the 
language of developmental psychology that is adopted by the NCCA and I wish 
to emphasise that I am not in any way criticising the manner in which they 
undertook the task assigned to them. Yet, if I were to suggest a change in the 
SPHE curriculum, it would be to reduce the focus (even visually) on ‘Myself 
and to place more emphasis on the whole aspect of citizenship (cf. Appendix C 
for an overview of the Strands and Strand Units of the SPHE curriculum). The 
2008 review of the Primary School Curriculum (NCCA, 2008, p. 149) outlines 
teachers’ concerns in relation to the difficulty of balancing concern with the self 
with concern for others. According to the review, 39% of respondents referred to 
the children’s ability or inability to relate well to other people as their greatest 
challenge in teaching the strand ‘Myself and Others’. One teacher outlined the 
challenge in helping children to appreciate that others think differently and see 
things from different perspectives. Another mentioned the need to get across to 
children that they must treat others with respect and understand that the world 
does not revolve around them alone. Such responses indicate a need to revise the 
SPHE curriculum so that the preoccupation with ‘Myself is challenged.
While the school needs to have a vision and understanding of its role in 
relation to future society, it needs to exercise caution in terms of taking on all of 
the responsibility in terms of the provision of intercultural education. A
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requirement of 6 flexibility’ is explicit in the 1999 curriculum and implicit in the 
Guidelines for Intercultural Education by virtue of the fact that they are based 
upon an assumption that teachers are ready, willing and able to undertake the 
task of intercultural education without supplementary training and with minimal 
support. However, this serves to exonerate the State from being more proactive 
in the process of accommodation. I reiterate McGorman and Sugrue’s (2007, in 
Chapters Three and Four) observations here: they contend that the dramatic 
demographic shifts witnessed in the past decade or so in Ireland are not merely a 
responsibility for schools. They also have major implications for local authorities 
and central Government. As observed in Chapter Three, this is not yet a political 
issue.
Contrary to the assumption of the readiness and willingness of all 
teachers to embrace and to celebrate the advent of cultural difference, they need 
time to reflect upon and to come to terms with its impact. The Guidelines were 
distributed to all schools independently of any accompanying training. While 
there is a reference to a potential need for training on page 26 of the Guidelines, 
this was not provided and the subtext was that it was up to the teachers 
themselves to locate such training. McGorman and Sugrue’s research indicates 
that many in the field of education viewed the lack of training as
a missed opportunity, to facilitate debate and discussion among 
teachers regarding issues such as identity, citizenship, conceptual 
understandings of interculturalism, and how to give such 
understandings practical embodiment within and beyond school 
communities (McGorman and Sugrue, 2007, p. 16).
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Such training would allow teachers to engage in what Giroux (1994, pp. 328- 
329) terms ‘critical’ or ‘insurgent5 multiculturalism, thus divesting the term of 
the benign and somewhat meaningless connotations accorded to it by Bauman
(2001) and Bhabha (1990/1994). Such an approach to multiculturalism
takes as its starting point the question of what it means for 
educators and cultural workers to treat schools and other public 
sites as border institutions in which teachers, students, and others 
engage in daily acts of cultural translation and negotiation 
(Giroux, 1994, p. 329).
Giroux contends that within this perspective on multiculturalism, 
“pedagogy is removed from its exclusive emphasis on management and is 
defined as a form of political leadership and ethical address” (p. 329). I view 
training in intercultural education as an opportunity to provide teachers with the 
skills in critical pedagogy that are necessary to render intercultural education a 
meaningful political activity. However, such a critical perspective may unsettle 
the status quo and generate calls for societal change that the State may be less 
than willing to take on board.
Training in intercultural education needs to be embedded in the 
preservice education of teachers in order that the student teacher can internalise 
the concept of critical pedagogy and incorporate such pedagogy into his or her 
future teaching. Although colleges of education were not featured in this 
dissertation, the focus that they accord to training in intercultural education 
merits comment here. The colleges occupy a significant role in relation to 
supporting future teachers in relation to implementing intercultural education and 
accommodating cultural difference in the classroom. Development and
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Intercultural Education is now incorporated into the B.Ed course. However, it is 
necessary to reflect upon the context in which the student teachers receive their 
education. All five colleges of education are denominational, with four of them 
being Catholic. Irwin (2005, p. 39) observes the anomaly between this structure 
and the growing diversity within the Irish population. The current profile of the 
majority of teachers in Ireland is white, Irish, and at least nominally Catholic, 
with a proficiency in speaking Irish as well as English. Admissions policies in 
the colleges of education have, to date, done little to change this profile.
While I subscribe to the concept of critical pedagogy as a means of 
facilitating the process of intercultural education, I believe that reflexivity should 
be exercised in relation to the acknowledgement of difference. Exhortations 
towards the recognition of difference, independent of context and of 
acknowledgement of the need to maintain social cohesion, may lead to over­
deference to the issue of difference, to the extent of being fearful of it. This fear 
may lead to the unsettling of the cohesion of the school due to the fact that the 
teachers are uncertain in relation to how to address issues and problems relating 
to cultural difference. This deference to difference can lead to an impasse rather 
than a resolution. Being overly deferential to the extent of being fearful impedes 
critical dialogue as such dialogue implies a certain level of risk-taking. Excessive 
deference to difference leads to an imbalance of power, undermines reciprocity 
and impedes progress. It thus could be seen to add another layer to Derrida’s 
ddfferance. Difference is deferred to while not being sufficiently problematised. 
The non-problematising of difference leads in turn to its meaningful 
accommodation being delayed (or deferred).
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This dissertation undertook an analysis of the writings of a number of 
significant political philosophers in an effort to achieve resolution between the 
issues of social cohesion and difference, specifically cultural difference, in the 
context of Irish education. As was seen, such resolution did not occur. Despite 
this lack of resolution and the lack of realisation of my original objectives, I 
consider that this dissertation has provided me with a far greater insight into, and 
understanding of, political and educational philosophy than I had hitherto. It 
afforded me the opportunity to reflect on the concept of freedom and led me to 
the conclusion that freedom must be constrained in order that social cohesion 
may be preserved. In other words, the ‘good5 must take precedence over the 
‘right’ in order to obviate anarchy or societal implosion. This does not mean that 
I am presenting social cohesion and freedom as binary opposites. In fact, I am 
guarding against what Hegel terms ‘unfreedom’, which is wrought by “the 
violence of a subjugating subjectivity” (Habermas, 1987a, p.33, in Chapter One).
I realise here that I am open to censure by the poststructuralists, in 
particular, Foucault, as I am placing limits upon the individual and upon the 
concept of freedom. Yet, I remain convinced that unconstrained freedom and 
excessive focus on the individual is not the means to a workable society, 
although it may be seen to serve the cause of difference. Nevertheless, Giroux 
(1994, p. 327) cautions against essentialising and granting immunity to groups 
that speak from subordinate positions of power. Excessive focus on 
individualism may result in such essentialisation.
Undoubtedly, I am leaving myself open to the charge of imposing power 
and hegemony upon the more vulnerable groups in society. In relation to power,
6.8 A Final Reflection
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I believe that the concept of reciprocity serves to empower marginalised groups 
and to accord them a voice in society. They are no longer groups that are, at best, 
'celebrated5, but groups that are accorded the rights and responsibilities of 
citizenship. In relation to hegemony, I feel that hegemony of some sort cannot be 
avoided in society, and that we should not allow the charge or, potential charge, 
to deflect our purpose. Thus, like Gramsci (1988, in Chapter One), I believe that 
instead of avoiding a charge of hegemony per se, we should be conscious of the 
type of hegemony to which we succumb. If we allow unconstrained freedom and 
excessive individualism to prevail, we ultimately succumb to the hegemony of 
the market place that thrives in a society of deregulation. This is not to say that I 
am proposing a neo-Marxist solution, just a more concerted State intervention.
While ultimately, I align myself with the Hegelian ideal, this is not to say 
that I am dismissive of the role of the poststructuralists. In the course of this 
dissertation, Foucault and Derrida have taught me about the concept of alterity 
and have provided me with clues in relation to unearthing the power relations 
and struggles within seemingly benign and neutral documents and to exposing 
the potentially cloying effects of an implicit neo-liberal agenda. They have 
helped me to realise we must take account of the singularity and contingency that 
are a significant part of society. Yet, Foucault and Derrida do not provide an 
alternative to the society that they critique. Without such provision, the issue of 
difference is more likely to be confined to superficial recognition without 
meaningful accommodation within a cohesive society. For the latter to be 
achieved, the Hegelian (or neo-Hegelian) perspective must be accorded priority.
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Positive and Negative Aspects of Recent Immigration 
Positive A spects
• Skilled workers from overseas have contributed to easing significant skill 
shortages in public services and the private sector;
• Many workers from overseas have taken jobs that have become 
increasingly less attractive to Irish people;
• The migrant workforce is still at the stage where it is disproportionately 
made up of young employed workers without dependants and, thus, is a 
low user of social services and a source of net contributions to the 
Exchequer;
• A historic debt of justice has been partially repaid as many former Irish 
emigrants, economically in-active, as well as workers, have returned to 
this country;
• The large number of accession state nationals earning at levels currently 
not possible for them in their own countries is an indirect Irish 
contribution to making a success of EU enlargement;
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• Remittances home by the nationals of developing countries have become 
an additional mechanism by which Ireland is aiding international 
development;
• Students from overseas are receiving part of their education in Ireland, 
and in addition, this may provide a basis for later commercial and cultural 
links between Ireland and their home countries;
• Ireland has assumed a share of the developed world’s responsibility to 
provide protection to refugees.
N egative A spects
• Some migrants have been exploited (by recruitment agents, employers, 
landlords, retailers and others) and their vulnerability has brought the 
worst out of some Irish people (racism, overcharging etc.);
• Some types of criminal have been able to take advantage of migrant flows 
and migrant communities (e.g., people trafficking);
• Some public health hazards have become more serious (e.g., HIV 
infection, TB);
• Some migrants live in tightly closed networks and experience little 
contact with the Irish population;
• Many migrants may be employed in jobs significantly beneath their 
capabilities (‘brain waste’) and the longer they are in such jobs the more 
they may be damaging their prospects of progressing to better ones 
(scarring);
• The hours worked by migrants in some sectors (e.g., health and caring 
services, hotels and restaurants) are much longer than the average that 
dual working and/or inferior working conditions can be suspected;
• The character of some neighbourhoods has been abruptly changed by the 
arrival of significant numbers of people from overseas with poor 
command of English and limited opportunities to form bridges with the 
local population;
• Additional demand has been generated on already overstretched public 
infrastructure and services (housing, transport, health care);
• In Ireland, as elsewhere, people seeking asylum exist at a remove from 
Irish society and only limited examples currently exist of social, cultural 
and sporting activities that include them.
(NESC, 2005, p. 133-134).
238
The Principles of the Primary School Curriculum
The 1971 curriculum was based on a philosophy of education that 
incorporated the following five principles:
• the full and harmonious development of the child
• the importance of making due allowance for individual difference
• the importance of activity and discovery methods
• the integrated nature of the curriculum
• the importance of environment-based learning.
The Review Body on the Primary Curriculum endorsed these principles and 
recommended that any future curriculum development should reflect them. 
The Primary School Curriculum affirms the view of the child and the learning 
process implicit in these principles and develops them. The principles of 
the full and harmonious development of the child and of making allowance 
for individual difference are redefined in the broader concepts of
• celebrating the uniqueness of the child
• ensuring the development of the child’s full potential.
The three pedagogical principles dealing with activity and discovery 
methods, an integrated curriculum and environment-based learning are 
subsumed into a wider range of learning principles that help to 
characterise more fully the learning process that the revised curriculum 
envisages. The more important of these are:
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• the child’s sense of wonder and natural curiosity is a primary motivating 
factor in learning
• the child is an active agent in his or her learning
• learning is developmental in nature
• the child’s existing knowledge and experience form the base for learning
• the child’s immediate environment provides the context for learning
• learning should involve guided activity and discovery methods
• language in central in the learning process
• the child should perceive the aesthetic dimension in learning
• social and emotional dimensions are important factors in learning
• learning is most effective when it is integrated
• skills that facilitate the transfer of learning should be fostered
• higher-order thinking and problem-solving skills should be developed
• collaborative learning should feature in the learning process
• the range of individual differences should be taken into account in the 
learning process
• assessment is an integral part of teaching and learning
(Department of Education and Science, 1999a, Primary School Curriculum, 
Introduction, pp. 8-9).
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Appendix C
Overview of content for SPHE
The strands and strand units of the SPHE curriculum
Strand Strand units
Myself
Self-awareness 
Developing self-confidence 
Making decisions
Taking care of my body
Health and well-being* 
Knowing about my body 
Food and nutrition
Crowing and changing
As I grow I change 
New life
Feelings and emotions
Safety and protection
Personal safety 
Safety issues
Making decisions*
Myself and others Myself and my family 
My friends and other 
Relating to others
T h is ( M ustrates how th e  SPH E Myself and the wider world
th e  p rim ary  sc h o o l Th e  stran d s and 
stran d  u n its are  se n fa r a t a l irv e h .
fT h is  SMb-onit is  ap p Scab le  o n ly  from
Developing citizenship
My school community 
Living in the local community 
National. European and wider 
communitiest 
Environmental care
developed m detail in SESE. 
Media education.
SPHE Teacher Guidelines
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Appendix D
Intercultural Education in the Primary School
Figure 2: School Review Checklist
For each question place a tick in the appropriate box The more positive the answers the more intercultural the 
school context is. Negative answers identify opportunities for further development Use them to make a list of 
what you need to do, and try to set achievable deadlines for addressing these issues.
School mission 
or vision
Current practice
Other issues to 
consider
To
some Not 
Yes extent yet
Does the school mission or vision include a focus on 
helping each child towards achieving his or her full 
potential7
Does it reflect the principles of equality and diversity?
Is the school environment, both physical and social, 
inclusive of all cultures?
Is the school complying with the relevant legislation in 
this area?
How have our practices changed in light of cultural diversity in recent years? 
What intercultural issues are staff most concerned with at the moment?
Who should be involved in drawing up a plan for an intercultural school? 
What aspects of school policy and practice need to be addressed?
242
Appendix E
CHAPTER 03 School Planning
Reviewing the school social and physical environment from an intercultural perspective 
Figure 3: School Environment Review Checklist
For each question place a tick in the appropriate box. The more positive the answers the more intercultural the 
school context is. Less positive answers identify opportunities for further development Use them to make a list 
of what you need to do. and try to set achievable deadlines for addressing these issues
Physical
Environment
Are the diverse cultures and ethnic groups of Ireland and 
of the school represented in pictures, multilingual signs, 
and other elements in the school's physical environment?
Are routines in place for welcoming new children, for 
assisting them in becoming part of the school, and for 
ensuring that their culture is affirmed in the environment?
Are there procedures in place for ensuring that the 
capabilities and needs of new children are recognised?
Are school routines and expectations made explicit in a 
way that can be understood by all children?
Are there procedures in place for dealing with racist incidents?
Is there a variety of extra-curricular activities to choose from?
Are special events planned to be as inclusive as possible 
of all the cultures in the school?
Is there recognition given to important festivals and special 
days of all the cultives in the school?
Are members of minority ethnic groups affirmed in a 
positive sense of their identity?
Is the school complying with the relevant legislation in 
this area?
Is there a method for vetting the appropriateness of images 
and messages contained in school texts and other resources?
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